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MICRO-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES 
FOR DUTCH DAIRY FARMING 
STELLINGEN 
1. De genormaliseerde kwadratische iunctie vorm is niet geschürt voor simulatie 
doeleinden, omdat alle veranderingen ten gevolge van een verandering van de 
geselecteerde input-output combinatie in de simulatie worden geabsorbeerd door de 
numeraire. 
DU proefschrifi. 
2. Het systeem van melkquota heeft een belangrijke bijdrage geleverd aan de oplossing 
van het mestprobleem in Nederland doordat het aantal melkkoeien drastisch is 
afgenomen. De veestapel en het mestoverschot zullen nog verder dalen door de 
ingevoerde overschothefFingen op fosfaat en de geplande implementatie van de 
nitraatrichtlijn. 
C. van Bruchem en H. Ruften, 1988. Landbouw-economisch bericht 1988. p. 71. / DU 
proefschrifi. 
3. De Agenda 2000 hervorming heeft op termijn negatieve inkomensgevolgen voor de 
Nederlandse melkveehouderij. Afhankelijk van de prijs binnen het A-quotum, zou het 
inkomen van de boer in een twee prijzen systeem gegarandeerd zijn. Bovendien zou het 
beslag dat een twee prijzen systeem legt op het overheidsbudget lager zijn omdat 
prijssteun, exportsubsidies en inkomenscompensaties lager zijn. 
DU proefschrifi:. 
4. Quotum handel via een nieuw op te richten quotumbeurs leidt niet tot een economisch 
efBcientere handel en heeft geen drakkend effect op de prijzen van melkquota. 
DU proefschrifi. 
5. Het kleine velden beleid voor aardgaswinning druist in tegen het economisch principe 
dat het aardgas eerst daar wordt gewonnen waar dat het goedkoopste kan. Het heeft 
echter wel als resultaat dat Nederland nog steeds relatief goedkoop aardgas kan 
exploiteren. 
6. Being explicit about one's assumptions is the difference between a scientist and a 
politician. 
J.P.C. Kleijnen en W. van Groenendaal, 1992. Simulation - A statistical perspective. 
7. Wie thuis blijft ziet het de hele dag regenen, buiten loopje tussen de buien door. 
John Jansen van Galen, 1997. Wandelingen - Nederland in vier seizoenen. p.53. 
8. Het voltooien van een proefschrift is geen kunst. Je zult het boekje doorgaans niet in 
een museum aantreffen, hoogstens in een vergeten la of stoffige boekenkast. 
9. De uitdrukking 'Oost West thuis best' krijgt een heel nieuwe dimensie wanneer je weer 
bij je ouders gaat inwonen, zeker als je pas getrouwd bent. 
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1999 is voor mij een bijzonder jaar geworden, en dat heeft niks te maken met de overgang 
naar het volgende millennium. Het is het jaar waarin ik met de liefde van mijn leven ben 
getrouwd. Daarnaast heb ik (eindelijk) een punt kunnen zetten achter dit proefschrift, wat 
toch wel een soort fin de siecle gevoel geeft. Het markeert in ieder geval het einde van een 
tijdperk in mijn leven. 
Het mag echter duidelijk zijn dat ik gedurende dit 'tijdperk' veel steun heb gehad 
van anderen. Ten eerste zijn dat natuurlijk mijn collega's bij de Leerstoelgroep Algemene 
Economie en Plattelandsbeleid. Geert Thijssen heeft mij (waarschijnlijk onbewust) tijdens 
mijn afstudeertijd op het ingeslagen onderzoekspad gezet. Arie Oskam, Jack Peerlings en 
Alfons Oude Lansink hebben mij vervolgens verder gestuurd en richting gegeven. Wilbert 
Houweling zorgde dat de juiste computers en software aanwezig waren en kwam altijd met 
praktische oplossingen voor mijn vragen en problemen op computer gebied. Tenslotte, 
kunnen Rien Komen en Coos Gardebroek niet ongenoemd blijven. Met Rien als 
kamergenoot en 'promovendus-in-hetzelfde-schuitje' heb ik alle proefschrift perikelen 
kunnen afreageren en veel gelachen. Coos heeft mij gewezen op een fout in de schattingen, 
die ik over het hoofd heb gezien. 
Ten tweede had ik dit werk niet kunnen doen zonder de uiterst gedetailleerde 
dataset die het LEI-DLO aan de Leerstoelgroep ter beschikking stelt. Ik besef dat we, in 
vergelijking met andere onderzoeksgroepen, bevoorrecht zijn met deze dataset. Ten derde 
heb ik mijn werk kunnen presenteren op verschillende internationale congressen door de 
financiele ondersteuning van het Fonds Landbouw Export Bureau en bood de reisbeurs van 
NWO mij de mogelijkheid om drie maanden in de Verenigde Staten te wonen en werken. 
Spiro Stefanou en andere medewerkers en Studenten van PennState University zijn mij 
daarbij zeer behulpzaam geweest. 
Maroeska Boots 
Wageningen, Oktober 1999 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
Within agriculture, dairy farming is an important industry, with considerable political and 
economic significance in the Netherlands. The importance of an industry is usually 
measured as the contribution of the industry to national (or total agricultural) income, 
employment, balance of trade, land use, and both positive and negative external effects 
(Stolwijk and Veenendaal, 1995). In terms of gross value added and employment, dairy 
farming is the largest agricultural industry in the Netherlands (Peerlings and Komen, 
1998). Milk and related beef production account for almost one-third of total agricultural 
production. About 28 per cent of all agricultural farms in 1998 were dairy farms and a 
majority of these are characterised as highly specialised (LEI-DLO and CBS, 1999 table 
21-a). 
A large part of the Dutch farmland area is used in milk production, determining the 
landscape and the image of agriculture in the Netherlands. In a policy proposal from the 
dairy farmers' organisation the importance of putting cows out to pasture is emphasised 
(LTO Nederland, 1998). Hence, the link between milk production and land, i.e. producing 
fodder at the farm instead of purchasing it, is to be maintained. In addition, nature 
management and nature production by dairy farming and the care for the countryside are 
important issues, also within the European Union (EU) (European Commission DG VI, 
1998). Therefore, the claim on farmland by dairy farms is justified. The positive valuation 
of landscape is an external effect of dairy farming. However, the sector also causes 
negative external effects. Nutrient losses and the emission of ammonia from animal 
manure cause problems. Moreover, the dairy sector is a substantial polluter of the 
environment because of the excessive use of fertiliser (Ministry of Agriculture, 1995). 
Production and income formation in dairy fanning is highly policy driven. In 1995, 
the net producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) of EU dairy farming amounted to 61 per cent or 
189 ECU per thousand kg of milk (OECD, 1996). A support system in the form of border 
protection, intervention buying and export subsidies apply to dairy products in the EU. 
Moreover, production is rationed through milk quotas enforced by a super levy. Recently, 
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the European Commission reached agreement on dairy policy reform, known as Agenda 
2000. The framework of the common market organisation and the quota regime for dairy 
are to be maintained. However, support prices have to decrease and the resulting loss of 
income will be compensated by direct payments (Agra Europe, 1999). Besides the 
European regulations, the dairy sector faces domestic agricultural and environmental 
policies. For example, in the Netherlands, a body of manure regulations have been 
developed to curb manure and nutrient surplus problems (e.g. Ministry of Agriculture, 
1995). In 1998 an accounting system for nutrient flows at the farm has been introduced. 
Hence, the dairy sector is increasingly restricted by environmental and agricultural 
policies. Despite the liberal trade and free market tendencies (e.g. the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and agreements of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)), 
farmers face an augmenting number of regulations, obligations and constraints, which are 
often very detailed in nature and oriented at the farm level. These detailed policies are 
made possible by increased opportunities for individual administration, observation and 
processing of data. For example, Dutch milk quotas are based on farmers' historical 
reference production. Detailed accounts of milk production and quality are kept. Over and 
under quota production and super levy payments are administrated, usually via dairies that 
purchase the milk from farmers. 
In the Netherlands, the most frustrating policy subjects observed by dairy farmers 
were revealed in a study by Frouws et al. (1996). Especially, dairy farmers perceive 
various parts of Dutch manure policy (proposals) as problematic and hard to adjust to. The 
level of manure and ammonia problems often depend on local conditions, such as farm 
location and soil type, but also on farm management. Farmers are not satisfied with general 
solutions and they ask to account for local circumstances and for more freedom to find 
solutions. Besides, due to for example, weather conditions or market fluctuations, they find 
it difficult to produce exactly at the farms' available milk quota. Therefore, more flexibility 
with respect to the regulations (for example, using the average of quota over and under 
production over three years) is requested (Frouws et al., 1996 p.8-18). 
To put it briefly, in choices made at the farm, detailed policies play an important 
role. Farmers constantly face minor and major policy changes, causing farm-specific 
uncertainties and adjustments in production. 
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1.2 Purpose and method 
The main focus area of this thesis is individual behaviour of dairy farmers in response to 
policy changes and the consequences at the aggregate dairy farming level. This thesis aims 
to quantify the effects of specific policy changes on production decisions (e.g. regarding 
the input of animal feed and land) and profit of individual Dutch dairy farms. The micro 
effects, that is, the reaction of individual farmers to policy changes, are emphasised. 
However, results are mainly evaluated at the aggregate level of the whole sector. 
Dairy farmers face a broad range of policies that affect their production. In this 
thesis, first the main policy issues will be identified. The policies analysed focus on three 
areas. The first deals with alternatives for current dairy policy, such as the abolition of the 
quota system. The second policy issue focuses on trade in milk quotas. Finally, manure 
policy in the Netherlands is handled. In these fields policy changes are to be expected or 
recently introduced. 
In order to serve the main purpose, an empirical economic model of the production 
behaviour of dairy farming will be developed and elaborated, which can be applied to 
determine effects of policy changes. It is assumed that farmers react differently on policy 
changes, especially when policies become increasingly farm-specific. Therefore, a micro-
economic approach is used. "A distinctive feature of such models is the close connection 
between economic theory and empirical implementation. Economic theory is often 
formulated in terms of individual decision making units." (Thijssen, 1989 p.viii). The basic 
theoretical assumption is that dairy farmers maximise profits in the short run, while facing 
technical and market restrictions. When farm-level effects of policy changes are 
determined, they can be aggregated in order to resolve the effects for the dairy sector. 
Milk production is relatively easy to model because some fundamental assumptions 
of economic theory are fulfilled. Milk is a homogeneous output, produced by many, and 
mostly specialised, farmers. Dairy farmers are price-takers in the input and output markets. 
The availability of a rich panel data source, provided by LEI-DLO, allows us to identify 
dairy farmers' behaviour at the micro level and check the theoretical assumptions. 
Consequently, the econometric techniques to analyse panel data are used (Judge et al., 
1988). Moreover, the data set provides weight factors in order to upscale the results for 
individual farms to the sector level. 
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The empirical model in this thesis builds on earlier modelling work. Thijssen 
(1992) developed micro-economic models for analysing the determinants of dairy 
production. He compared several assumptions. For example, should we use the primal or 
dual approach and are intercepts treated as fixed or random effects? Apart from milk, dairy 
farming produces other outputs, such as beef and calves. Therefore, the theory on multi-
output production and the joint use of inputs has to be used (Shumway, Pope and Nash, 
1984; Chambers and Just, 1989). Moreover, from an applied economist's point of view, 
dairy farming is an interesting sector to study because milk production is quota 
constrained. Moschini (1988) used an output-constrained profit function for the Canadian 
agricultural sector. Helming, Oskam, and Thijssen (1993) used the theoretical model of 
Moschini to incorporate supply constraints on milk production into their analytical 
framework. Finally, the models developed by Oude Lansink (1997) for Dutch arable 
farming aimed to analyse policy changes at the farm level. 
Following the conclusions of the previous studies, in this thesis the static dual 
approach (Chambers, 1988; Shumway, 1995) is adopted, using a flexible functional form 
specification for the profit function. Micro level demand and supply equations are derived 
and a fixed-effects model is used, which assumes equal functional forms across farmers, 
however with different intercepts. The analysis relies on a strong empirical orientation, 
hence technical details of policy changes should explicitly be incorporated (Oude Lansink 
and Peerlings, 1997). 
The purpose to assess individual farm effects and the choice for a micro-economic 
model demarcate the analysis in this thesis. Implications of policy changes for consumers, 
other agricultural industries and the government are not explicitly determined. Hence, 
conclusions with respect to social welfare effects, overall environmental effects and the 
results for imports and exports (including export subsidies) are not given. Moreover, the 
analysis is restricted to Dutch dairy farming, therefore dairy farming in other countries and 
the effects for the EU budget are not studied. Finally, a typical short-run method is applied. 
As a result, long-ran dynamics, such as the impact of investments or major changes in 
production technologies, are not incorporated here. 
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1.3 Overview 
This thesis consists of seven chapters, starting with this introduction. The chapters have 
originally been written as stand-alone papers, e.g. for submission to journals. Therefore, 
some overlap between the chapters, in particular in data and model description and in 
presenting the estimation results, is inevitable. 
Chapter 2 describes the current policies faced by dairy farms. A distinction is made 
between EU policies, such as the Common Agricultural Policy with respect to dairy and 
the milk quota system, and typical Dutch policies, especially manure policy. Problems with 
respect to current policies are discussed and (expected) policy changes relevant to dairy 
farming are reported. Then, the research topics for the thesis are derived. Hence, the survey 
serves as background for the research and delineates the research questions of the thesis. 
The basic micro-economic model for analysing production and profit of dairy farms that 
are subject to milk quotas is developed in chapter 3. The decisions behind model choices 
are explained and some alternative specifications and estimations are reported. Moreover, 
the data that is used throughout the thesis, as well as estimation results are discussed. 
In chapter 4 the issues of milk quota trade efficiency and resulting quota prices are 
addressed. Although the Dutch quota market is known as fairly liberal, there still exist 
some distortions in quota trade, resulting in efficiency losses for dairy farming. Distortions 
are caused by the minimum and maximum thresholds that can be traded according to the 
regulations. Costs related to transaction services by a middleman or a notary are less 
visible. Both types of trade distortions will be simulated. The effects of alternative EU 
dairy policy changes are assessed in chapter 5. The theoretical model is extended to allow 
for a two-tier milk price system. Further complication is introduced by simulating a two-
tier system in which milk quota trade occurs. Quota abolition and the agreed price cuts for 
dairy products of Agenda 2000 are relatively easy to simulate, because only milk quantities 
or prices are affected. In chapter 6, the core issues are land demand and the introduction of 
phosphate surplus taxes. The model is adapted in order to simulate an imperfect market for 
farmland. Additionally, phosphate surplus taxes per farm are calculated and incorporated 
in the model in such a way that the surplus tax to be paid depends on the amount of 
farmland and the input of livestock. Farmers may avoid paying the tax by adjusting 
livestock or land input. Finally, in chapter 7 the various policy simulations and their effects 
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for dairy farming are discussed. The model is evaluated on its theoretical and practical 
applications and final conclusions are drawn. 
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Chapter 2 POLICY ISSUES FOR THE DAIRY SECTOR 
2.1 Introduction 
Dairy farming faces constantly changing circumstances regarding production techniques, 
policies and relative prices. In this thesis the short-term, policy-driven adjustments in dairy 
production play a central role. Therefore, the basics of policy relevant to dairy farming, as 
well as the issues at stake in this policy, should be clear. Hence, this chapter provides the 
reader with background information regarding dairy policy and it focuses on some topics 
that are currently in discussion. These topics are translated into three research objectives, 
which will subsequently be analysed further in the thesis. The level of detail of the policy 
descriptions in this chapter is determined by the research objectives. 
Since the completion of a single market with common prices for dairy products in 
1968, dairy policy in the Netherlands has been mainly directed by the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU. A major shift in dairy policy came into force in 1984 
with the introduction of milk quotas. There is quite some descriptive-analytic literature 
with respect to the formation and further development of the CAP (European Commission, 
1997b; Tracy, 1997 and 1989; Harris, Swinbank, and Wilkinson, 1983; De Hoogh and 
Silvis, 1994), and the implementation and impact of milk quotas in the EU and the 
Netherlands (Burrell, 1989a; Krijger, 1991; Oskam and Speijers, 1992). More recently, 
further reform of dairy policy was proposed in Agenda 2000 (European Commission, 
1997a; European Commission DG VI, 1998; Tracy, 1997; Agra Europe, 1998) and finally 
agreed in March 1999 (Agra Europe, 1999a). Two of the research objectives of this thesis 
are derived from this branch of literature and focus on the various alternatives for the 
current milk quota system and the efficiency of milk quota trade. In addition, Dutch 
manure policies (Ministry of Agriculture, 1995; Ministry of Agriculture, 1997b) have an 
increasing impact on dairy farming, especially since the introduction of prohibitive taxes 
on nutrient surpluses. Consequently, the third research objective focuses on the effects of 
these taxes. 
The chapter proceeds with a description of EU policy relevant to dairy farming. 
Possible future developments in dairy policy are looked at from an EU perspective. The 
Policy issues for the dairy sector 
next section focuses on milk quota trade, from a mainly Dutch perspective. In addition, an 
overview of relevant Dutch manure policy is given. Each of these descriptions leads to a 
definition of the research topic that will be elaborated in separate chapters in the thesis. 
This chapter ends with a resume and a brief discussion of the basic modelling 
requirements. 
2.2 EU dairy policy 
In this section, the basics of dairy policy in the EU, i.e. market support and the milk quota 
system, are described. Then, the different reasons and options for reforming this policy are 
given. Finally, the research topic for chapter 5 is defined. 
2.2.1 Market support 
In 1968, a full system with common pricing arrangements came into force for dairy in the 
EU (Commission of the European Communities, 1968), with important adjustments made 
in 1992 (1992 CAP reform) and 1995 (GATT). The main establishment of the common 
market organisation for dairy was the introduction of a target price for milk. The target 
price is a purely administrative instrument, which represents the average price that milk 
producers should be able to obtain for milk, containing 3.7 per cent fat, sold to dairies. The 
target price is determined in annual negotiations and applies for the marketing year, which 
runs from the beginning of July to the end of June the following year 1. The target price is 
supported through a system of intervention buying, import tariffs, export subsidies and 
disposal measures. 
Products covered by intervention are butter and skimmed milk powder (SMP). 
Butter represents the fat component of milk, whereas SMP represents the protein 
component. These products account for more milk than other dairy products, they are 
residual outlets for milk and are easily storable. Through purchases of butter and SMP 
offered for intervention, prices of other dairy products are also supported (Harris, 
Swinbank, and Wilkinson, 1983). 
' Until 1996 the marketing year (milk year) ran from April to March. The reference period for milk quotas is 
still running from April to March. 
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Intervention purchases by public intervention agencies provide a floor in the 
market. This floor is set by intervention prices. The intervention price is derived from the 
target price, taking account of manufacturers' margins and yield factors (i.e. the amount of 
milk required to produce 1 kg of butter or SMP). Since 1987, buying-in of butter and SMP 
may be suspended if the quantities offered exceed certain limits. Thus, access to 
intervention is restricted, and the resulting effective support price for butter is only 90 per 
cent of the intervention price. Besides public intervention, aids are given for private 
storage of butter, cream, SMP and certain cheeses in order to balance seasonal variations in 
production. Stocks of butter and SMP have drastically decreased since 1987 (European 
Commission, 1997b). Table 2.1 gives an overview of institutional prices and intervention 
stocks in the EU. 
Table 2.1: Target prices, intervention prices, community stocks and expenditure on dairy. 
1973/74 1977/78 1983/84 1987/88 1993/94 1997/98 
Target price of milk (3.7% fc, gld/100 kg) a 42.08 59.04 74.97 75.23 69.13 68.84 
Intervention price (gld/100 kg)": 
Butter 605.44 785.85 978.13 846.36 743.59 722.93 
SMP 220.16 320.16 409.01 470.31 451.47 452.70 
Community stocks (1000 t) b: 
Butter 294.7 148.4 340.0 1175.0 196.0 
SMP 55.9 884.8 648.0 756.8 30.7 
EAGGF Guarantee expenditure on dairyc: 
Million ECU 1497.0 2545.0 4396.1 5182.3 5211.2 3738.0 
Percentage of total 39.2 41.4 27.6 22.4 15.0 8.9 
* Source: LEI-DLO and CBS, several years, tables 73-a and 73-b. Target prices and intervention prices are 
those that apply during the majority of the production year . b Source: European Commission, several years, 
table 4.20.6.3. 1973 and 1977 EU-9, 1983 and 1987 EU-10, 1993 E U - 1 2 . c Source: European Commission, 
several years. 1973/74=1973 etc. 
In order to protect the EU internal dairy market, trade protection provisions at the 
border are established. When the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement (URA) came into 
force in July 1995, the system of variable import levies and threshold prices (i.e. minimum 
import prices) for certain pilot products was abolished. Variable import levies were 
replaced by fixed tariffs for specified dairy products. Under the GATT URA, existing 
import concessions with third countries were transformed into "current access" quotas 
11 
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with reduced or nil rates of tariffs. In addition, the EU offered "minimum access" import 
quotas with reduced tariffs to foreign importers. The sum of both types of access quota 
should count for the equivalent of 3 per cent of 1986-1988 internal consumption in 1995, 
rising to 5 per cent by the end of 2000 (Tracy, 1997 p.74). In addition, when world prices 
are lower than EU market prices, export subsidies (refunds) are paid to exporters of dairy 
products to enable them to compete on world markets. Export subsidies are also reduced 
under the GATTURA. 
Since the achievement of a single market for dairy products, production surpluses 
have been present. Initially, the common market organisation was suited for ensuring a 
satisfactory income for milk producers, but not for balancing supply and demand for milk 
and dairy products at the same time (Harris, Swinbank and Wilkinson, 1983 p.96). With 
mounting surpluses and related budget costs, the EU sought for measures to increase the 
demand for dairy products and reduce supplies. Special disposal measures for butter and 
SMP are provided for. Butter and butterfat can be sold at reduced prices to the ice cream 
and baking industry and other food processors, to non-profit organisations, the armed 
forces, to recipients of welfare benefits or as concentrated cooking butter. Liquid skimmed 
milk and SMP are used in animal feed and casein production. A school milk programme 
provides for distribution in schools at reduced prices (European Commission, 1997b; 
Tracy, 1997 p.30). 
Until the introduction of the milk quota system in 1984, the most important 
measures aiming to reduce milk supply included conversion schemes, co-responsibility 
levies and a guarantee threshold system. Conversion schemes 2 have been introduced in 
order to stimulate dairy farmers to convert to beef or sheep production or to go out of 
production altogether (Krijger, 1991 p . l l ) . The system of co-responsibility levies forced 
farmers to contribute to the costs of disposing of production surpluses. In 1982 the EU 
established a guarantee threshold system for milk deliveries to dairy processors. The 
threshold was based on milk deliveries in 1981 plus a percentage to account for the growth 
in dairy consumption. Neither the co-responsibility levy nor the guarantee threshold was 
2 Also known as SLOM, which is the Dutch abbreviation for the slaughter and conversion schemes for the 
dairy cow herd. 
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able to re-establish the equilibrium between dairy production and consumption3 (European 
Commission, 1997b; Krijger, 1991; Oskam et al., 1988 p.14). 
2.2.2 Milk quotas 
In order to control milk production and the agricultural budget, quotas on milk deliveries 
were implemented in the EU in April 1984. The milk quota system in the EU is based on a 
number of regulations (after a complete revision in 1992, see Commission of the European 
Communities, 1992 and Commission of the European Communities, 1993), which provide 
a framework for member states to organise their national quota system. Thus, within the 
framework, member states are, to some extent, free to arrange their quota system. 
Therefore, the rules and the effects of the milk quota system differ considerably between 
countries (Krijger, 1991 p.8). 
The quota system provides for a limited quantity of milk to be produced (in 
1995/96, 115 million tonnes for the EU-15). Production in excess of the quota is charged 
with a so-called super /evy^Since 1992/93 the levy is fixed at 115 per cent of the target 
price of milk 4. National guaranteed quantities {reference quantities) for deliveries to dairy 
processors {delivery quota) and for selling milk and dairy products directly to consumers 
{direct sales quota) were shared out 5. Within the national quota it is possible to apply for 
quota exchanges from direct sales to deliveries to dairies. Individual farmers may also 
apply for the temporary or permanent exchange between direct sales quota and delivery 
quota, provided that he owns both types of quota. 
By producing milk with higher fat levels, farmers could raise the price received for 
their milk and circumvent their quota. This resulted in increased milk deliveries and butter 
production and excessive intervention stocks, imposing a further pressure on the EU 
budget. Therefore, differences in the quality of milk (i.e. fat content) are accounted for in 
the regulations. Since 1986 reference quantities for the fat content of the milk deliveries 
are fixed for individual producers. If fat content of milk deliveries deviates from the 
The guarantee threshold system was replaced by the milk quota system in 1984, co-responsibility levies 
were abolished in 1993. 
4 Before 1992, the super levy for direct sales quota was lower than for delivery quota. 
5 Most of the milk produced is delivered to dairies, e.g. in 1994 93.5% of production was delivered to dairies 
in the EU-12. 
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producers' representative fat content in the reference period (1985/86), milk deliveries are 
increased or decreased by 0.18 per cent per 0.1 gram of additional or lower fat per kg of 
milk. 
EU members were given the option of distributing their national quotas either to 
individual producers {formula A) or to purchasers of milk (i.e. dairy processors - formula 
E). In case of over-quota production, depending on the formula chosen, the individual 
farmer or the dairy processor had to pay the levy. Since 1993/94, there is no distinction 
made anymore; the purchasers (dairies) are liable for the levy, which they deduct from the 
price of milk paid to producers who owe the levy. Initially, the levy under formula A was 
lower than under formula B (75 per cent and 100 per cent of the target price of milk 
respectively). From 1987/88 both levies are fixed at the same rate (100 per cent, and since 
1992/93 115 per cent). 
At the end of the first reference year (1984/85) it was decided that, on a national 
basis, under-quota production could be used to offset over-quota production. If formula B 
was applied, this mechanism of equalisation was already possible at the level of the dairy 
processor. The problem with equalisation is that the individual farmer is uncertain about 
his exact amount of quota and the super levy in case of over-quota production, because the 
consequences also depend on the behaviour of other farmers (Oskam et al., 1988). 
Initially, the national guaranteed quantity for most member states was equal to the 
guarantee threshold in 1983/84 (milk deliveries in 1981 plus one per cent). In the first 
quota year, 1984/85, the guaranteed quantity was increased by circa one per cent as a 
transitional provision. Table 2.2 shows that the reference quantities for deliveries to dairies 
in the EU-10 for the milk year 1984/85 were fixed at 99.524 million tonnes. Additionally, a 
Community reserve of 0.393 million tonnes was created6. Direct sale quota was fixed at 
3.761 million tonnes. In subsequent years, quotas were reduced further and voluntary 
6 The Community reserve was created to facilitate the application of the milk quota system in those member 
states where difficulties occurred. The reserve was increased several times in order to take into account the 
social needs of certain member states and also the special situation of certain producers. In 1993 the 
Community reserve was abolished and the quantities divided between the member states. 
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cessation schemes were introduced in order to encourage farmers to discontinue 
production7. 
Table 2.2: EU milk quotas (1000 tonnes). 
Year" Delivery quota Cons, quota Total quota 
Guarantee Suspended' Reserve" Available 
EU SLOM +1% 
1984/85 99524 393 0 0 99917 3761 103678 
1985/86 99079 393 0 0 99472 3334 102806 
1986/87 103989 393 0 0 104382 3824 108206 
1987/88 102096 3778 443 0 0 98761 3531 102292 
1988/89 101059 5396 443 0 0 96106 3520 99625 
1989/90 100209 4518 443 502 1040 97677 3520 101196 
1990/91 100559 4679 443 502 1040 97865 3370 101234 
1991/92 106658 4986 443 600 1040 103755 3126 106881 
1992/93 101672 443 600 1040 103755 3097 106852 
1993/94 106498 2548 109046 
1994/95 107062 1984 109046 
1995/96 115381 2070 117451 
1996/97 115577 1915 117493 
1997/98 115904 1593 117496 
Source: European Commission, 1997b table 12. Source for figures in 1997/98: Agra Focus, 1998c p.47. 
" 1984/85-1990/91: EU-10 (as from 1986/87 incl. Spain), 1991/92-1994/95 EU-12, 1995/96-1997/98 EU-15. 
'' In order to reduce production further, quotas were temporarily suspended by 4% in 1987/88, 5.5% in 
1988/89 and 4.5% in the following three years. Farmers were compensated for this (10 ECU/100 kg in 
1987/88 and 1988/89, 8 ECU in 1989/90, 7 ECU in 1990/91, and 6 ECU in 1991/92). Member states could 
supplement these compensations to a certain limit from their own budget. In 1992/93 the temporary 
suspension became permanent. c The Community reserve was initially allocated to Ireland (303), 
Luxembourg (25) and Northern Ireland (65) and from 1987/88 also to Spain (50). Part of the reserve was 
allocated to SLOM producers in several countries. Additionally, 1% was allocated as a result of the reduced 
temporary suspension from 5.5% to 4.5%. 
In most countries, the distribution of reference quantities to individual producers 
and purchasers of milk was based on historical (1983) deliveries (or purchases) minus a 
necessary reduction in order to achieve the national guaranteed quantity and to create a 
7 Quota reductions in 1987/88 (2%) and 1988/89 (1%) were to be reached by a Community cessation scheme. 
Farmers participating in the cessation scheme received a buy-out premium; 6 ECU/100 kg of milk during 
seven years. Member states could adjust the buy-out premium under certain conditions. 
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national reserve (European Commission, 1997b). After the 1992 CAP reform, quotas are 
based on quantities at the end of the reference year 1992/93. The development of milk 
quotas in the EU is shown in Table 2.2. 
2.2.3 Reasons to reform dairy policy 
It is widely acknowledged that dairy policy in the EU should be revised. Besides the 
increased attention to consumer and social interests, such as food safety, environment, 
natural landscape, animal welfare, and rural development, there are four important reasons 
for policy reform (see also Tracy, 1997 p.96-100). First, imbalances between the 
production and consumption of milk and dairy products and the budgetary constraint of the 
EU make it difficult to maintain current policy. Second, dairy policy should be compatible 
with the WTO (World Trade Organisation) agreements (Agra Europe, 1996). Third, the 
enlargement of the EU with Central- and East European countries (CEECs) somewhere 
after 2000 will put pressure on the milk price and the export budget in the EU. Finally, the 
current milk quota system is often viewed as an obstacle for structural adjustments and 
productivity growth in the EU dairy sector. Support prices are too high in relation to both 
the level of production and the level of productivity. 
Dairy policy has not substantially changed in the decade after the introduction of 
the quota system. However, the implementation of the GATT URA by the EU in 1995 
affected the CAP fundamentally. The most important elements regarding dairy in the URA 
are (Tracy, 1997 p.74): 
• A reduction of export subsidies by 36 per cent, combined with a 21 per cent reduction 
in the volume of subsidised export. For butter and SPM these reductions are compared 
with the reference period 1986-1990, for cheese and other dairy products the period 
1991-1992 applies as reference. Reductions should be made in six annual steps; 
• Tariffication: conversion of variable import levies into fixed tariffs and reduction of the 
average tariff by 36 per cent as compared with the average rate in 1986-1988 (tariff 
equivalent). The 36 per cent reduction applies to each dairy product, except SMP, for 
which the reduction percentage is 20. The reductions have to be realised in six annual 
steps; 
• Current and minimum market access provisions. 
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For dairy products, the EU commitments regarding exports, import tariffs and access 
quotas are shown in Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. For butter and SMP, the export constraints can 
easily be met. As a result of disposing of large parts of the intervention stocks of these 
products, export volumes were substantial in the reference period 1986-1990. The EU-15 
exports of butter and butteroil and SMP have to reduce to 399 and 272 thousand tonnes 
respectively. However, total exports of butter and SMP in 1994 were 154 and 138 thousand 
tonnes (European Commission, 1996). Hence, the URA effectively allows the EU to 
increase subsidised exports of butter and SMP (Swinbank, 1996). Despite the use of the 
favourable reference period 1991-1992 for cheese, export volumes of cheese still have to 
decline substantially (Swinbank, 1996). 
Table 2.3: EU import tariff rates. 
Reference price (ECU/t.) Import tariff (ECU/t.) Reduction (%) 
External Internal Base (tariff equivalent) Final after six years Over six years 
Butter 943 3905 2962 1896 36 
SMP 685 2170 1485 1188 20 
Source: Tracy, 1997 table 6.3. 
Table 2.4: Current and minimum access quotas for the EU-15. 
Current access quota (tonnes) 
Beneficiary country Quantity 
Minimum access quota (tonnes) 
Initial quantity Final quantity 
Butter New Zealand 76667 0 10000 
Skimmed milk powder - - 40401 68000 
Cheese for processing Australia, New Zealand 4500 -
Cheddar cheese Australia, Canada, New Zealand 14250 -
Cheese and curd - - 15273 83400 
Source: Tracy, 1997 tables 6.4 and 6.5. 
While the effects of the URA for dairy products are not severe in the short run, in 
the longer run the commitments may cause serious problems for the EU. In future WTO-
agreements it is likely that the new path of tariffication and reductions in subsidised 
exports and export subsidies will be continued. Moreover, the problems related to GATT 
and WTO commitments become more serious with the future enlargement of the EU. 
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Table 2.5: Initial and final commitments regarding subsidised exports in the EU-15. 
Limits on export subsidy expenditures Export quantity limits 
(million ECU) ( 1000 tonnes) 
Base 1995 2000 Reduction Base 1995 2000 Reduction 
Butter and butteroil 1481.0 1392.1 947.8 -36% 505.5 487.8 399.3 -21% 
SMP 430.9 406.2 275.8 -36% 344.9 335.0 272.5 -21% 
Cheese 533.9 594.1 341.7 -36% 406.7 426.5 321.3 -21% 
Other milk products 1090.1 1024.7 697.7 -36% 1212.8 1185.4 958.1 -21% 
Source: European Commission, 1997b table 10. 
In 1998 negotiations started between the EU and several CEECs to facilitate the 
integration of the CEECs into the common market organisation. Although enlargement 
would mean new market opportunities and trade expansion for EU businesses, there are 
quite some problems expected if the existing CAP regulations are applied to the acceding 
countries. The main difficulties arise from the difference in agricultural prices between the 
EU and CEECs; dairy prices in the CEECs are significantly lower9. The increasing 
production capacity, especially at high support prices, will boost dairy surpluses. EU 
budget costs of market support (support prices, border protection, intervention, quotas, 
direct payments etc.) would increase and keeping within the WTO constraints would 
become difficult. 
Because dairy market support applies to the constrained production allowances 
(quotas), the high support prices have been incorporated into the value of milk quotas and 
other fixed assets, such as farmland. It allows some smaller, less efficient farmers to 
remain in the sector (delay of exit) and creates an entry barrier for new farmers. Producers 
wishing to increase their quota and young entrants face problems with respect to acquiring 
finance to buy (additional) quota. Therefore, the competitiveness of the sector and 
structural change towards larger and more efficient farms are obstructed. 
The first group of candidates for future membership of the EU comprise of Poland, Slovenia, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Estonia, and Cyprus. The other countries involved are Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Slovakia, and Bulgaria. 
9 For example, compare the differences in PSE for milk between the EU and some CEECs in 1997: EU 54%, 
Poland 9%, Czech Republic 28%, Hungary 30% (Agra Focus, 1998b p.34). 
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2.2.4 Options for dairy policy reform 
Within the EU, alternative systems, which combine lower support prices and more 
flexibility for the farmer regarding the production level, are examined. The discussion 
focuses on how farm prices should be brought in line with world market levels, whether 
and how farmers should be compensated for price reductions, and to what extent quota 
levels should be adjusted (European Commission, 1997a; Agra Europe, 1996). 
A two-tier price system is one of the options (with advocates particularly in France 
and Denmark). Similar to the sugar regime, in a two-tier milk price system, A-milk is 
produced within the market support measures and farmers are allowed to produce 
additional B-milk at the lower world market price. The advantage of the two-tier system is 
that it would enable to export without export subsidies, a prerequisite given the GATT 
URA, while maintaining a high level of support for dairy farmers. However, there are high 
monitoring and administration costs involved (Agra Europe, 1996) and it is questionable if 
the WTO would accept the two-tier price system because it could be considered as unfair 
competition. Price support to A-milk increases the overall (A- and B-milk) average 
revenue of milk production (cross-subsidisation). Therefore, a two-tier system would lead 
to increasing exports to the world market and could offset the export reductions agreed in 
the GATT URA. 
A radical option to reform focuses on the immediate elimination of milk quotas 
facilitated by a substantial price reduction to near world market levels (supported by 
Denmark. Sweden and the UK, see Agra Focus, 1998a p.7). Reducing prices gradually will 
also permit quotas to be phased out. Farmers could then be compensated for their income 
losses by direct payments, incurring increased budgetary expenditure (Tracy, 1997 p.99). 
However, it is questionable if the value of the quota assets, which is substantial in some 
countries, should also be compensated. Moreover, financial positions of dairy farmers 
reduce considerably because quotas are often used as collateral. 
The European Commission's options for dairy policy reform are reflected in 
Agenda 2000. published in 1997, with adjustments made in 1998 (European Commission 
DG VI. 1998) and finally agreed in March 1999 (Agra Europe, 1999a). In the view of the 
Commission, extreme measures (e.g. quota abolition or drastic price cuts) are not 
necessary because severe market imbalances are not expected for dairy products in the near 
future. Furthermore, the Commission rejects the two-tier system because of the 
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disadvantages mentioned above. Hence, the framework of the common market 
organisation and the quota regime for dairy are to be maintained. 
The latest reform agreement includes a 15 per cent cut in the intervention prices for 
butter and SMP over the period 2005/06-2007/08 in order to improve competitiveness of 
EU dairy farming 1 0. As a result, the possibilities to sell milk and dairy products are 
broadened. Therefore, a 2.4 per cent increase in total EU milk quotas until 2007/08 is 
assumed to be justified. A compensation for the price decrease is given on a flat rate basis 
per tonne of quota held in the previous year. The compensating premium is divided into a 
statutory EU element of 17.24 euro per tonne (from 2007 onwards) and a national element 
of 7.63 euro per tonne (from 2008 onwards) 1 1. The latter element allows member states to 
allocate part of the premium as they see fit (not necessarily per tonne, but e.g. per hectare). 
CAP aid payments can therefore be better targeted e.g. to extensive producers or 
disadvantaged areas. 
It is questionable if the Agenda 2000 agreement meets the needs of the new trade 
round. The elimination of export subsidies is not ensured and compensatory payments are 
not production-neutral. Therefore, the Agenda 2000 agreement is not WTO-compatible. 
Tracy emphasises that provisions for gradually phasing-out the compensatory payments 
and putting limits per farm on these payments are lacking. Moreover, the enlargement 
issues are not explicitly considered (Tracy, 1997 p. 103; Agra Europe, 1999b). Another 
point of critique focuses on the price reductions, which are claimed not to be large enough. 
If the EU have to open its markets further in the next WTO-round (more import, less 
export) and if EU prices are better than world market prices, the EU market will be flooded 
with dairy imports. Price cuts of 25 (Boerderij, 1998) and 30 (Agra Focus, 1998a p.7) per 
cent have been discussed. 
1 0 The price reduction is greater than earlier announced (10 per cent reduction), because milk producers will 
benefit from the maintenance of the subsidy for silage cereals and EU milk quotas will increase by 2.4 per 
cent. The reduction in prices has to be established in three equal steps of 5 per cent each year. 
'' The development of the Dutch average compensation in euro/tonne is as follows: 
2005 2006 2007 2008 
Premium: 
EU element 5.75 11.49 17.24 17.24 
National element 1.92 3.82 5.74 7.63 
The national element for the Netherlands is calculated by taking the countries' total envelope and dividing it 
by the milk quota in 1998/99 plus the 1.5 per cent quota increase (Agra Europe, 1999a p.EP/7). 
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2.2.5 Research topic 
Because the Agenda 2000 agreement is just recently issued, detailed analysis of their 
effects are not available. Therefore, in this thesis, the effects of the agreement of the 
European Commission for dairy farms will be analysed. The two-tier system and quota 
abolition continuously return in debates on dairy policy reform, and have therefore been 
subject of study before. 
Oskam et al. (1988) compared a number of alternatives for the milk quota system in 
the EU. One of the alternatives was abolition of quota combined with a milk price 
reduction. Another dealt with a two-tier quota system in which producers received a higher 
(supplemented) price for 80 per cent of the quota level at that time. For the other 20 per 
cent farmers received a lower (levied) price. The effects of the alternatives were 
determined for the aggregate level for the period 1988-1997. Quota abolition resulted in 
increased milk production of almost 19 per cent over the analysed period (23 per cent 
higher than with quotas), while dairy farming income would be 30 per cent lower (Oskam 
et al., 1988 p.90). In a linear programming approach, Berentsen, Giesen and Renkema 
(1997) assessed the effects of a two price system for a typically Dutch dairy farm. A 
theoretical and empirical analysis of the European quota regime for sugar is conducted by 
Bureau et al. (1997). The sugar quota regime is a three-tier system, with differentiated 
supported prices for A- and B-quota. For C-sugar producers receive the world market 
price. Especially, the welfare gains of introducing quota mobility across borders of EU 
member states are incorporated in their analysis. 
Despite these investigations, the effects of a two-tier system and abolishing quotas, 
for individual Dutch dairy farms are unknown. These effects, together with those of the 
latest dairy reform agreement are determined in chapter 5. In contrast to the aggregate 
analysis of Oskam et al. (1988) and the mathematical programming analysis of a specific 
farm of Berentsen, Giesen and Renkema (1997), in this thesis we use a micro-econometric 
approach like Bureau et al. (1997) (although they empirically applied it to the regional 
level). Individual farm response to a two-tier system and to different world market prices 
of milk can be analysed and the interaction (e.g. quota trade) between farmers is explicitly 
taken into account. Where Bureau et al. (1997) applied their analytical framework to the 
existing sugar quota system, in this thesis it is applied to a hypothetical two-tier milk quota 
system. 
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2.3 Milk quota trade 
In this section, a brief report of the Dutch milk quota regulations is given and the general 
regulations regarding quota trade and the interpretation thereof by the Netherlands are 
described. Then, the situation on the Dutch quota market and some policy issues regarding 
quota trade are described. Finally, the research topic, which will be elaborated in chapter 4, 
is defined. 
2.3.1 Quota transfer regulations 
The Dutch regulations with respect to the milk quota scheme and quota transfers are based 
in the 'Regeling Superheffing 1993' (Productschap voor Zuivel, 1998). Initially, quotas 
were distributed to individual producers (formula A). From 1988/89, quotas were 
distributed to dairy processors (formula B). In 1984/85 the guaranteed quantity of milk 
deliveries to dairy processors was equal to 12052 thousand tonnes. The guaranteed 
quantity for direct sale for consumption was 145 thousand tonnes (Krijger, 1991). In 
1985/86, the Netherlands used the provision to exchange an amount of 50 thousand tonnes 
permanently from direct sales to delivery quota. Permanent and temporary exchanges 
between both types of quota have occurred frequently in the Netherlands. 
Table 2.6 shows the development of delivery quotas in the Netherlands. In the 
initial four quota years there was an over allocation of quotas to the producers, which was 
mainly the result of additional quota allotments to farmers in specific situations (e.g. 
farmers who invested a lot just before milk quotas were introduced). With the introduction 
of the B formula in 1988/89 and the related quota reduction (see Table 2.7) the over 
allocation disappeared. The over-quota delivery in the beginning is reversed since 1987/88. 
This is the result of the higher super levy (100 per cent instead of 75 per cent), the quota 
reduction of 6 per cent and the tightened regulations with respect to the fat content of 
deliveries (Krijger, 1991 p.54). However, each year, milk deliveries corrected for the fat 
content of the milk remain higher than the national quota, causing a liability for the 
Netherlands to pay super levy. 
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Table 2.6: Development of Dutch delivery quota (1000 tonnes and percentage of available 
quantity). 
Year Available Allotted quantity Milk deliveries Milk deliveries corrected 
quantity" for fat content 
lOOOt lOOOt % 10001 % 1000 t % 
1983 11929 - - - - - -
1984/85 12053 12173 101.0 12195 101.2 na. na. 
1985/86 11984 12158 101.5 12258 102.3 na. na. 
1986/87 11986 12177 101.6 12180 101.6 12267 102.3 
1987/88 11266 11397 101.2 11223 99.6 11398 101.2 
1988/89 10964 10942 99.8 11030 100.6 11213 102.3 
1989/90 11124 11104 99.8 10921 98.2 11215 100.8 
1990/91 11127 11112 99.9 10846 97.5 11208 100.7 
1991/92 10882 10871 99.9 10542 96.9 10928 100.4 
1992/93 11003 10996 99.9 10675 97.0 11070 100.6 
1993/94 10983 10908 99.3 10579 96.3 11011 100.3 
1994/95 10982 10960 99.8 10658 97.0 11032 100.5 
1995/96 10986 10970 99.9 10749 97.8 11080 100.9 
1996/97 10988 10977 100.0 10706 97.4 11070 100.7 
1997/98 10989 10980 99.9 10697 97.3 11024 100.3 
Source: LEI-DLO and CBS, several years, table 53-b. " National available quantity, including reductions, 
suspensions, addition to community reserve, SLOM provisions and exchange between delivery and direct 
sales quota, na. = not available. 
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Table 2.7: General quota reductions (percentage of quota in previous year and cumulative 
percentage of deliveries in 1983) at the Dutch farm level. 
Year Quota reductions" Cumulative 
quota reductions 
% Remarks % 
1984/85 8.65 6.6% to achieve the national reference quantity; 2.05% to create 
national reserve. 
8.65 
1985/86 1.00 Expired transitional provision for the first quota year. 9.56 
1986/87 - - 9.56 
1987/88 6.00 2% permanent EU reduction; 4% temporary EU suspension. 14.99 
1988/89 3.95 1% permanent EU reduction; 1.5% temporary EU suspention;1.45% 
national reduction to offset the over allocation in previous years. It 
was no longer possible to equalise the over allocation with the total 
under-quota production at the farm level, because of the shift to the B 
formula. 
18.35 
1989/90 -1.09 From the Community reserve; 1% (neutral) shift from temporary 
suspension to permanent reduction. 
17.46 
1990/91 - - 17.46 
1991/92 2.39 2.16% reduction in order to increase the Community reserve; 0.23% 
national reduction. 
19.43 
1992/93 -1.10 Temporary quota increase, because of 4 extra days (4/365=1.1 %) as a 
result of a system-switch from 52 weeks to 12 months. 
18.54 
1993/94 0.82 Because of the 12 months-system, there is one extra day 
(1/364=0.27%), hence, the quota increase in 1993/94 compared with 
1991/92 is 0.27%. The temporary 1.1% increase from 1992/93 lapsed, 
therefore quota decrease with a factor 0.9918 (=1.0027/1.011 ) in 
1993/94 compared with the previous quota year, which is 0.82%. An 
additional EU quota increase of 0.6% was added to the national 
reserve in the Netherlands. 
19.21 
1994/95 -0.53 From national reserve. 18.78 
1995/96 - - 18.78 
1996/97 - - 18.78 
1997/98 - - 18.78 
Sources: Krijger, 1991, table 2.2.; Productschap voor Zuivel, several years. * Negative percentages indicate 
quota increases. Individual reductions and increases are not included here. 
In the first quota year, about 54500 producers (Krijger, 1991 p.48) received quotas 
according to their deliveries in 1983 minus 8.65 per cent. A reduction of 6.6 per cent of 
1983 deliveries was necessary to achieve the guaranteed quantity and an additional 2.05 
per cent was used to create a national reserve. Table 2.7 shows that, in subsequent years, 
quotas have been reduced, and occasionally increased, several times for different reasons. 
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One of the most discussed subjects regarding the milk quota system is quota 
transferability. Should quota trade be possible, and if so, how should it be organised? From 
an economic point of view, the possibility to transfer quotas is important in the allocation 
of milk quota to the most efficient producers (Cox, 1987). However, from a political or 
social point of view, (free) quota trade might be undesirable. For example, if quotas and 
dairy farming disappear from certain regions, leaving an "empty" country side. 
Oskam and Speijers (1992) distinguish three types of quota transfers: i) sales of 
quota i.e. permanent transfers of ownership rights, ii) lease of quota i.e. temporary transfer 
of user rights, and iii) administrative redistribution of quotas. In order to decrease the 
rigidity on production structure imposed by the quota system, the EU has allowed the 
transfer of quotas within national borders 1 2. Member states are free to implement quota 
trade rules at their own discretion. National differences regarding quota trade are therefore 
substantial (see Table 2.8). For example, in France, the government administratively 
redistributes quotas that are released from farms that cease production, whereas in the UK 
and the Netherlands a relatively liberal market for quotas exists (van Dijk, 1995). 
Moreover, quota trade rules have changed continuously since the introduction of the quota 
scheme. 
In general, milk quotas are attached to the land and cannot be freely traded 1 3. If the 
whole farm is being transferred, reference quantities are transferred to the new owner. If 
only part of the farm is being transferred, an amount of quotas proportional to the number 
of hectares (or another objective criteria) used in milk production will be transferred. The 
latter rule is widely used by farmers (especially in the UK and the Netherlands) to transfer 
quota permanently via a temporary lease of land, thus circumventing the link between 
quota and land. In the Netherlands, a maximum of twenty thousand kg per hectare can be 
transferred and a minimum of twenty thousand kg has to be transferred per transaction 
(with exceptions possible). Land transferred with quota must be used for milk production 
1 2 In some member states, e.g. the UK and Germany, quota transfer is only allowed within specified regions. 
From 1993, regional quota transfer boundaries are abolished in the UK. 
b Tying quota to land had to prevent i) the concentration of milk production in a few regions and on a smaller 
area, and ii) quota from becoming an object of investment, which would bring about uncertainty for farmers 
(Oskam and Speijers, 1992; van Dijk, 1995). 
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at least one year before and one year after the transaction. Thus, milk quota transfers are 
tied to land, although in practice only for at least one year. 
In 1987/88, member states were given the option of introducing one-year leasing of 
quotas, following the practices in the UK where quota leasing became possible in 1986. 
This was to meet demands for a more flexible quota trade system. Leasing is used as a 
management tool to absorb expected over-quota production. In addition, if quotas are tied 
to land, leasing increases quota mobility 1 4 and lowers the financial barriers to transfer 
(Oskam and Speijers, 1992). Lease is limited to one-year contracts, which have to be 
concluded before a (by member states) specified date before 31 December 1 5 of the 
effective reference period. Leasing of quotas has been permitted since 1989/90 in the 
Netherlands 1 6. A lease contract has to deal with at least ten thousand kg of milk 
(exceptions possible). A maximum lease-in of 75 thousand kg per farm applies per 
reference year. Moreover, in order to prevent speculation, a farmer cannot take quota on 
lease and put quota out to lease in the same period. 
Quotas accompanying the transfer of small amounts of land may be added to the 
national reserve. It is also optional to add a part of every transfer to the national reserve by 
introducing a siphon or deduction percentage on each quota transfer. In accordance with 
the policy of restructuring milk production, the government may buy quotas from farmers 
who withdraw from milk production (cessation scheme). These amounts of milk will then 
be added to the national reserve. The national reserve is used to administratively 
redistribute quotas to remaining and new farmers who follow specified requirements, e.g. 
farmers in less-developed regions, small farmers and new entrants. Implemented cessation 
and restructuring schemes have had varying successes in member states. It depended 
mainly on the presence of a quota market and prices paid on the market, but also on 
relative profitability of milk production and alternatives for outgoing producers. 
1 4 In general quota lease is separated from the lease of land, except in Denmark, where quota lease is linked 
to land. 
1 5 This date applies for all quota transfers in the Netherlands since 1994. 
1 6 At first, lease was only allowed between farmers who delivered to the same dairy, in 1993 this restriction 
was abolished. 
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Table 2.8: Overview of the main quota transfer regulations in different EU member states in 1995. 
Belgium Denmark France Germany Netherlands UK 
Sale Max. 20000 kg/ha. 
Max. distance 30 
km. Only within the 
region. 
Strictly linked to 
land and producer. 
Max. 10000 kg/ha. 
Max. distance 10 
km. 
Strictly linked to 
land. Quota is not 
supposed to have 
any value, though 
land with quota is 
more expensive than 
land without quota. 
Max. 12000 kg/ha. 
Since 1993 no link 
to land for transfers 
within Landesbezirk. 
Max. 20000 kg/ha, 
though circumvented 
by one-year lease of 
land. 
Linked to land, 
though 
circumvented. 
Lease Max. 60000 kg/year. 
Max. distance 30 
km. Only within the 
region. Leasing out 
is limited to twice in 
a lifetime. 
Linked to land. Max. 
distance 25 km. 
No Since 1990/91. Since 1989/90. Max. 
75000 kg/year. Min. 
per contract 10000 
kg. 
Since 1986. Only 
between farmers 
supplying the same 
dairy. 
Siphon 10% if quota of 
purchaser stays 
below 520000 1, 
90% if this limit or 
max. distance is 
exceeded. 
1989-1992: 33% of 
all transfers (incl. 
lease) 
No Since 1990/91: 30% 
if quota of purchaser 
exceeds 350000 kg 
No No 
Cessation scheme Varying successes Success is declining Successful Varying successes Not successful Not successful 
Source: van Dijk, 1995. 
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The cessation schemes were not successful in the Netherlands, because prices paid 
in the quota market were higher and milk production in general was (and still is) more 
profitable than alternative agricultural businesses. About 2.1 per cent of the total reference 
quantity in 1984/85 was released in the period 1984/85 to 1988/89 via both national and 
Community cessation schemes (Dillen and Tollens, 1990; Krijger, 1991). 
2.3.2 Quota values and activities in the quota market 
The mere introduction of the milk quota system caused milk quotas to acquire value for 
producers, although some countries (i.e. France and Denmark) have forcefully tried to 
repress quota prices. Theoretically, the maximum quota price equals the capitalised super 
levy, whereas the levy rate equals the maximum lease price (Oskam and Speijers, 1992). 
Since the super levy is higher than the milk price, the theoretical maximum quota price is 
determined by the milk price. The theoretical minimum quota price is equal to the 
compensation that can be received by taking part in the cessation scheme of the 
government (De Boer and Krijger, 1989). In general, marginal cost and revenue of milk 
production determine quota prices. Costs are mainly affected by feed prices, while 
revenues are affected by the milk price (Oskam and Speijers, 1992). Additionally, 
institutional arrangements, such as tax regulations (e.g. provisions for the depreciation of 
quota expenditures) and quota transfer regulations (e.g. limits on the transferred quantities) 
affect quota prices. In this respect, the economic consequences can be quite different from 
one member state to another. 
Relative quota values (i.e. efficiency of production) between farmers determine the 
decision to purchase quota. However, capital constraints faced by milk producers, 
imperfections in credit markets, the level of risk aversion and growth dynamics of the 
family business (e.g. the availability of family labour or a successor) also affect the 
purchase decision (Burrell, 1989b). 
In the Netherlands, a market in milk quotas soon developed after the introduction of 
the quota regime. Table 2.9 shows the transferred quantities and the average prices of milk 
quota transfers. During the first years it was only possible to obtain additional quota via 
permanent land transfers. The quantity of quota transferred with land increased from about 
0.4 per cent of the national reference quantity in 1984/85 to 5.4 per cent in 1997/98. There 
was a heavy demand for quotas, so quota prices increased rapidly. Important reasons for 
28 
Chapter 2 
the increased quota values in the first years are: a) the reduced prices for feedstuff and the 
increased yields per cow, b) the quota reductions, causing an over-capacity of farm 
buildings and land, c) farmers got used to the quota system and assumed it would continue 
to exist for the time being, and d) the reduced interest rate (van Bruchem and Rutten, 
1988). Essentially, the high quota values indicate the economic well being of the Dutch 
dairy sector (van Bruchem and Rutten, 1988). 
Table 2.9: Milk quota transfers and quota prices in the Netherlands. 
Number Total quota Quota Quota Purcha- Average Purcha- Quota Lease 
of quota of quota transferred transferred sing fat sing price leased* price d 
holders" held" with whole with land • b content' 
farm" (excl. whole price 
farm)" 
tonnes tonnes tonnes gldVkg, % gld/kg, real tonnes gld/kg 
l%fat 
fat content 
1984/85 54500 na. 47713 - 4.13 - - -
1985/86 na. na. 88650 - 4.17 - - -
1986/87 na. na. 179031 0.26 4.27 1.11 - -
1987/88 49000 na. 256989 0.48 4.31 2.07 - -
1988/89 na. na. 367796 0.72 4.30 3.10 - -
1989/90 47097 11188575 na. 0.86 4.32 3.72 124871 0.38 
1990/91 46506 11194135 na. na. 1.07 4.37 4.68 210570 0.41 
1991/92 46120 10970523 na. na. 1.10 4.43 4.87 297546 0.40 
1992/93 45083 11092024 253770 270982 1.12 4.41 4.94 401950 0.40 
1993/94 43928 11000691 263675 231882 1.11 4.46 4.95 473727 na. 
1994/95 42205 11052891 341600 254331 0.94 4.43 4.16 577607 na. 
1995/96 41008 11057242 267945 259172 0.90 4.40 3.96 577455 0.36 
1996/97 39865 11063164 302018 282046 0.87 4.44 3.86 600608 0.45 
1997/98 38558 11065622 284998 309637 0.83 (4.41) 3.66 619740 0.35 
a Source: COS statistics, several years. Figures for 1984/85 to 1988/89 are from Krijger, 1991 p.48 and p.43. 
na. is not available. b Source: Hoekman, 1998. Prices are averages over the calendar year, so 1986/87=1986 
etc. c Source: LEI-DLO, several years. Also for the calendar year. Sources: 1989/90 to 1992/93 van 
Zwambagt (1992); 1995/96 Loman, 1995 p.35; 1996/97 Hoekman, 1996 p.67; 1997/98 Siemes, 1997 p.71. 
Lease prices are estimated averages for the calendar year, i.e. 1997/98=1997 etc. 
Table 2.9 also shows that fewer quota holders own more or less the same amount of 
total quota each year, indicating that Dutch dairy farms are becoming larger. Most of the 
quota sold comes from small and medium sized farms that cease milk production. Table 
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2.10 gives an indication of the size of the farms that trade quota in 1997/98. Almost 60 per 
cent of the quota that was sold with land (not the whole farm) originates from farms with 
up to 300 thousand kg of quota. About 40 per cent of the quota selling farms have quota 
holdings smaller than 100 thousand kg. Quota is often purchased by larger and specialised 
dairy farms; farms in the size class 200-750 thousand kg quota buy about 60 per cent of 
quota transferred with land. Purchases per quota buyer amount to 39 thousand kg on 
average, while an average of 106 thousand kg is sold. When the whole farm is involved in 
the quota transfer, the averages are much higher; 323 thousand kg for purchases and 312 
thousand kg for sales. 
The introduction of leasing gave an additional impulse to the development of the 
quota market. At the start, leasing seemed to oust quota transfers with land, because the 
latter amount decreased substantially in 1989/90. Thereafter however the amount of quotas 
transferred with land stabilised more or less and then increased again (van Bruchem, 1992 
p.81). The quantity of milk quota leases increased from 1.1 per cent of the total reference 
quantity owned by quota holders in 1989/90 to 5.6 per cent of total quota in 1997/98. The 
jump in quota transfers in 1994/95 is mainly the result of extending the period in which 
contracts should be closed. For permanent quota transfers the closing date was changed 
from 31 October to 31 December, for lease contracts from 31 July to 31 December. 
Usually, the demand for quota and quota prices rise at the end of the calendar year because 
contracts have to be established then in order to be effective for the running reference year. 
Note that the number of quota holders is not the same as the number of dairy farms. 
Two or more quota holders may represent one dairy farm, for example, a partnership of 
father and son. At the start of the quota regime, there were more dairy farms than there 
were quota holders, because some farms were not awarded milk quotas. At the moment 
there are more quota holders, because quota holders may lease-out quota while they are not 
registered as dairy farms. There is a remarkable number of quota holders who own just a 
small amount of quota, indicating that these quota holders see their quota as a valuable 
asset (van Bruchem and Terluin, 1994 p. 105). Table 2.10 shows that 43 per cent of the 
lessors own less than 100 thousand kg of quota, and most of them lease-out their entire 
quota. About 80 per cent of the quantity of temporarily transferred quotas originates from 
farms with less than 300 thousand kg of quota and is leased-in by farms with 100-500 
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thousand kg. On average, lessors lease-out 73 thousand kg, while lessees lease-in 40 
thousand kg. 
Apart from the buyers/lessees and sellers/lessors involved, there are also 
intermediaries operating in the quota market, such as brokers, middlemen and traders. In 
addition, large dairy processors and some compound-feed companies are active on the 
Dutch quota market as intermediaries. Intermediaries are important in matching quota 
demand and supply and some of them take-over part of the price risk (i.e. uncertainty about 
the level of quota prices at the end of the reference year) faced by dairy farmers (Pennings, 
1998). 
Table 2.10: Activities in the Dutch quota market in 1997/98per quota size class in the previous 
year (percentages of total). 
Quota Quota transfers with whole Other quota transfers with Temporary quota transfers 
class farm land 
(tonnes) Buying Selling Buying Selling Lease-in Lease-out 
h. q- h. q- h. q- h. q- h. q- h. q-
0 89.3 90.1 0.8 0.7 4.8 13.5 1.3 1.4 3.2 3.3 1.4 1.4 
< 100 5.6 5.5 10.2 1.8 3.8 4.2 38.0 14.3 6.9 5.3 42.0 27.0 
100-199 1.4 1.1 19.6 9.9 9.0 7.6 24.2 22.3 19.7 19.0 24.6 34.6 
200-299 1.5 1.1 22.3 17.9 16.6 12.8 13.9 19.9 22.4 23.5 11.7 17.3 
300-399 0.2 0.2 20.2 22.3 23.3 17.8 9.0 15.0 20.5 20.9 8.2 8.8 
400-499 0.9 0.6 14.0 20.1 18.0 14.7 4.7 8.2 13.0 12.9 5.1 4.3 
500-749 0.5 0.8 9.7 17.9 18.3 18.0 5.2 9.5 11.1 11.4 5.2 4.5 
> 7 5 0 0.7 0.6 3.2 9.5 6.2 11.4 3.6 9.4 3.1 3.6 1.7 2.2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Absolute 882 285 913 285 8042 310 2920 310 15314 620 8487 620 
Source: COS statistics, several years, h. = number of quota holders; q. = total quantity of quota. Absolute 
total quantities transferred are given in million kg. Farmers with no quota (quota class 0) in the previous year 
can sell or lease-out quota because they have also bought quota in the same year. 
2.3.3 Quota trade issues 
There are three, interrelated issues of possible concern regarding the liberal Dutch quota 
market. First, Dutch quota prices are often perceived as too high. High quota prices cause 
rising cost of obtaining additonal quota (especially for young farmers) which endangers 
both the structure and the competitive position of the Dutch dairy sector. At the farm level 
the costs (including interest and depreciation costs) of aquiring quota have increased and 
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may be reduced by increasing production. However, only a limited amount of quota is 
available (Ministry of Agriculture, 1998). Note, that quota prices may decrease as a result 
of the price cuts agreed by the European Commission in Agenda 2000. Second, the 
possibility to lease is believed to hamper the permanent transfer of quota, hence slowing 
down structural changes. Farmers willing to cease production gain from putting quota out 
to lease and delay the decision to stop farming (Ministry of Agriculture, 1998). Third, it is 
sometimes argued that farmers face an undesirable price risk, because of fluctuating prices 
in the spot market for milk quota sales and leases (Pennings, 1998 p.239-246). 
A number of alternatives have been suggested for the reorganisation of quota trade, 
in order to solve the assumed problems. First, a centralised spot market, according to the 
model of the quota exchange in Ontario and Quebec (Canada), could replace both existing 
decentralised permanent and temporary quota trade 1 7 . In such a system, farmers must state 
what volume they wish to sell at what nunimum price, or how much they want to buy at 
what maximum price. Based on these offers, a market clearing price is calculated. 
Transfers are effectuated at this price. If the bid to sell (buy) is above (below) this price 
there is no sale (purchase). Since the beginning of 1998, a milk quota exchange is effective 
in Denmark. The Canadian experience with a quota exchange indicates that there is less 
shortage of quotas and prices are tempered. Moreover, transparency of the market is 
enhanced, because demand and supply are centralised at a specified date (van Dijk, 1995; 
Oskam and Speijers, 1992). However, if the current quota market in the Netherlands is 
already efficient and transparent, a centralised quota exchange would not have much effect. 
A second alternative for the organisation of permanent quota transfers is reducing 
each quota transfer by a siphon. Belgium and Germany are currently operating a siphon on 
quota transfers. In Belgium the siphon aims to limit farm sizes and stimulate new 
established producers (van Dijk, 1995 p.31). In Germany, the siphon also had to encourage 
farmers to sell their quota to the state in order to correct the over-allocation of quotas (van 
Dijk, 1995 p.20). The theoretical and empirical effects of a siphon on the transfer of quotas 
have been studied by Burrell (1989b), Daatselaar and Rijk (1994) and by Guyomard, 
Herrard, and Mahé (1995). In general, less quota will be traded as a result of a siphon. The 
1 7 In the Canadian system quota rental is prohibited and separate auction markets exist for trade in used and 
unused quota, see e.g. Chen and Meilke, 1998. 
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effect on quota prices depends on the elasticities of quota demand and supply (e.g. Chen 
and Meilke, 1998). However, quota that is "creamed off" is usually administratively 
reallocated by the government (for example to young farmers or proportionally to all dairy 
farmers) and therefore costs of acquiring quota are expected to be lower than without a 
siphon. Because the government usually lacks information about farm level efficiency, the 
government uses other criteria to reallocate quota (e.g. equity). As a result the efficiency of 
dairy farming worsens. 
Third, putting limits to the production per hectare or the number of cows per 
hectare may also reduce quota prices. In this system only extensive farms are allowed to 
purchase quota (up to the specified limit). The demand for quota and quota prices are 
expected to decrease. However, the demand for farmland and land prices possibly increase. 
Fourth, quota lease may be restricted to a pure management tool, i.e. permit lease only for 
'last minute' adjustments in production. As a result, demand and supply for permanent 
quota transfers increase. However, de Hoog (1998) concludes that abolition or restriction 
of the current quota lease system will not be effective. Finally, in order to increase the 
transparency of the quota market and to reduce the price risk that farmers possibly face, 
Pennings (1998) studied the possibilities for a futures market for milk quotas. 
2.3.4 Research topic 
Despite the various options for reorganising quota trade in the Netherlands, the question 
remains if current quota trade is efficiently organised. The high quota prices, the lease 
system, and price risks suggest that there are important inefficiencies involved in current 
quota trade. However, high quota prices and some price risk may be a common result of 
demand and supply in a fairly free market, wherein quotas are purchased by the most 
efficient farmers. 
A number of authors have studied quota trade efficiencies, either theoretically or 
empirically. Burrell (1989b) and Cox (1987) focus on the theoretical efficiency gains of 
free quota trade. For the case of tobacco in the U.S., the distribution of economic rents 
between owners and renters of marketable production quotas is analysed by Babcock and 
Foster (1992). Other literature deals with the welfare effects of transfer restrictions. 
Rucker, Thurman and Sumner (1995) determine the impact of geographical trade 
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restrictions, while Guyomard, Herrard and Mahe (1995) model a tax in the form of a 
siphon on French milk quotas exchanges. 
The economic inefficiency of current milk quota distribution and efficiency losses 
that result from distortions in quota trade are the subjects in chapter 4. Theoretical insights 
from previous studies are used to quantify the effects of quota trade distortions that are 
specific for the Netherlands, such as quantitative trade restrictions and costs for transaction 
services. Again, a micro-level approach is used, so each farm is identified either as a quota 
buyer or quota seller (or indifferent to buying and selling). Gains from quota trade and 
losses from distortions in quota trade are quantified at the farm level and aggregated to the 
total dairy sector. 
2.4 Manure policy 
In this section, the current manure regulations in the Netherlands are described. 
Furthermore, the possibilities for dairy farms to adapt to the new regulations are discussed. 
Finally, the research topic for chapter 6 is defined. 
2.4.1 Manure problems and early policy 
Application of excessive amounts of phosphate (P2O5) and nitrogen (N), contained in 
animal waste (manure) and chemical fertiliser, cause eutrophication of the soil and surface 
and ground water. Eutrophication of surface water poses a threat to the ecosystem, while 
increasing amounts of nitrate in ground water endangers its use for drinking water. Table 
2.11 shows that dairy farming accounted for almost 65 per cent of manure production in 
1996. However, only about 6 per cent of the Dutch manure surplus problem is caused by 
dairy farming. Because dairy farms are mainly self-supporting in producing fodder, they 
can sustainably apply manure on their own land. Apart from the direct contamination of 
soil and water, the emission of ammonia from stables and spreading manure contribute to 
acidification. About 50 per cent of the emission of ammonia (NH 3) caused by agricultural 
sectors originates from dairy farming (see also Ministry of Agriculture, 1995). Ammonia 
emission depends on the type of housing, type of manure storage, manure application 
methods and grazing. 
34 
Chapter 2 
Table 2.11: Manure production, manure surplus at the farm (million tonnes and million kgN, P, 
and K) and emission of ammonia (million kg NH3) in 1996. 
Total 
agriculture 
Dairy cattle Dairy cattle in % 
of total 
Production (million kg): 
Nitrogen N 636.2 354.5 56 
Phosphorus P 84.1 38.1 45 
Potassium K 511.5 333.0 65 
Quantity (million tonnes) 79.9 51.5 64 
Surplus at farm (million kg): 
Nitrogen N 199.0 7.8 4 
Phosphorus P 34.7 0.9 3 
Potassium K 112.7 7.3 6 
Quantity (million tonnes) 18.4 1.1 6 
Ammonia emission (million kg NH 3 ) from: 
Stables 83.7 35.4 42 
Storage 4.0 1.5 38 
Grazing 14.6 12.4 85 
Spreading 25.2 12.5 50 
Total 127.5 61.8 48 
Source: Brouwer, Baltussen and Daatselaar, 1997 p. 162-163. 
Manure policies have been in effect in the Netherlands since 1984. In several steps, 
various regulations were introduced and tightened. At first, the law aimed to prevent 
further expansion of the numbers of pigs, chickens and cows. In 1987, the production of 
manure was restricted by phosphate based manure production rights (quotas) and 
application standards for phosphate were enacted. Total manure production from all animal 
sources up to 125 kg phosphate per hectare of land was allowed. Farmers producing more 
manure need additional animal based manure production rights. Each farmer received a 
reference quota based on an inventory of animal numbers and standards for the manure 
production for each animal category. Moreover, the area of farmland was assessed. The 
difference between the reference quota and the acreage based phosphate rights was used to 
make a distinction between manure surplus farms and manure deficit farms (i.e. farms with 
a manure production larger or smaller than 125 kg phosphate per hectare). 
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Manure production in excess of the 125 kg standard was charged with a small 
levy 1 8 . Funds raised by the levy were used to stimulate technical solutions to the manure 
problem, such as lower levels of minerals in animal feed, distribution of manure from 
surplus areas to non-surplus areas, industrial processing of manure into dry granular 
fertiliser, and export of manure. In addition, the handling of manure is regulated. The 
general rules include i) a ban on the application of manure on farmland during the period 
September-January, ii) the obligation to use pre-described application techniques, and iii) a 
compulsion to cover manure deposits. 
Table 2.12: Development of P, N and NH; emission by the agricultural sector (million kg). 
1985 1990 1995 1996 
Emission of Pto soil 87 71 63 60 
Emission of N to soil 527 426 509 473 
Emission of N H 3 239 220 141 138 
Source: Silvis and van Bruchem, 1998 p. 100. 
Table 2.12 shows how the emissions of different nutrients to the environment have 
developed since the introduction of manure policy in the Netherlands. The emission of 
phosphorus from the agricultural sector declined by about 30 per cent, while ammonia 
emission decreased by 42 per cent (although controversy exists about this figure, see Silvis 
and van Bruchem, 1998 p. 103). The emission of nitrogen clearly decreased initially, 
however since the beginning of the 1990s it increased again. Especially the declining stock 
of cattle caused by the milk quota regulations, the lower contents of phosphorus in animal 
feed, and the awareness of farmers about the efficient use of fertiliser resulted in 
decreasing emission of nutrients. Unfavourable weather conditions and the obligation to 
apply manure under the surface of the soil caused nitrogen emissions to increase (Silvis 
and van Bruchem, 1998 p. 100). 
Despite the development of a whole body of regulations and some declining 
emissions, the Dutch manure policy has not been sufficiently effective in abating nutrient 
losses. Especially the pace at which emissions are reduced is too slow. Dietz (1992) 
1 8 The first 125 kg phosphate per hectare was free of charge, the next 75 kg was subject to a levy of 0.25 
guilders per kg, and any quantity in excess of 200 kg was charged with a levy of 0.50 guilders per kg. 
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identified the main failures of the manure policy. The policy aimed at a gradual reduction 
in the use of manure, without reducing the size of the national herds. Besides, only the 
production and use of phosphate was regulated. Nitrogen was ignored, and the application 
of nutrients via chemical fertiliser was unrestricted. Moreover, the maximum application 
standards were set too high and some categories of animals were excluded from the 
regulations (e.g. horses) (Dietz, 1992). Therefore, a new framework for manure policy was 
outlined in 1995 in the 'Integrate notitie mest- en ammoniakbeleid' (Ministry of 
Agriculture, 1995). Effective regulations with respect to the amount of N and P 2 0 5 that can 
be applied, the permitted applications method and the period during which it can be 
applied are retained. The emission of ammonia has to fall by 70 per cent in the period 
2000-2005 compared with 1980. Therefore, animal housing has to fulfil specific 
requirements regarding ammonia emission (e.g. 'green-label' housing). Additionally, a 
new instrument, known as Minas (mineral registration system), is implemented to control 
manure surplus problems. 
2.4.2 Manure regulations: Minas 
From the beginning of 1998 on Minas has been effective. Phosphate and nitrogen flows 
have to be registered and acceptable losses of phosphate and nitrogen per hectare are fixed. 
Phosphate and nitrogen surpluses are taxed. The new policy makes a distinction between 
intensive and extensive farms. Intensive farmers with more than 2.5 GVE 1 9 per hectare are 
obliged to keep accounts of nitrogen and phosphate flows at their farm. Farmers may 
choose between a detailed registration of real flows or a registration based on standards. In 
the detailed registration, the farms' in- and outflow of minerals (phosphate and nitrogen) is 
based on the real mineral content in all inputs and outputs. The exact contents of phosphate 
and nitrogen in, for example, animal waste, feedstuff, chemical fertiliser and milk have to 
be determined. If the registration is based on standards, only the in- and outflow of 
minerals in animal waste and chemical fertiliser is recorded. Standards are provided by law 
(Ministry of Agriculture, 1997b). 
The calculation of phosphate and nitrogen surpluses is based on the registrations 
(either detailed or standardised) in Minas. For political reasons, phosphate inflow from 
''' GVE is the Dutch abbreviation for standardised cattle unit, I GVE = 1 dairy cow. 
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chemical fertilisers can be deduced to determine the taxable mineral surpluses. Moreover, 
legally permitted losses of phosphate and nitrogen (i.e. application minus the amount taken 
up by the crops) can be deduced. In 1998, the permitted loss of phosphate is 40 kg per 
hectare. Permitted nitrogen losses are 300 kg per hectare of grassland and 175 kg per 
hectare of arable land. Table 2.13 shows that the permitted nutrient losses decrease in the 
following years. For intensive farms, the number of animals, rather than the area of 
farmland, determine ammonia emission. Therefore, a correction is made for ammonia 
losses per animal. 
Table 2.13: Permitted phosphate and nitrogen losses per hectare. 
1998 2000 2002 2005 2008 
Phosphate loss / ha 40 35 30 25 20 
Nitrogen loss / ha of grassland 300 275 250 200 180 
Nitrogen loss / ha of arable and waste land 175 150 125 110 100 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, 1997b. 
Arable farming, horticulture and farms with 2.5 GVE or less per hectare, are not 
obliged to participate in Minas initially 2 0. They only have to keep a simple registration of 
animal numbers and hectares. In addition, they have to keep accounts of the deliveries of 
manure and other organic fertilisers (volume and type of manure) on their farm. Nitrogen 
and nutrients in chemical fertilisers are not recorded. In 1998 and 1999, these farms are 
allowed to apply 120 kg phosphate per hectare on grassland, and 100 kg phosphate per 
hectare on arable land. In 2000 and 2001 these thresholds are 85 kg phosphate per hectare, 
and from 2002 onwards 80 kg. Farms have a phosphate surplus if the sum of their 
phosphate production, calculated as the number of animals times the phosphate standard 
per animal 2 1 , and the deliveries of phosphate in manure (standards per type of manure) is 
higher than the total amount they are permitted to apply on their land. Note here that 
manure removed from the farm is not deducted from the surplus (Ministry of Agriculture, 
2 0 From 2000 all animal farms, and from 2002 all arable and horticulture farms have to participate in Minas. 
2 1 For example, the standard phosphate production per dairy cow is 41 kg per year, whereas standard nitrogen 
production is 161 kg per cow per year. 
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1997a). In the case of a surplus, the farm automatically participates in Minas based on 
standards. 
Resulting surpluses will be taxed according to the rates in Table 2.14. For nitrogen 
surpluses the tax is 1.5 guilders per kg per hectare, for phosphate it is 10 guilders per kg 
per hectare. However, the first 10 kg per hectare of the phosphate surplus will be taxed a 
the rate of 2.5 guilders per kg per hectare in 1998 and 1999 (Ministry of Agriculture, 
1997b). 
Table 2.14: Mineral surplus taxes (guilders per kg of surplus). 
1998-1999 2000-2004 2005 onwards 
Nitrogen 1.50 5.00 5.00 
Phosphate 10.00 20.00 20.00 
first 10 kg of the surplus 2.50 5.00 -
first 5 kg of the surplus - - 5.00 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, 1997b. 
2.4.3 Consequences for dairy farming 
Since the onset of manure policies in 1984, dairy farming was hardly restricted by the 
Dutch manure regulations. In the first period after 1984, the milk quota system contributed 
even more to the solution of the manure problems in the Netherlands than the manure 
policy itself (van Brachem and Rutten, 1988 p.71). Due to the milk quota constraints, 
Dutch dairy farming has become less intensive. Dairy cow numbers decreased 
substantially, although this was partly offset by keeping more fattening animals and sheep. 
Furthermore, farmland acreage was under-utilised. Because of growing milk yields per 
cow and the availability of more or less the same area of farmland, the extensification 
process is expected to continue. The average specialised dairy farm held 2.46 GVE per 
hectare in 1997, and it is expected that it will decline to less than 2 GVE per hectare in 
2015 (LTO Nederland, 1998 p. 14). Anyway, it is the dairy sectors' own wish to further 
extensify production and prevent dairy farms from becoming industrialised units where 
dairy cows are kept inside year-round. Thus, the sector aims at the full dependence of milk 
production on land, because of the image building of dairy farming towards society and 
manure policy (LTO Nederland, 1998). Note that the propagation of grazing cows works 
against the goal of ammonia emission reduction. 
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On the basis of the situation in 1997, about half of the Dutch dairy farms are 
obliged to participate in Minas (Silvis and van Bruchem, 1998 p.101). However, there are 
large differences between farms. Somewhat more than half of the dairy farms in 1996 held 
less than 2.5 GVE per hectare, about 30 per cent held between 2.5 and 4 GVE per hectare. 
Another 15 per cent of dairy farms held even more than 4 GVE per hectare (LEI-DLO and 
CBS, 1997 table 41-d). If these intensive farms are not able to properly remove or avoid 
manure surpluses, the new manure policy may cause serious problems. In the case of an 
imminent surplus, the farmer has to weigh the transportation costs involved in removing 
manure from the farm and paying the surplus tax against each other. For individual farms it 
may be profitable to extensify their production by purchasing land, hence grow more feed 
on the farm, and prevent manure surpluses arising. 
Obviously, interaction is expected between the manure surplus taxes on the one 
hand and the demand for farmland and milk quotas on the other (e.g. Luijt, 1994). If the 
manure regulations have a negative effect on farm profits, then the value of land and the 
demand for farmland will decrease. Differences in the value of land between farms induce 
land transfers. However, extending farmland acreage usually is difficult in the short-run, 
because there is no supply of land in the neighbourhood of the farm. Land supply is 
essentially rationed (Luijt, 1994). Of course, this is also affected by other measures such as 
the objective to create valuable wildlife and landscape conservation areas (Oskam and 
Slangen, 1998). More severe manure regulations might eventually constrain milk 
production, making milk quotas non-binding in the Netherlands. As a result, quota prices 
will decrease. 
2.4.4 Research topic 
Until the introduction of Minas, dairy farming in the Netherlands was hardly restricted by 
manure and nutrient policies. In addition, it may be clear from the above that the average 
dairy farm will probably not be constrained much by Minas (because of the 2.5 GVE 
limit). However, in the case of surpluses, individual farms are liable for surplus taxes, and 
the regulations become stricter in the future, thus restricting more dairy farms. 
Economists generally propagate taxes (levies) as instruments to curb manure 
problems (see for example Dietz and Hoogervorst, 1991). Using a linear programming 
(LP) model, describing a typical dairy farm, Berentsen and Giesen (1997) (see also 
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Berentsen, Giesen and Renkema, 1997) calculated the possible effects of prohibitive levies 
on nitrogen and phosphate losses. As a result, land use on the farm shifted from growing 
silage maize to grass. However, the total area of land remained fixed. The interaction 
between different farms, e.g. on a market, are ignored in LP modelling. In an econometric 
study, nitrogen surplus levies for Dutch pig farms have been analysed by Fontein et al. 
(1994). They assume that farmers reduce livestock numbers in response to a levy. Polman 
and Thijssen (1996) use the concept of marginal abatement costs in order to take into 
account that farmers have several options to react to a nitrogen surplus levy. Oude Lansink 
and Peerlings (1997) introduced a nitrogen tax in their model of arable farms. Kleinhanss, 
Becker and Schleef (1997) simulate the impact of a fertilizer levy on agricultural 
production at the regional level of EU member states and at the farm level in Germany. 
Despite the historical emphasis on phosphate in Dutch manure policies, phosphate 
surplus levies have not often been studied before in a micro-econometric context. In 
addition, empirical studies, which recognise the interaction between a surplus tax and the 
demand for farmland, are lacking. The effects of the new phosphate surplus taxes for 
individual dairy farms, especially in relation to the demand for farmland, will be studied in 
chapter 6. The effect of the surplus taxes on the demand for milk quotas is illustrated by 
the change in the shadow prices of quota. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The supply constraint, enforced by the milk quota regime, combined with the price support 
and border protection measures, play a central role in dairy policy. However, the EU seeks 
to readjust dairy policy. The alternative EU policies to be analysed in chapter 5 are a two-
tier milk price system, quota abolition, and the Agenda 2000 agreement, which include 
price cuts and compensating premiums. Within the milk quota system, quota mobility and 
the organisation of quota trade have been debated constantly. In the Netherlands, milk 
quotas are traded in a fairly liberal quota market. The efficiency of milk quota trade and 
the effects of distortions in quota trade are analysed in chapter 4. Another policy issue of 
interest for Dutch dairy farms consists of the nutrient surplus taxes recently introduced. 
The effects of phosphate surplus taxes, especially in relation to the demand for farmland, 
are investigated in chapter 6. 
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In order to assess the impacts of the policies described, a model is developed. The 
model should be flexible in order to handle the diversity of policy changes defined here, 
implying that the model can be adapted to answer specific research questions. Obviously, 
the model should distinguish milk quotas and various inputs necessary for producing milk. 
Moreover, it should be possible to include farmland and manure surpluses. Since we are 
particularly interested in the policy effects for individual dairy farms, a micro-economic 
method is required, which recognises differences between farms. It is assumed that 
differences in the efficiency of milk production drive the adjustments to policy changes on 
the farm. Therefore, the production economics of dairy farming play a central role. The 
reaction of individual farms to policy changes will often come together in simulating a 
market (e.g. the quota market). In that way, interaction of individual behaviour is 
aggregated to the level of the dairy sector. Besides, the model accounts for regional 
differences in the Netherlands. Thus, effects can be aggregated to the level of the region or 
the total dairy industry. 
The data, the choices regarding the basic model, and the estimations will be 
discussed in the next chapter. Specific extensions to the model that are required for 
simulating the defined policy issues are described in the respective chapters. 
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Chapter 3 A MICRO-ECONOMIC MODEL FOR DATOY FARMING 
UNDER QUOTAS 
3.1 Introduction 
In 1984 supply control regulations for dairy farming were implemented in the European 
Union (the European Community at the time) in response to overproduction and budgetary 
problems. In the Netherlands, milk production was effectively restricted to farm level 
quotas by a prohibitive levy on surplus production. Quotas have been allocated to 
producers on the basis of their milk output in 1983/84. In order to decrease the rigidity in 
production structures, milk quotas were made transferable. Initially, only the quota 
ownership rights were exchangeable, but since 1989, farmers are also allowed to exchange 
quota user rights through leasing. 
Modelling quota constraints has received considerable attention in the agricultural 
economics literature. Moschini (1988) and Helming, Oskam and Thijssen (1993) provided 
a framework for modelling quotas, where the latter implicitly includes the regime switch in 
the empirical model. Fulginiti and Perrin (1993) showed the link between quota-
constrained and unconstrained behaviour, while others focused on different aspects of 
quota trade (Cox, 1987; Babcock and Foster, 1992; Guyomard, Herrard and Mane, 1995; 
Rucker, Thurman and Sumner, 1995). 
Objectives of this chapter are a) to develop a theoretical framework for transferable 
and non-transferable output quota, b) to develop an empirical micro-model which can be 
used to simulated alternative dairy policies, and c) to describe the considerations behind 
choices we make about the model. In general, the objectives serve as a basis for further, 
continuating research of Dutch dairy farming. However, the latter objective is also an 
implicit reply to Elhorst's criticism on the "additional and practically-based decisions" of 
agricultural economists in implementing agricultural household models (Elhorst, 1996). 
Elhorst distinguishes choices related to data, model specification, prices and econometric 
methods. Several of these points will return in this chapter. Regarding the data, we will go 
into the choice of the research population, the stratified nature of the data and the related 
necessity of weighting. Regarding the model specification, this chapter deals with the 
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short-term dimension, the treatment of cattle as a variable in the model, and the 
measurement of quasi-fixed inputs, especially buildings. Finally, regarding the 
econometric methods, this chapter focuses on the possibility of negative profits and the 
panel data nature which allows for fixed and random effects. 
In order to make the choice for a particular model more explicit, three alternative 
models are compared with the central model in this study. The central model consists of 
the unweighted estimation of the symmetric normalised quadratic (SNQ), including fixed 
effects. The alternatives distinguished are the normalised quadratic (NQ), the SNQ 
including additional fixed effects, and the weighted estimation of the SNQ. The 
comparison between the SNQ and NQ relates to the functional form of the model (for a 
thorough study on functional forms see Oude Lansink and Thijssen, 1998). The other 
alternatives relate to the estimation procedure. 
The next section presents the theoretical model for non-tradable and tradable 
production quotas, which is followed by a description of the empirical model. Then the 
data are given, the estimation procedure is explained and the estimation results are 
presented. This chapter ends with a discussion and conclusions. 
3.2 Theoretical model 
In this section a theoretical micro-economic model, which includes non-tradable and 
tradable production quotas, is developed. Assumptions made beforehand are that dairy 
farming is characterised by the joint production of multiple outputs using variable inputs 
and some inputs which are fixed in the short run (quasi-fixed inputs). The objective of the 
farmer is to maximise profit, while the level of prices and quasi-fixed inputs are given. 
Therefore, the short-term, dual profit function ^(v,z/,) for farmer h is: 
^ ( v » z * ) = m a x { v q A } = vq; (3.1) 
it 
where q/, is a vector of netputs (if qu, > 0, it is an output, whereas if qu, < 0, it is an input) 
with corresponding netput prices v. Quasi-fixed inputs are denoted by vector z*. It is 
assumed that the profit function is continuous and twice differentiable. Furthermore, 
profits are non-negative, non-decreasing in output prices and quasi-fixed inputs, non-
increasing in input prices and convex and linear homogeneous in prices (Chambers, 1988). 
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If the netput vector is partitioned into a single output qoh (could also be a vector) 
and a vector of other netputs q^, the profit maximisation problem is represented by: 
**(•.**) = max{v 0 ? 0 4 + g A (v, . ,9 0 A ,z A )} (3.2) 
&(v f ,9o/, 5 z / , ) = max{v,.q a} (3.3) 
Ilk 
Here, gh{-) is the restricted profit function which is defined as the cost of producing qoh-
The properties of the restricted profit function are equivalent to those of the regular profit 
function in (3.1). However, it is possible that restricted profit is negative (Moschini, 1988). 
Since both profit functions satisfy the derivative property (Hotelling's lemma) 
supply and demand equations for the netputs q*,/,(v„ qoh, %h) are: 
and the supply of ?*OA(VO, V; , z/,) results from solving: 
~ ~ VOft v 0 - - 3 — Hah 
(3.5a) 
or equivalently: 
^ X ^ = V o + * f e i o ^ = 0 (3.5b) 
This condition states that the optimal output supply q*oh is found where the marginal cost 
of producing this output ( - ) equals its price. The economic value of the quasi-fixed 
inputs can also be revealed in this system: 
(3.6) 
Here, s/,(v„ 90*» ZA) is the vector of shadow prices for the given quasi-fixed inputs z/,. These 
shadow prices result in z A being profit-maximising levels of quasi-fixed inputs. 
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3.2.1 Introducing quotas 
When the supply of #OA at the farm level is restricted by a production constraint at the level 
q0h, the partitioning of q proves to be helpful. The profit maximisation problem for every 
farm h, assuming given netput prices, becomes: 
nh (v, zh) = max{v 0? 0 A + gh (v f , q0h, zh)} 
i°* (3.7) 
? 0 A * ? 0 » 
This constrained maximisation problem is restated as the Lagrangian: 
£ ( V . ? O A . * A ) = {Mo* + &0' / .?O»»*A)- 'OA(? I>A (3.8) 
where roA > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier resulting from the quota constraint. It represents 
the extra profit of the farm when the constraint is relaxed by one unit. Therefore, it is also 
referred to as the shadow price of the constraint (Chiang, 1984 p.727). If the constraint is 
not binding roh must be zero. 
The optimal supply and demand of unconstrained netputs q*y,, are already solved 
implicitly by the restricted profit function g(-), see equation (3.4). The shadow prices for zh 
are derived as in equation (3.6). In the following, the derivations of the unconstrained 
netputs and shadow prices of quasi-fixed inputs are not shown anymore. The Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions of the problem in equation (3.8) are: 
A 0 7i, °* 
^ (3.9a) 
^ V 0 - - ' O A 
< ^ 0 A 
' •OA ( 9 OA - 9 OA ) = 0 ( 3 - 9 b ) 
Equation (3.9a) is used to reveal the shadow price rn*(v, qoh, Zh) of a given positive supply 
qoh- This shadow price equals the difference between the market price, vn, and the marginal 
costs of q0h (=-^h^ ). When the quota constraint is not restrictive (e.g. in the pre-quota 
^ O A 
period), r 0 A will be zero. 
Fulginiti and Perrin (1993) show that there exists a shadow price roll which would 
induce the farm to freely choose the output at the level q0h. Evaluated at shadow prices, 
constrained and unconstrained profit (equation (3.8) and (3.2) respectively) must be equal. 
The relationship can be characterised by stating that constrained profit equals 
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unconstrained profit evaluated at the shadow price plus the quota rent: 
VO<7OA + 81, (0 = rMqah + gh (•) + qoh (v0 - roh). 
When quota trade is possible in a competitive quota market, the initial quota level 
at the farm is not binding anymore, instead the aggregate national quota is binding. If the 
rental price of quota is denoted by X, the profit function becomes: 
^ A ( V , ? O A > Z A ^ ) = m a x { M o / , +Z^iA^T-h)-K<lM -Hot,)} ( 3 - 1 0 ) 
»0» 
The first order condition implies that the marginal cost of producing qoh equals the 
difference between its market price and the rental price of quota: 
<%o„ ° dqah 
This equation holds for all farms and vo and X are equal across farms. Moreover, the sum 
of all qof, over farms is given (the national quota level Q). Therefore, both q*of, and X* are 
found where: 
<%»(V ; .go».s«)_ ^ * ( v / » g o / » z / ) hf = l H (3.12a) 
and (3.12b) 
This concludes the theoretical model for tradable quotas. 
3.3 Empirical specification 
In this section, the functional form for the empirical model of dairy farming under quotas is 
developed. Here, the symmetric normalised quadratic (SNQ) is chosen as the functional 
form (Oude Lansink and Thijssen, 1998). The SNQ allows for negative profits and it has a 
Hessian of constants, so that convexity in prices can be tested globally. In earlier versions 
of the model the normalised quadratic (NQ) was used (see Appendix 3.A). However, the 
NQ has two major disadvantages. First, it is well known that the estimates of the NQ are 
not invariant with respect to the choice of the numeraire (Diewert and Wales, 1987). 
Second, using the model for simulating purposes, the NQ imposes that a profit change at 
the national level is wholly due to a change in the numeraire netput. The other netputs 
remain at their initial levels. The SNQ is used to avoid these problems. 
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Consider a profit maximising dairy farmer who produces two outputs; milk (<7o), 
which is subject to supply constraints, and an aggregate of other output (q\), using 
purchased feed (q2), dairy cattle {q-$) and a composite of other inputs (# 4) as variable inputs. 
Output is produced given netput prices vo to V4 and quasi-fixed inputs labour (z\), land (22), 
buildings (zi) and machinery (24). The model also includes a time trend (Z5) representing 
technology and a dummy allowing for a change in technology due to the introduction 
of milk quotas in 1984. Furthermore, there are dummies (z7 and z%) included to distinguish 
between three regions. It is assumed that each farmer has access to the same production 
technology. Farm-specific features (e.g. the quality of land and management) are modelled 
using fixed effects. In a micro-economic study on Dutch dairy farms, Thijssen (1992) 
concluded that the fixed effects estimator is preferred to the random effects estimator, 
because the important assumption for the random effects estimator to be consistent, i.e. that 
the individual effects and the regressors are independent, is rejected by a Hausman test. 
The symmetric normalised quadratic (SNQ) restricted profit function (see Kohli, 
1993; Moschini, 1988) for each farm h and year t is here defined as: 
4 j 4 4 4 4 8 
ghi O;,»lot,,> zu„) = Z aih vu + Tw~'Y<H auv<<vji+X CMOIU+X X y-<k v«zk>« + 
/=i ^ /=i >i ;=i w *=i 
1 8 1 5 5 
^MzhAm + w__/**z»?o*/ + r W^ZAA' 2 '* ' + (3-13) 
4=1 Z *=I n=l 
5 8 
4=1 »1=6 
The last term in the restricted profit function indicates that the cross-products of the 
dummies are not taken into account. Farm Ks specific parameters are denoted by an,. 
Symmetry is maintained by requiring aij=aji and fihpPnk- Linear homogeneity in prices is 
4 
imposed by the term w = ^  9,vlt, where 0/ are non-negative constants. In this study (9/ is 
the average share of netput / in total costs plus revenues, so they sum to unity. They can be 
interpreted as fixed weights for the price index w. In order to identify all parameters of the 
model, additional restrictions have to be imposed: 
2 > ; / v . ; = 0 V/ = l,..,4 (3.14) 
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where v, is an arbitrary point of observation. In this study v, equals the sample mean of 
pricej ( vr=1.04, v2=0.94, v 3=1.04and v4=0.98). 
From the restricted profit function, the following netput equations (7=1,..,4) for each 
farm h are derived using Hotelling's lemma: 
4 j 4 4 8 1 
1m, = «/« + w"' Z <V/< - ~ d i w ~ 1 Z Z a / 7 v / < v / ' + €flo» + Z ^*z«» + , 5 / « a 
7=1 ^ W 7=1 *=1 ^ 
h,ZkhlZnhl 
(3.15) 
*=1 ^ *=l n=l * = [ H=6 
Note that all netput equations have a farm-specific intercept. The model is completed by 
the milk supply function, which is only valid in the pre-quota period. The milk supply 
function does not include a farm-specific intercept (see later on for motivation): 
P +
 V0, |+Z^Z« (3.16) 
In the post-quota period, milk supply is exogenously given for the individual farm and the 
milk supply equation does not apply. In that case, the marginal cost of milk supply, that is, 
the price that would have given rise to producing at the quota level, is given by: 
(3.17) 
The farm shadow price of milk quota, equals vorSoht- The shadow prices of the quasi-
fixed inputs (A=l,..,5) are calculated as: 
~ ' (3.18) 
3.4 Data 
Data on Dutch dairy farms, that obtain 50 per cent or more of their total returns from milk 
production, are selected from a stratified sample of farms keeping accounts on behalf of 
the LEI-DLO farm accounting system. The panel contains 9365 observations on 1961 
farms, covering the period 1973/74-1992/93. The farms usually remain in the panel for 
about five years, so the data set forms an incomplete (or unbalanced) panel. 
In the model, one supply-constrained output, one unconstrained output, three 
variable inputs and four quasi-fixed inputs are distinguished. The constrained output is 
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'milk' which consists of milk revenues. The unconstrained or 'other output' is an aggregate 
of revenues from marketable crops, beef and veal, pigs, poultry and other farm revenues. 
The three variable inputs are 'purchased feed' for cattle, 'dairy cattle' and 'other input'. 
The first consists of the costs of compound feed, roughage and milk powder. Dairy cattle is 
measured as 4 per cent1 of the dairy cattle stock at the farms' balance sheets. Dairy cattle is 
assumed to be a variable input since dairy cows are rather easily adjusted to optimal levels. 
Other input is a composite of costs of feed for animals other than dairy cattle, seeds, 
fertilisers, pesticides, contract work, veterinary services, fuel, energy, other cattle (again 4 
per cent of stock value) and other variable inputs. 
Quasi-fixed inputs are 'labour', 'land', 'buildings' and 'machinery'. Labour 
contains both family labour and hired labour, measured in hours. Earnings from family 
labour and hired labour are divided by their respective wage rates. The area of farmland is 
directly available in the data set and measured in hectares. Data on capital invested in 
buildings for tenant farms are incomplete (Elhorst, 1990 p.84). Therefore, simulated values 
for invested capital in tenant fanners' buildings are used. First, for owner-occupied farms, 
capital invested in buildings was regressed on the costs of buildings and size of the farm. 
Second, predicted values for capital invested in buildings for tenant farms were determined 
and used in later stages of estimation. Buildings and machinery are both measured as total 
invested capital at 1980/81 prices (stock value in the balance sheets). A 'trend' variable is 
included in the model to represent technology development. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that the soil type and regional location influence dairy farmer behaviour. Therefore, the 
farms are distinguished according to the region in which they operate. The regions are 
'sandy soils', 'northern clay and peat', and 'western pastures' (see also van Dijk, Douma 
and vanVliet, 1995 p. 16). 
1 This is the real discount rate, which is taken as an estimate for the yearly costs. 
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Table 3.1: Data and base simulation for the average specialised dairy farm in 1992/93. Simulated 
values between brackets (NQ) and [SNQJ. 
Price" 
index 
Dimension Sandy 
soils 
Northern 
clay 
Western 
pastures 
Total sector 
No. of farms 14517 6888 6110 27515 
Quantity Quantity Quantity Quantity Shadow 
price 
(1992/93 
guilders) 
Milk output 1.17 Kilograms *1000 366.412 441.047 365.380 384.868 (0.330) 
[0.311] 
Other output 1.05 Guilders »1000 84.121 72.112 72.243 78.477 
(1980/81 prices) (86.897) 
[87.603] 
(74.722) 
[75.379] 
(74.349) 
[75.114] 
(81.063) 
[81.769] 
Purchased 0.82 Guilders »1000 73.321 70.348 66.626 71.090 
feed (1980/81 prices) (70.315) 
[69.174] 
(71.108) 
[70.010] 
(65.491) 
[64.364] 
(69.442) 
[68.315] 
Dairy cattle 1.12 Guilders »1000 3.852 4.562 3.809 4.020 
(1980/81 prices) (3.839) 
[3.743] 
(4.555) 
[4.463] 
(3.788) 
[3.685] 
(4.007) 
[3.910] 
Other input 1.14 Guilders* 1000 81.134 69.382 66.349 74.909 
(1980/81 prices) (81.581) 
[82.051] 
(72.111) 
[71.241] 
(66.968) 
[67.539] 
(75.965) 
[76.122] 
Profits Guilders* 1000 189.364 
(194.255) 
[195.508] 
244.293 
(243.311) 
[245.999] 
198.531 
(200.994) 
[202.190] 
205.151 
(208.032) 
[209.632] 
-
Labour - Hours 3 869 4 054 3 871 3 916 (4.717) 
[7.676] 
Land - Hectares 28.738 37.790 29.244 31.117 (1 553) 
[1 629] 
Buildings Inventory value, 
guilders* 1000 
(1980/81 prices) 
235.160 277.324 233.572 245.363 (0.015) 
[0.036] 
Machinery Inventory value, 
guilders * 1000 
(1980/81 prices) 
195.540 211.498 184.619 197.110 (0.009) 
[0.086] 
" 1980/81 = 1. 
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Implicit quantity indices were obtained as the ratio of values (revenues or costs) 
over price indices. Tornqvist price indices (see Thijssen, 1992) were calculated for the 
compound variables (other output, purchased feed and other input). The price indices vary 
over years but not over farms, implying that differences in the composition of a netput or 
quality differences are reflected in the quantity. The base year for the indices is 1980/81. 
Price and quantity indices for milk are standardised for a fat content of 3.7 per cent. Data 
on prices are obtained from the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI-DLO) and 
Statistics Netherlands (CBS). The data for 1992/93 are presented in Table 3.1. In 1992/93 
4 
01=0.323, 62=0.337, 03=0.022 and 04=O.317, hence w = ^ ^ , v „ = 1.003 in 1992/93. 
/=i 
Appendix 3.B shows the yearly averages of the data over the period 1973/74-1992/93. 
3.5 Estimation procedure 
The equations estimated are (3.15) and (3.16) with additional error terms. Every farm is 
assumed to have a different intercept reflecting differences in farm characteristics. This 
assumption is explicitly accounted for by a fixed effects model. The necessary 
transformation of the variables (the deviation of each observation from the average over 
time per farm) can also be applied to an incomplete panel like our data set, as long as a 
farm is present in the panel for at least two subsequent years (Thijssen, 1992). As a 
consequence the information on farms that are present in the panel only once is lost, 
affecting the representativeness of the data. The farm-specific intercepts of the netput 
equations (a,/,) appear as slope coefficients in the profit function. In order to avoid direct 
estimation of the farm-specific intercepts, the profit function is left out of the estimated 
system. The milk supply equation is assumed not to have a farm-specific effect, since 
consistent estimation requires the farm-specific effect to appear as a slope coefficient in the 
netput equations. These farm-specific effects do not leave when the fixed effects model is 
transformed to be estimated. 
The structure of the estimated system, consisting of a pre-quota (1973/74-1983/84) 
and post-quota (1984/85-1992/93) period, is as follows: 
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'qi,={\-zb){A} 
,<?o = ( 1 - Z 6 ) { Q + Z 6 . ) V 
where z 6 = 0 in the pre-quota period and Z(, = 1 in the post-quota period; qu = endogenous 
netput / in pre-quota period (/=1973/74,.., 1983/84); qis = endogenous netput / in post-quota 
period (s=1984/85,..,1992/93); q0 = endogenous milk supply; j>o= exogenous milk output; A 
= equation (3.15) with qo included; B = equation (3.15) within included; C = equation 
(3.16). The milk supply equation is only estimated in the period before the quota 
introduction, causing a difference in the number of observations across equations. The 
covariance matrix of residuals used in estimating the system is corrected for this difference 
in observations (Judge et al., 1988 p.462). In the pre-quota period, the quantity of milk can 
be related to the error term and an instrumental variable estimator must be applied. 
Endogenous variables are qo, q-, (;=1,..,4), and all variables containing milk output {qoqo, 
zkqo). All exogenous variables are used as instruments. Error terms may be correlated 
across equations. Therefore, non-linear 3SLS is an appropriate estimation technique (Judge 
et al., 1988 p.655). The 'proc model' procedure of the SAS/ETS software is used for 
estimating. 
The farm-specific effects are calculated afterwards, using the parameter estimates 
(denoted by hats) and the averages over time per farm (denoted by bars). It is assumed that 
the average of the remainder disturbance per farm, that is the part of the error term which is 
not farm-specific, is zero (Baltagi, 1995): 
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8 J 8 
^ £=î »=1 ^1 m=fi 
3.5.1 Fixed effects in the milk supply equation 
In contrast with the earlier statement that consistent estimation of fixed effects in the milk 
supply equation is not possible, this problem is addressed here. In the following it is shown 
that it is possible to 'estimate' fixed effects also when they appear as slope coefficients in 
an equation in the estimation system. This solution is due to Oude Lansink (1997). 
An additional term wshq0ht is included at the right-hand side of equation (3.13): 
4 j 4 4 4 4 8 
M j = l M /=1 4=1 
1 * 
W£i,1oh, + 2 wpq0>llq0hl + w £ nkzmqm + (3.20) 4=1 
5 1 
» WX X P^u,,2^, + WX X Pk,,zkh,z„i 
4=1 n=l 4=1 n=6 
Here, £•/, is a farm-specific parameter. It is easy to see that the additional term is highly 
correlated to the third term on the right-hand side of the same equation. In order to avoid 
singularity, an additional restriction (additional to equation (3.2)) has to be imposed: 
XC ;v ;=0 V/ = l,..,4 (3.21) 
>i 
8 
2 Note that the term X^* z 4n should have been the summation over A=l,..,6 only. The regional dummies z 7 
4=1 
and z 8 are time-invariant. Therefore, the deviations of these from the average over time per farm 
(z w „ - z m ) are zero and yn and yi8 cannot be estimated. However, we have failed to recognise this 
complication until recently. Moreover, due to errors in the data (for 13 farms the region changed during their 
presence in the panel) the deviations from the mean were not always zero. As a consequence parameters yn 
and y,s have been estimated. Hausman and Taylor (1981) show how the coefficients of the time-invariant 
variables can be estimated. 
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This restriction should not contradict the assumptions for a normal milk supply function, 
i.e. £2, Gi, GA and p < 0. As a result of including the extra term, there appear extra terms on 
the right-hand side of equations (3.15) and (3.16) as well: 
4 1 4 4 
4 j 4 4 1 
*=i 
5 
diei,<ln,
 + Z^^ *2""^ /,, +0/ZZAb,W™ 
4 = 1 ^ 4 - 1 » ^ 1 4 = 1 
1 
w~' Z + v0, + e„ + Z 
(3.22) 
(3.23) 
The farm-specific effects £/, do not leave equation (3.22) when the fixed effects 
model is transformed to be estimated (subtracting the average over time per farm from 
each observation). However, direct estimation of Sh is avoided when the definition of Sh is 
used, which follows from rewriting equation (3.23), and using the averages over time per 
farm (denoted by bars): 
+ v„ 
— 4 + P?0A. + Z VkZkH. (3.24) 
For estimation, this definition is included in equation (3.22), instead of st,. Because both 
s0i„ and sh are unknown in the post-quota period, e is estimated as a parameter which is 
equal across farms in the post-quota period. Thus, s/, is only relevant in the pre-quota 
period. 
3.5.2 Weighted estimation 
The data used in this study are selected from a stratified sample of farms. For each farm in 
each year a weight factor is given, denoting the number of farms in the population which 
are represented by the farm in the sample. The purpose of stratifying is to increase the 
reliability of the sample results. The reliability will only increase if there is a high 
correlation between the variables under research and the variables on which the 
stratification is based. Thus, the classification into strata may affect the level of the 
research variables. As a result, the important assumption that, given the explanatory 
variables, the expected error term will be zero, is not valid anymore. Therefore, the method 
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of estimation may need a modification which accounts for the weight factors (Elhorst, 
1 9 8 8 ) . The stratification of the LEI-DLO data used in this study is mainly based on farm 
type (eight classes) and farm size (four classes). The resulting strata are further stratified 
by the number of hectares, age of the farmer and region (Dijk, 1 9 9 0 ) . 
Elhorst ( 1 9 8 8 ) proposes a test to determine if there is a significant difference 
between the ordinary estimation method and the weighted estimation. The model 
y = Xb + u is taken as the null hypothesis, while the alternative model is 
y = Xb + w'Xc + u , where b and c are vectors of parameters, X is the matrix of 
explanatory variables, y is the vector of explained variables, w is the vector of weight 
factors and u is the vector of error terms, with a zero expected value. Thus, the alternative 
model has twice as many parameters than the original model. Now, an F-test on c = 0 with 
an F(K,N-2K) distribution is performed. However, this method cannot be applied to our 
system of simultaneous equations, because the model becomes highly singular. Therefore, 
we only compare the unweighted and weighted estimation of the model, without testing. 
The estimation of our central model does not account for the weights, because 
weighting only becomes important when we would like to say something about the average 
farm or the total sector, but not when estimating individual behaviour. Moreover, it is 
questionable if the variables on which the stratification is based are highly correlated with 
the variables in the model. 
3.6 Results 
In this section the estimation results, elasticities and shadow prices of the SNQ model are 
being discussed. Results for the alternative estimation procedures are also given. 
Differences between the results of the NQ and SNQ model are only mentioned if they are 
notable. The estimation results are reported in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2: Estimation results. 
Parameter NQ SNQ Parameter NQ SNQ 
Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio 
8 -0.429 -17.85 - - /43 - - 0.014 0.78 
Pi -3.0E-4 -0.14 - - YtA - - 0.191 4.53 
Ä -0.152 -0.54 - - YAS - - -2.332 -2.69 
A 0.047 2.11 - - Ytb - - -4.926 -0.51 
A 0.438 9.09 - - YAI - - 1.662 0.14 
ßi -4.881 -4.62 - - YAS - - 1.180 0.08 
A 55.818 4.66 - - p -0.005 -18.13 -0.009 -11.17 
ßi 5.945 0.44 - - M\ 2.7E-5 7.27 5.4E-5 6.70 
ß^ 0.218 0.01 - - Mi 0.010 15.33 0.020 10.72 
a,. 17.284 5.22 18.163 5.69 Mi 0.001 16.13 0.003 10.61 
« 1 2 7.340 3.6.7 2.382 1.24 MA 0.002 15.24 0.004 10.17 
«13 -0.097 -0.13 -1.662 -3.08 M5 0.003 2.03 0.007 2.22 
«22 11.393 4.87 2.619 1.32 Mb 0.222 8.13 0.102 1.08 
« 2 3 -0.450 -1.83 -0.453 -2.39 Mi 0.024 2.39 0.038 2.00 
Ä33 1.308 2.14 1.752 3.96 Mi -0.069 -5.83 -0.108 -4.63 
f. -0.101 -8.63 -0.247 -16.58 ß u 8.0E-7 1.85 5.2E-7 0.45 
6 -0.493 -48.87 -0.678 -48.65 ßn 3.3E-6 0.08 2.3E-5 0.22 
-0.026 -28.77 -0.035 -35.47 ßn -4.9E-6 -1.49 -8.4E-6 -0.98 
a - - -0.179 -11.98 ßu -6.2E-5 -8.54 -1.2E-4 -6.07 
0.003 7.11 0.004 2.20 ß » 0.001 3.59 0.001 2.07 
1.189 17.99 1.405 5.58 ßM -0.005 -4.64 -0.005 -1.62 
0.033 8.31 0.059 3.07 ß v -3.0E-4 -0.21 -0.001 -0.21 
0.085 8.59 0.292 6.75 ßn -0.001 -0.85 -0.001 -0.20 
/15 1.081 6.48 -0.976 -1.10 ßn -0.044 -7.02 -0.085 -5.27 
-4.714 -5.44 -7.595 -0.77 A3 -0.002 -3.83 -0.004 -2.99 
-1.420 -0.22 -0.972 -0.07 ßlA -0.002 -3.14 -0.006 -2.69 
/ I S -11.448 -1.58 -15.583 -0.97 ß25 -0.046 -2.50 -0.089 -1.85 
3.3E-4 0.92 0.002 0.97 Ä s 0.031 0.18 1.277 2.59 
Y22 1.488 26.16 1.775 6.89 ß i i 0.144 0.63 0.098 0.16 
723 -0.033 -9.81 -0.001 -0.04 ßi% 0.307 1.00 0.045 0.06 
/24 0.046 5.43 0.276 6.18 A3 -3.4E-4 -7.42 -0.001 -5.75 
/ 25 1.483 10.21 -0.785 -0.86 A4 -0.001 -11.33 -0.002 -7.16 
-5.531 -7.40 -9.075 -0.88 A3 0.006 3.41 0.007 1.57 
Yn -2.517 -0.45 -1.730 -0.14 Ä 6 -0.108 -7.63 -0.102 -2.42 
728 2.769 0.45 -1.632 -0.10 Ä 7 -0.059 -4.20 -0.073 -1.97 
/31 3.9E-5 1.22 1.3E-4 0.96 ßi» -0.011 -0.77 -0.021 -0.52 
f32 0.023 4.49 0.035 2.10 A4 -0.001 -6.39 -0.002 -5.14 
/ 3 3 0.001 1.89 0.002 1.71 Ä 5 -0.012 -3.80 -0.004 -0.44 
YiA 0.003 4.00 0.017 5.70 Ä 6 -0.120 -5.25 -0.171 -2.69 
r>5 0.102 7.82 -0.046 -0.77 Ä 7 0.015 0.48 0.072 0.84 
Yit, -0.328 -4.92 -0.510 -0.76 Ä 8 0.120 3.06 0.265 2.56 
Yn 0.276 0.56 0.294 0.35 Ä 5 0.533 5.13 0.246 0.93 
YiS 0.254 0.47 -0.004 -0.00 Ä 6 -4.205 -4.26 1.385 0.55 
- - 4.6E-4 0.24 Ä 7 -0.479 -0.94 -0.254 -0.19 
- - -0.860 -3.53 Ä 8 -0.919 -1.59 -1.221 -0.79 
Observations 9 365 
Farms 1 961 
Period 1973/74-1992/93 
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The t-ratios indicate that 49 per cent of the parameters in the SNQ model and 67 per 
cent of the parameters in the NQ model are significantly different from zero at the 5 per 
cent level. The Hessian matrix of prices is positive senn-definite, which is a necessary 
condition for farmers to be profit maximisers. Most parameter estimates related to regional 
dummies are not significant. Therefore, an F-test is used to test 
H o : ; t 7 = / ; 8 = / ^ 7 = / * = A 7 = / k 8 = 0 (i=l,..,4; A=l,..,5) against the alternative that at least one of 
these parameters is not equal to zero. The null hypothesis is rejected 
(F(2o,34662;a=o.05)=l-57<25.00)3. Furthermore, the fixed effect model is tested on the 
assumption that all farms have the same intercepts in the netput equations; Ho: aa,=Of for 
all h,f=l,..,R (/=1,..,4) against the alternative that at least one of the farms has a different 
intercept (note, that this is a rather broad way of testing). For each netput equation qi and 
for the whole estimated system the null hypothesis is rejected (F(i96U,7384;a=o.o5)=l<31.30; 
16.49; 19.02; 32.42 and F(7840,34662;a=o.05)=l<9.18)4. 
Table 3.3 presents the simulated conditional and unconditional elasticities for 
1992/93. The elasticities are calculated for each farm in 1992/93 and their weighted 
average is presented here. The conditional elasticity (conditional on the quantity of milk 
supply) can be referred to as a short-term elasticity, whereas the unconditional elasticity is 
a kind of intermediate-term elasticity because milk supply is variable but the quasi-fixed 
inputs are still taken as given. The Le Chatelier-Samuelson principle is satisfied since, in 
absolute terms, the unconditional own price elasticity is larger than the conditional 
elasticity. 
The first column of Table 3.3 gives the elasticities of milk supply. Because milk 
supply is subject to quotas, the elasticity of milk supply with respect to the market price of 
milk has no practical meaning (the elasticity conditional on the quantity of milk does not 
exist). Therefore, the elasticities of milk supply are calculated using the marginal costs of 
milk. Increasing netput prices result in decreased milk supply. Milk supply is increased by 
increasing the quantity of quasi-fixed inputs. Milk supply is inelastic. 
3 The number of restrictions is 20. The degrees of freedom are (N*G)+M-K-(H*G), where N is the total 
number of observations, G is the number of equations in which fixed effects are included, M is the number of 
observations in the pre-quota period, K is the number of parameters and H is the number of farms. Thus, the 
degrees of freedom equal (9365*4)+5127-81-(1961*4)=34662. 
4 The number of restrictions is 1960 for each netput equation and 4*1960=7840 for the whole system. The 
degrees of freedom are N-K rH=9365-19.67-1961=7384.33 for each netput equation and 34662 for the whole 
system. 
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Table 3.3: Conditional and unconditional price and quantity elasticities simulated for J992/93 
(weighted calculated mean) for NQ and SNQ. 
Milk Other output Purchased feed Dairy cattle Other input 
U " C b U C U C U C U 
With respect to prices: 
Milk NQ 0.43 - -0.12 - 0.71 - 0.66 - 0.09 
SNQ 0.26 - -0.08 - 0.47 - 0.40 - 0.03 
Other output NQ -0.08 0.20 0.22 -0.10 -0.24 0.02 -0.11 0.26 0.24 
SNQ -0.04 0.26 0.27 -0.06 -0.13 0.44 0.38 0.28 0.27 
Purchased feed NQ -0.32 0.07 0.16 -0.12 -0.64 0.08 -0.41 0.14 0.07 
SNQ -0.20 0.04 0.10 -0.04 -0.41 0.10 -0.21 0.06 0.04 
Dairy cattle NQ -0.02 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.32 -0.36 0.01 0.01 
SNQ -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.50 -0.52 -0.00 -0.00 
Other input NQ -0.01 -0.26 -0.26 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.21 -0.40 -0.40 
SNQ -0.00 -0.28 -0.28 0.09 0.09 -0.05 -0.06 -0.33 -0.33 
With respect to quantities: 
Milk output NQ - -0.29 - 1.65 - 1.53 - 0.22 -
SNQ - -0.30 - 1.80 - 1.53 - 0.12 -
Labour NQ 0.10 0.14 0.12 -0.02 0.14 -0.04 0.11 -0.05 -0.03 
SNQ 0.11 0.21 0.18 -0.11 0.08 -0.13 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 
Land NQ 0.29 0.46 0.37 -0.67 -0.20 -0.18 0.26 0.34 0.41 
SNQ 0.31 0.48 0.39 -0.75 -0.19 -0.21 0.26 0.41 0.44 
Buildings NQ 0.32 0.10 0.01 0.12 0.64 -0.03 0.45 0.01 0.08 
SNQ 0.31 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.65 -0.05 0.43 0.02 0.06 
Machinery NQ 0.44 0.21 0.08 -0.13 0.59 -0.15 0.52 0.36 0.46 
SNQ 0.43 0.10 -0.03 -0.05 0.73 0.02 0.68 0.14 0.19 
Technology 0 NQ 0.06 0.27 0.25 -0.43 -0.34 -0.51 -0.43 -0.47 -0.46 
SNQ 0.07 0.48 0.46 -0.67 -0.55 -0.79 -0.68 -0.15 -0.14 
a Unconditional elasticity: milk supply is variable, although there are still quasi-fixed inputs. ° Conditional 
elasticity: milk supply is fixed. c Annual percentage change in supply and demand due to technological 
change. 
Looking at the conditional elasticities, milk and other output are substitutes at the 
farm level; also variable inputs are mainly substitutes, except for dairy cattle and other 
input in the SNQ model. Dairy cattle and purchased feed become complements if milk 
supply is variable. The elastic demand for purchased feed and dairy cattle with respect to 
the quantity of milk already indicates this reaction. Labour, land and machinery are 
substitutes for purchased feed input, indicating that the dairy farmer has a choice between 
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buying feed or growing it on the farm. Labour and machinery become complements for 
purchased feed when the farmer has the possibility to adjust his level of milk supply 
(unconditional elasticities). For given milk quota, quasi-fixed inputs, except machinery in 
the SNQ model, are substitutes for dairy cattle, and they become complements when 
quotas can be reallocated. Land, buildings and machinery are complements for the 
composite category of other variable inputs; labour is a substitute. The elasticities with 
respect to the trend (last row of Table 3.3) indicate an annual technological efficiency 
progress. 
For the farms in 1992/93, the estimates are used to simulate input demand, output 
supply, profits and shadow prices. The results of this base simulation are shown in Table 
3.1. The simulated values for the input supply, output demand and profits are very similar 
to the data. The NQ model performs better than the SNQ model. Calculated shadow prices 
are given in Table 3.4. The quasi-fixed inputs are at their long-run equilibrium level if the 
shadow price equals the actual rental price (Segerson and Squires, 1993). The shadow 
price of labour is low compared to hourly earnings of hired farm labour, which was 27.40 
guilders in 1992 (LEI-DLO and CBS, 1994). This well-known result in agriculture 
indicates either, that agricultural labour is satisfied with lower wages because they are 
attached to the farm, or official off-farm wages are higher than real off-farm earnings for 
farm labour (Elhorst, 1996). The average shadow price of agricultural land resembles the 
actual free rental price of 1700 guilders per hectare (Huntjens, 1996). The average 
calculated shadow price of milk quota is 39 cents per kilogram. The average lease price of 
quota in 1992/93 was 40 cents per kilogram of milk with an average of 4.4 per cent fat 
(LEI-DLO and CBS, 1994). So, for milk with 3.7 per cent fat (which is the standard in our 
model), the actual lease price was 34 cents per kilogram. The difference indicates an 
incentive to invest in quota. 
The shadow prices of the quasi-fixed inputs are positively related to the quota level 
(/tt>0, A=l,..,4), so a more restrictive quota regime lowers the profitability of additional 
units of quasi-fixed inputs. The estimates juk imply that larger amounts of quasi-fixed 
inputs on the farm result in higher shadow prices of quota. Moreover, the shadow price of 
quota is higher (jtj) for farms on northern clay and lower for farms on western 
pastures, compared to farms on sandy soils with equal endowments of quasi-fixed inputs. 
Therefore, this model indicates a tendency to redistribute quotas from western pastures to 
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northern clay and peat. Parameter estimates for f3k„ (k,n=l,..,4), except /3\\ and /3n, indicate 
that larger amounts of labour, land, buildings or machinery result in lower shadow prices 
for any of these quasi-fixed inputs. 
Table 3.4: Average" shadow prices in 1992/93for milk quotas and quasi-fixed inputs (1992/93 
guilders) for NQ and SNQ. 
Variables Dimension Total Sandy Northern Western 
sector soils 
clay pastures 
Milk quotas Kilogram NQ 0.374 0.387 0.390 0.325 
SNQ 0.393 0.410 0.420 0.323 
Labour Hour NQ 4.717 4.946 4.815 4.065 
SNQ 7.676 7.681 7.301 8.090 
Land Hectare NQ 1 553 1 449 1 554 1 798 
SNQ 1 629 1 619 1 609 1 675 
Buildings Invested guilder of 1980/81 NQ 0.015 0.027 -0.020 0.025 
SNQ 0.036 0.049 0.001 0.045 
Machinery Invested guilder of 1980/81 NQ 0.009 -0.033 0.004 0.116 
SNQ 0.086 -0.000 0.087 0.288 
Technology Annual increase in profits NQ 4 455 4 835 4 145 3 900 
SNQ 4 716 5 085 4 713 3 842 
'Weighted calculated mean. 
3.6.1 Fixed effects in the milk supply equation 
The estimation results of the model including fixed effects in the milk supply equation are 
shown in Appendix 3.C. The t-ratios indicate that 48 per cent of the parameters are 
significantly different from zero. The parameter estimates for ay, p and p.k (A=l,..,5) are of 
the same magnitude and sign as in the central SNQ model. The estimates for p6, p% ^ 
most of the estimates for fj„k and yik related to k=6 and k=8 switched signs. As a result of 
the restriction in equation (3.21) the estimate for £j has a positive sign, indicating that 
other output and milk have become complements. The estimates for Qi, £, Q, and p 
correspond to the assumption for a normal milk supply function, i.e. they are smaller than 
zero. The estimate for the intercept of the milk supply equation s, which is equal for all 
farms and valid for the post-quota period, is significant and matches the estimate in the NQ 
model (which is valid for the total sample period). 
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3.6.2 Weighted estimation 
The results of the weighted estimation of the SNQ model are also shown in Appendix 3.C. 
The number of significant parameters is 43 per cent, which is less than in the other models. 
Only 6 of the parameter estimates have an other sign than in the central SNQ model. The 
magnitude of most of the estimates is the same. 
3.7 Discussion and conclusions 
In this chapter, a theoretical framework and an empirical micro-model for quota 
constrained dairy farming are developed. The model is applicable to simulate short-run 
effects of alternative dairy policies, see chapter 4 for an example. Elhorst (1996) indicated 
that, while building an empirical model, a lot of practically-based decisions are made, 
which are not always clearly described and argued by the researcher. Although, for the 
purpose of many articles, it is not necessary and even diverting to describe all those 
decisions, some of the consideration behind the model in this study are discussed here, as 
far as they have not yet been discussed in earlier sections. In the following we discuss the 
functional form, using weights, the research population, and fixed effects. 
The empirical model consists of a system of simultaneous equations, which 
accounts for a regime switch through a difference in the number of observations across 
equations. Since estimating such a model, using an unbalanced panel data set, is 
complicated, the structure of the model is kept as simple as possible (keeping in mind also 
the applicability for policy simulations). Therefore, the NQ would have been preferred to 
the SNQ as a functional form. However, the NQ is not invariant with the numeraire and 
resulted in one-sided simulation effects, that is all variability is absorbed by the variable 
used as the numeraire. 
The data used are selected from a stratified sample of farms, which gives an 
opportunity to obtain weighted estimators. However, the test which Elhorst (1988) 
suggests to determine the difference between weighted and unweighted estimation could 
not be applied to our model. Further research is needed in this respect. Therefore, the 
estimation of our central model does not account for the weights. Weight factors are only 
used in this thesis to present averages and totals and in the simulations. Estimation results 
of the weighted estimation are similar to the results of the unweighted estimation. 
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For the purpose of developing a model for simulating dairy policy, it is necessary to 
distinguish specialised dairy farms. In order to get as many observations as possible, the 
criteria used is 50 per cent of total returns coming from milk. As a consequence, a small 
part of total milk production (ca. 5 per cent in 1992/93) is not covered by the model. 
Furthermore, observations are lost due to the fixed effect transformation and substitution 
between milk and other specific agricultural products, cannot be handled by this model. 
The available panel data set makes it possible to use fixed effects or random effects 
estimators. In this study the fixed effects model is used, because Thijssen (1992) showed 
that the random effects estimators are not consistent since individual effects and the 
regressors are not independent. Moreover, as argued before, the model is mainly used to 
make inferences about the behaviour of individual farms in the sample. In that case, fixed 
effects are more appropriate (Elhorst, 1996). A more complicated system, i.e. including 
additional fixed effects in the milk supply equation for the pre-quota period, was also 
estimated. However, given that the model will be used for simulating behaviour in the 
post-quota period (the most recent year, 1992/93, will be taken as the base year), they are 
relatively unimportant. Furthermore, the necessary restriction (equation (3.21)) forced milk 
and other output supply to become complements, which is counter-intuitive. 
The central model presented in this chapter is a flexible tool to show short-term 
behaviour of individual Dutch dairy farms. The chapter showed some of the considerations 
a researcher has to make in constructing such a model. It is shown in next chapters that the 
model enables to simulate alternative policies, especially those dealing with tradability of 
quotas. 
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Chapter 4 EFFICIENCY LOSS DUE TO DISTORTIONS IN DUTCH 
MILK QUOTA TRADE1 
4.1 Introduction and background 
In 1984 quotas on milk supply were introduced in response to overproduction and 
budgetary problems of the EU. In the Netherlands, milk production was effectively 
restricted to farm level quota by a prohibitive levy on surplus production. In order to 
decrease the rigidity on production structure, imposed by the quota system, exchange of 
milk quotas was allowed for. Initially quota exchange was limited to the exchange of 
ownership rights, but since 1989, farmers are also allowed to exchange user rights through 
leasing. 
The exchange of quota ownership and user rights is subject to restrictions (Krijger, 
1991). Milk quotas are tied to land, and a buyer of ownership rights is required to buy land 
or rent land for the period of at least one year. Moreover, a maximum of twenty thousand 
kilograms per hectare applies in the exchange of ownership rights. Suppliers of user rights 
are not allowed to lease-out less than ten thousand kilograms of milk; demanders may not 
lease more than 75 thousand kilograms. Exchange of both ownership and user rights incurs 
additional costs related to arranging and preparing the contract, for example costs for 
transaction services by an estate agent or notary. De Groot (1995) calculated the notary and 
estate agent costs as approximately two per cent of the milk quota price. Distortions like 
these result in efficiency losses for the dairy sector. 
Modelling milk quota and quota mobility has received considerable attention in the 
agricultural economics literature. Moschini (1988) and Helming, Oskam and Thijssen 
(1993) provided a framework for modelling quotas while others (Burrell, 1989; Cox, 1987) 
focused on the efficiency gains of free tradability of quotas or analysed milk quota 
mobility in different countries (Oskam and Speijers, 1992). For the case of tobacco in the 
U.S., the distribution of economic rents between owners and renters of marketable 
production quotas is analysed by Babcock and Foster (1992). More recent literature deals 
1 This chapter has been published as: Boots, M., A. Oude Lansink and J. Peerlings (1997). Efficiency loss 
due to distortions in Dutch milk quota trade. European Review of Agricultural Economics 24: 31-46. 
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with the welfare effects of transfer restrictions. Rucker, Thurman and Sumner (1995) 
determine the impact of geographical trade restrictions using county level data, whereas 
Guyomard, Herard and Mahe (1995) model a tax on milk quota exchanges (siphon), using 
a cross-section of French dairy farms. 
The contribution of this chapter is that it explicitly quantifies the costs of quantity 
restrictions and transfer costs in dairy quota exchange, for dairy farms in different regions 
in the Netherlands. The relevance of these results for policy makers is that these costs 
should outweigh the policy gains (e.g. protecting small farmers). 
This chapter calculates the welfare costs of the existing quota trade distortions, using a 
simulation model that consists of equations estimated on panel data of specialised Dutch 
dairy farms. In the model there are two outputs: milk and other outputs; three variable 
inputs: purchased feed input, dairy cattle and other inputs; four fixed inputs: labour, land, 
buildings and machinery. All farms are allowed to have a different technology through 
farm specific and regional dummies. The next section elaborates on the econometric 
model, which is followed by a description of the data and a discussion of estimation 
results. The results of the estimation are used in a simulation model that calculates the 
short-term effects of the trade distortions for the farms in the panel. Simulation results are 
aggregated for farms in different regions and for the sector as a whole. The static model 
used does not enable us to distinguish explicitly between the exchange of ownership and 
user rights. Therefore the simplifying assumption is made that only the exchange in user 
rights takes place. Since the markets for user and ownership rights are closely related 
(Hubbard, 1992) this assumption is not very restrictive, given the purpose of this research. 
Simulations and simulation results are presented subsequently, followed by a summary and 
concluding comments. 
4.2 Econometric model 
In order to analyse the welfare effects of distortions in a system of tradable milk quotas, a 
model of output supply and input demand for dairy farmers is developed. It is assumed that 
the farmers' objective is the maximisation of short-run profit and that the farmer is a price-
taker in all input and output markets. In the short run, volumes of fixed inputs and the state 
of technology are assumed to be fixed. The system of input demand and output supply is 
74 
Chapter 4 
derived from a symmetric normalised quadratic (SNQ) restricted profit function. The SNQ 
was used because it allows for checking convexity in prices globally (a Hessian of 
constants) and because netputs are treated symmetrically (Kohli, 1993; Oude Lansink and 
Thijssen, 1998). Restricted profit is defined as the value of unconstrained outputs minus 
the value of inputs (Moschini, 1988). It is assumed that each farmer has access to the same 
production technology; farm-specific features (e.g. the quality of land and management) 
are modelled using fixed effects. 
In the model, five netput quantities qt (positive for outputs, negative for inputs) are 
distinguished with r=0 (milk output), 1 (other output), 2 (purchased feed input), 3 (dairy 
cattle) and 4 (other variable inputs). Netput price indices are vn,..,V4. Fixed inputs are zk (k: 
l=labour, 2=land, 3=buildings and 4=machinery). Furthermore, the model includes a trend 
zs representing technology and a dummy Z(, allowing for a change in technology due to the 
introduction of milk quota in 1984. Finally, dummies z^ and z 8 are included to distinguish 
between three regions in which farms operate; sandy soils (z 7=z 8=0), northern clay and peat 
(z 7 =l, z 8=0), and western pastures (z7=0, z 8 =l) . 
For each farm h and year t, the SNQ restricted profit function is written as: 
4 j 4 4 4 4 8 
8>„(vin1oh,>zkh,) = Z«*v« +-Xw',HYauvi'VM +Z^V»9o*/ + ZZ^* v* z4»i + 
1 = ! ^ 1=1 > 1 7 = 1 1 = 1 4 = 1 
1 8 1 5 5 
r wpq0hlq0hl + w£ Mk2u,<lo*, + r WZ Z P^u,,2^, + (4- *) 
*• 4=1 4=1 n=l 
5 8 
4=1 »1=6 
The last term in the restricted profit function indicates that the cross-products of the 
dummies are not taken into account, eta, denote farm h specific parameters. Symmetry is 
maintained by requiring afo^i and /Jh,=/Jnk- The profit function is linearly homogeneous in 
4 
prices because of the term w = Z 9ivi< > where Gi are non-negative constants. In this study 
/=i 
6i is the average share of netput / in total costs plus revenue, so they sum up to unity. They 
can be interpreted as fixed weights for the price index w. In order to identify all 
parameters, additional restrictions have to be imposed on the profit function: 
Z«/;V;=0 V/ = l,..,4 (4.2) 
»=i 
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where vy is an arbitrary point of observation. In this study v, equals the sample mean of 
price j . 
Using Hotelling's lemma, the supply functions for other output and demand 
functions for feed, dairy cattle and other variable input are given by: 
4 i 4 4 
4 J 4 4 8 J 
8 i 5 5 
(4.3) 
d i E Mkzic„1oh, + X 61E E Ph,zkh,z^ + e , E E ^*»Z*Z» 
All netput equations have a farm-specific intercept. The model is completed by the milk 
supply function, which is only valid in the pre-quota period. The milk supply function does 
not include a farm-specific intercept, since consistent extimation requires the farm-specific 
effects to appear as slope coefficients in the netput equations. If included, these farm-
specific effects would not disappear when the fixed effects model is transformed for 
estimation. 
loin — 
1 
E ^ + M + E - " * 2 * (4.4) 
After the introduction of the quota system, milk supply is exogenous and the milk 
supply equation does not apply. The marginal costs of milk supply, that is, the price that 
would have given rise to production at the quota level, is given by: 
E ^ V » + w[ Mo,,,+E/"*Z«" ] (4-5) 
Furthermore, the shadow price of milk quota rA, is vorSon- The shadow prices of the fixed 
inputs are given by: 
(4.6) %„ = E^*V"+A MAM, + E^*»Z. 
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4.3 Data and estimation 
Data on specialised dairy farms 2, covering the period 1973/74-1992/93 are selected from a 
stratified sample of farms keeping accounts on behalf of the LEI-DLO farm accounting 
system. The data set used for estimation contains 9365 observations. 
Two outputs, milk and other outputs, are distinguished. Other output is an aggre-
gate of revenues from marketable crops, beef and veal, and other animals. The three 
variable inputs are purchased feed for (dairy) cattle, dairy cattle and other variable inputs. 
The latter consists of feed for animals other than dairy cattle, seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, 
contract work, veterinary services, fuel, energy and other cattle. Variable outputs and 
inputs are measured as revenues and costs. Fixed inputs are labour (hours), land (hectares), 
buildings (total invested capital at 1980/81 prices) and machinery (total invested capital at 
1980/81 prices). Data on capital invested in buildings for tenant farms are incomplete 
(Elhorst, 1990 p.84). Therefore, simulated values for invested capital in tenant farmers' 
buildings are used. First, for owner-occupied farms, capital invested in buildings was 
regressed on costs of buildings and size of the farm. Second, predicted values for capital 
invested in buildings for tenant farms were determined and used in later stages of 
estimation. Other variables in the econometric model are a trend and regional dummies. 
The regions distinguished are sandy soils, northern clay and peat, and western pastures (see 
also van Dijk, Douma and van Vliet, 1995 p. 16). 
Tornqvist price indices were calculated for the compound variables (other outputs, 
feed input and other variable inputs). Implicit quantity indices were obtained as the ratio of 
value and the price index. The price indices vary over years but not over farms, implying 
that differences in the composition of a netput or quality differences are reflected in the 
quantity. Price and quantity indices for milk are standardised for a fat content of 3.7 per 
cent. Data on prices are obtained from LEI-DLO and CBS. The data for the average farm 
in 1992/93 are summarised in Appendix 4. A. 
" Farms with more than 50 per cent of output coming from milk production. 
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The equations estimated are (4.3) and (4.4) with additional error terms, where the 
latter equation is only relevant for the pre-quota period. Every farm is assumed to have a 
different intercept reflecting differences in farm characteristics. This assumption is 
explicitly accounted for by a fixed effects model. The necessary transformation can also be 
applied to an incomplete panel like our data set, as long as a farm is present in the panel for 
at least two subsequent years (Thijssen, 1992). The farm-specific intercepts of the netput 
equations (an,) appear as slope coefficients in the profit function. In order to avoid direct 
estimation of the farm-specific intercepts3, the profit function is left out of the estimated 
system. 
The milk supply equation is included during estimation in the period before the 
quota introduction, causing a difference in the number of observations across equations. 
The covariance matrix of residuals used in estimating the system is corrected for the differ-
ence in the number of observations (Judge et al., 1988 p.462). In the pre-quota period, the 
quantity of milk can be related to the error term and an instrumental variable estimator 
must be applied. Endogenous variables are qo, q, (/=1,..,4), and all terms containing milk 
output (Vjqo, qoqo, z^a). All exogenous variables are used as instruments. Error terms may 
be correlated across equations. Therefore, non-linear 3SLS is an appropriate estimation 
technique (Judge et al., 1988 p.655). 
The estimation results are reported in chapter 3, Table 3.2. At the 5 per cent 
significance level 49 per cent of the parameters is significantly different from zero. Most 
parameter estimates related to regional dummies are not significant. Therefore, an F-test4 is 
used to test Ho:tf7=tf8=^7=/4=A7=A8 = 0 (/=1,..,4; k=l,..,5) against the alternative that at 
least one of these parameters is not equal to zero. The null hypothesis is rejected 
(F(2o,34662;a=o.os) = 1.57 < 25). The Hessian of prices is positive semi-definite, a necessary 
condition for farmers to be short-term profit maximisers. 
The shadow prices of the fixed inputs are positively related to the quota level, so a 
more restrictive quota regime lowers the profitability of additional units of fixed inputs. 
The estimates /ik imply that larger amounts of fixed inputs on the farm result in higher 
3 The farm-specific effects are calculated using the parameter estimates (denoted by hats) and the averages 
over time per farm (denoted by bars). It is assumed that the average of the remainder disturbance per farm, 
that is the part of the error term which is not farm-specific, is zero (Baltagi, 1995). See also equation (3.19) in 
chapter 3 and the related footnote. 
4 See also chapter 3. 
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shadow prices of quota. Moreover, the shadow price of quota is higher for farms on 
northern clay and lower for farms on western pastures, compared to farms on sandy 
soils with equal endowments of fixed inputs. Therefore, this model indicates a tendency to 
redistribute quotas from western pastures to northern clay and peat. Parameter estimates 
for Pkn, except /in and /3\2, indicate that larger amounts of labour, land, buildings or 
machinery result in lower shadow prices for any of these fixed inputs. 
Shadow prices are given in chapter 3, Table 3.4. The shadow price of labour is low 
compared to hourly earnings of hired farm labour, which was 27.40 guilders in 1992 (LEI-
DLO and CBS, 1994). The average shadow price of agricultural land (1629 guilders per 
hectare in 1992/93) resembles the actual rent of 1700 guilders per hectare (Huntjens, 
1996). The value of agricultural land is higher in the western part of the Netherlands. It is 
probably the result of the relatively high pressure of alternative use of land in this part of 
the country. 
Price and quantity elasticities for 1992/93 are shown in chapter 3, Table 3.3. The 
first column of the table gives the elasticities of milk supply in 1992/93. Because milk 
supply is subject to quotas the elasticity of milk supply with respect to the market price of 
milk has no practical meaning (the elasticity conditional on the quantity of milk does not 
exist). Therefore, the elasticities of milk supply are calculated using the marginal costs of 
milk. Increasing netput prices result in decreased milk supply. Milk supply is increased by 
increasing the quantity of fixed inputs. Looking at the conditional elasticities (conditional 
on the quantity of milk supply), milk and other outputs are substitutes at the farm level; 
also variable inputs are mainly substitutes, except dairy cattle and other inputs. Labour, 
land and machinery are substitutes for purchased feed input, indicating that the dairy 
farmer has a choice between buying feed or growing it on the farm. The fixed inputs 
become complements for purchased feed when the farmer has the possibility to adjust his 
level of milk supply (unconditional elasticities). For given milk quota, fixed inputs, except 
machinery, are substitutes for dairy cattle, and they become complements when quotas can 
be reallocated. Land, buildings and machinery are complements for the composite category 
of other variable inputs; labour is a substitute. They are all complements for other variable 
inputs if quotas are tradable. 
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4.4 Policy simulations and results 
The model developed in the previous section (equations (4.3), (4.4) and (4.5)) is used to 
determine the effects of distortions in the market for milk quotas. Three simulations are 
performed and results are compared with a base simulation. The simulations describe the 
potential direction (demand or supply) of quota trade among farms. It is assumed that 
quota price is market determined, so the quota market clears. Hence, the trade distortions 
are valued in terms of the market price of quota. The prices of other output and variable 
inputs, the amount of fixed inputs at the farm level and national milk quota are kept 
constant throughout all the simulations. 
The effects are determined for individual farms in the sample in 1992/93, represent-
ing 27515 farms in the sector. These farms represent a total quota of 10590 millon kilo-
grams, which is 95 per cent of the national quota in 1992. It shows that in our sample, 
larger farms are over-represented (Reinhard et al, 1995 p.37-38). More than fifty per cent 
(14517) of the farms is situated on sandy soils. There are 6888 farms (25 per cent) located 
in the northern clay and peat region and 6110 (22 per cent) on western pastures. The simu-
lations are described below. 
4.4.1 Base simulation 
The base simulation represents the situation for dairy farms in 1992/93. Quota trade is not 
allowed for, so the allocation of quotas is fixed at the 1992/93 level. Since endowments of 
fixed inputs differ across farms, this gives rise to farm-specific shadow prices of milk 
quota (r/,). The direction of potential quota trade in subsequent simulations is determined 
by these shadow prices. The results of the base simulation for the average dairy farm in 
1992/93 are shown in Appendix 4. A. 
4.4.2 Unconstrained quota trade (I) 
This simulation assumes that quotas can be traded freely in a competitive market. It 
implies that even marginal amounts of quotas will be transferred and every farm faces the 
same market price of quota. 
If the price of quota is too low, demand would exceed supply; if it is too high, 
supply would exceed demand. The market price of quota is the price at which total excess 
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demand for quota is zero. The market price is calculated using the Minos solver in GAMS 
(Brooke, Kendrick and Meeraus, 1988). Individual quota levels and netputs are adjusted to 
profit maximising levels. Profit, after quota trade, for the individual farm h is given by the 
value of the netputs minus the value of net traded quotas: 
nh = v0g7M + fjvlqlh -rr{qlh -q"™) (4-7) 
Here, 7th are profits, q1^" is the level of milk quota on farm h in the base simulation, q\h is 
the quota level on farm h after trade and / is the market price of quota which is equal and 
given across farms. Both quota sellers and quota buyers gain from quota trade. That is, 
they all end up with higher profits after trade (see also Cox, 1987). 
4.4.3 Trade distortions: thresholds (II) 
In this simulation, thresholds in quota trade are introduced. Quota supply of less than ten 
thousand kilograms is not allowed in this simulation. When a farmer's optimal supply turns 
out to be less than ten thousand kilograms, he is assumed to supply either zero or ten 
thousand kilograms, depending on which gives him higher profits. Further, a maximum 
quota demand of 75 thousand kilogram is imposed. These thresholds coincide with the 
current regulations for quota lease in the Netherlands. 
Again, the optimal market price for quotas is calculated as the price at which total 
excess demand for quotas is zero. Once the market price for quotas and the individual milk 
supply is known, equation (4.3) and (4.7) are used to determine demand and supply of 
netputs and profits. The efficiency loss due to thresholds is calculated as the difference in 
total profit compared to unrestricted quota trade (I). 
4.4.4 Trade distortions: price margin (III) 
The costs of a notary and estate agent cause a margin between the buyers' and sellers' price 
of milk quota. These additional costs are referred to as transfer costs 5 and they are 
expressed as a proportion of the sellers' price of quota. This proportion (?) is chosen to be 2 
per cent. Thus, it is assumed that the buyers' price of quota (r^ e r a) is higher than the sellers' 
5 One might argue that this is a form of transactions costs. 
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price (rsup)) that is r d e m =(l+/ ' ) -r^ . Using the relation r-v-s (we skip the subscript 0 here), 
the effect on the marginal costs of milk production can be written as Sdem=(l+t)-Ssup-t-v. 
It is profitable for farmer h to demand quota when s^ > s/,, which can be rewritten 
as smp > (si,+ t-v)/(\+t). Similarly, farmer A is a supplier of quotas if smp < Sh. When s h < 
< (sh+ t-v)l{\+t) farmer h will remain at his initial quota level. 
The value of SsuP (and using the relationship given above, also s dan) is again 
calculated as the price at which the quota market clears. The price solutions (Ssup for a 
quota supplier and Sdem for a quota demander) are used to determine demand and supply of 
netputs, and profit. The difference between calculated total quota demand valued at the 
demanders' price and calculated total supply valued at the suppliers' price represents total 
transfer costs. Total efficiency loss is again the difference in total profit with simulation I. 
4.4.5 Results 
The effects of simulations I-III on the quota market are reported in Table 4.1. In Table 4.2 
the results of the simulations are compared with the base simulation. Table 4.3 summarises 
the transfer costs and efficiency losses as a result of the simulated trade distortions 
compared to unconstrained trade. 
From the unconstrained trade simulation (I) it becomes clear that the allocation of 
quotas in 1992/93 can still be improved upon, in spite of the earlier possibilities for farmers 
to trade quotas. For full efficiency, 1082 million kilograms of quota has to change hands 
(10.2 per cent of total national quota in the model). Each farmer will end up with higher 
profits and total profit increases by 9 per cent. The profit gain is higher for large farms (9.7 
per cent) than for small farms6 (8.1 per cent). The profit gain is highest for farms on 
northern clay. At the regional level, increasing the supply of milk and other output and 
decreasing the demand for variable inputs may go together. This is a result of aggregation; 
for individual farms this is not the case. The total profit increase is determined by an 
increasing supply of other outputs and decreasing demands of variable inputs. The optimal 
quota allocation comes about when the price of quota is 0.39 guilders per kg at 1992/93 
prices. At the calculated price, all farmers in the sample participate in quota trade. There 
b A particular farm is defined as large (small) if its milk production is higher (lower) than the average milk 
production in the base simulation. The results for large and small farms are not shown in the tables. 
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are 13263 (48.2 per cent) quota buyers and 14252 (51.8 per cent) quota suppliers, and none 
of the farmers leases out all their initial quota. 
Table 4.1: Effects of unrestricted quota trade (I), thresholds in quota trade (II) and a price margin 
in quota trade (III) (percentage changes compared to base simulation). 
Sandy soils Northern clay Western pastures Total sector 
Milk output I 1.45 1.98 -6.16 0 
II 1.64 -0.48 -3.27 0 
III 1.45 1.95 -6.11 0 
Other outputs I 6.02 11.00 7.73 7.52 
II 3.84 8.52 6.47 5.45 
III 6.02 11.01 7.71 7.52 
Purchased feed I -6.01 -9.20 -18.25 -9.39 
II -2.86 -10.32 -12.57 -6.81 
III -6.01 -9.27 -18.17 -9.39 
Dairy cattle 1 -7.98 -10.42 -17.56 -10.68 
II -4.29 -10.30 -12.60 -7.75 
III -7.97 -10.47 -17.49 -10.68 
Other inputs I -6.56 -11.90 -7.16 -7.93 
II -4.30 -8.73 -6.39 -5.75 
III -6.56 -11.90 -7.16 -7.93 
Profits I 8.73 10.93 7.41 9.09 
II 5.93 7.92 6.29 6.60 
III 8.59 10.77 7.28 8.95 
Including thresholds in the quota market (simulation II) has a substantial impact on 
the dairy sector. Profits increase by 6.6 per cent compared to the base simulation. 
However, as a result of the thresholds, the profit increase is higher for small farms (6.7 per 
cent) than for large farms (6.5 per cent). The amount of quota traded is 819 million kg (7.7 
per cent of total quota in the model), at a price of 0.33 guilders per kg 7 . The number of 
quota demanders is 15732 (57.2 per cent), the number of suppliers is 11125 (40.4 per cent). 
In total, 658 farmers (2.4 per cent) do not participate in quota trade. Total efficiency losses 
7 The effects of including thresholds in quota trade fit the actual situation in the Netherlands. The average 
lease price of quota in 1992/93 was 0.40 guilders per kilogram, with an average of 4.4 per cent fat (LEI-DLO 
and CBS, 1994). So, for milk with 3.7 per cent fat, the lease price was 0.34 guilders. The total amount of 
transferred milk quota in 1992 was 927 million kg, which is 8.4 per cent of the total national quota. 
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are 2.29 per cent compared to unconstrained quota trade (see Table 4.2). By assumption, 
there are no transfer costs. 
The effects of a price margin of two per cent (simulation III) are only slightly 
different when compared to unconstrained quota trade. Total profits after quota trade have 
increased by 8.9 per cent compared with the base run. The calculated suppliers' price of 
quota is 0.39 guilders per kg, the demanders' price is 0.40. Less quota is traded, a total of 
1066 million kg is traded between 13106 (47.6 per cent) quota buyers and 14075 (51.2 per 
cent) quota suppliers. Because of the transfer costs, 334 farmers (1.2 per cent) will not 
operate on the quota market. Table 4.2 shows that 0.13 per cent of profits under 
unconstrained trade leaves the dairy sector as transfer costs. Total efficiency loss as a result 
of the two per cent price margin is 0.13 per cent. 
Table 4.2: Transfer costs and efficiency losses as a result of thresholds (II) and a price margin (III) 
(percentage of profits under unrestricted quota trade (I)). 
Sandy soils Northern clay Western pastures Total sector 
Transfer costs II 0 0 0 0 
III 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.13 
Efficiency loss II 2.57 2.71 1.05 2.29 
III 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 
As the shadow prices have already indicated, farms on western pastures are net 
quota suppliers in the unconstrained trade simulation. Thus, quotas are reallocated to sandy 
soils and the northern clay and peat area. This is also the case when a price margin is 
included. However, the situation changes when thresholds on transactions are imposed. 
Farms on northern clay also become net quota suppliers and the whole quota flow is in the 
direction of the sandy soils. When milk production in a region is increased by quota 
buying, the shadow prices of all fixed inputs rise, and vice versa. 
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Table 4.3: Effects of unrestricted quota trade (I), thresholds in quota trade (II) and a price margin 
in quota trade (III). 
Sandy soils Northern clay Western pastures Total sector 
Quota demand 
(kilogram* 1000) I 550 923 375 879 156 037 1 082 840 
11 426 223 241 216 151 257 818 696 
III 541 984 370 989 152 817 1 065 790 
Quota supply 
(kilogram* 1000) I 473 759 315 635 293 445 1 082 840 
II 338 794 255 645 224 257 818 696 
III 464 756 311 904 289 130 1 065 790 
Value quota demand 
(1992/93 guilders 
*1000) 
I 216 501 147 712 61 319 425 533 
II 140 847 79 711 49 983 270 541 
III 215 179 147 291 60 671 423 141 
Value quota supply 
(1992/93 guilders 
* 1000) 
I 186 177 124 038 115318 425 533 
II 111 956 84 479 74 106 270 541 
III 180 900 121 404 112 540 414 845 
4.5 Summary and caveats 
This chapter has examined regional and national effects of distortions in Dutch milk quota 
trade on profit and quota allocation. Simulations show that free tradability of milk quotas 
increases profit (value of netputs) by 9 per cent and reallocates quotas from farmers on 
western pastures to farmers on sandy soils and the northern clay and peat area. The shadow 
price of milk quota is 0.39 guilders. The effects on these results of a 2 per cent price 
margin, representing transfer costs, are small. However if threshold levels for quota trade 
are introduced, profit increase is substantially smaller (6.6 per cent) and farmers in the 
northern clay and peat area switch from being net buyers to net suppliers of milk quota. 
The calculated market price with thresholds is 0.33 guilders. The policy implication of 
these results is that welfare gains can be obtained if restrictions on milk quota trade are 
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removed. In the situation of trade restrictions, small farms gain more from quota trade than 
large farms. However, all farms obtain additional profit when quota trade is unconstrained. 
The potential profit increase with free tradability of milk quotas is still underesti-
mated by our model. This is because only specialised dairy farms are represented in our 
sample, whereas farms that supply quota in the Netherlands are often small unspecialised 
farms leaving the sector (van Everdingen, 1993). A number of other caveats can be 
mentioned. First, it was assumed that quantities of land, labour, machinery and buildings 
are constant in the short term. This assumption is unlikely to hold if changes in milk quota 
at the farm level are large. Second, although the simulations identify farmers as potential 
quota demanders and suppliers, information about actual quota trade and lease for these 
farmers is not available, so the accurateness of the model predictions could not be checked 
at the individual level. 
The strength of the model is that it provides valuable information about the welfare 
effects of milk quota trade restrictions and transfer costs. It also identifies farmers that 
incur relatively large losses due to trade restrictions and it determines potential 
interregional trade flows. 
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Chapter 5 TWO-TIER PRICING AND AGENDA 2000 
5.1 Introduction and background 
It is widely acknowledged that dairy policy in the European Union (EU) should be revised. 
There are three reasons for policy reform. First, EU dairy policy should be compatible with 
the 1994 GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) agreement and the EU may 
anticipate to the new WTO (World Trade Organisation) round after 2000 (Agra Europe, 
1996). Under the 1994 GATT-agreement subsidised dairy exports have to be reduced by 
21 per cent, export subsidies have to fall by 36 per cent, a minimal market access of 5 per 
cent has to be established and (fixed) import tariffs have to be reduced by 36 per cent for 
dairy products (e.g. Hassan, 1996). Second, the enlargement of the EU with Central- and 
East European countries (CEECs) somewhere after 2000 will put pressure on the export 
budget of the EU when those countries become net exporters of dairy products. Third, the 
current, rigid milk quota system is an obstacle for structural adjustments and productivity 
growth in the EU dairy sector. Support prices are too high in relation to both the level of 
production and the level of productivity. 
Within the EU, alternative systems, which combine lower support prices and more 
flexibility for the farmer regarding the production level, are examined. The discussion 
focuses on how farm prices should be brought in line with world market levels, whether 
and how farmers should be compensated for price reductions, and to what extent quota 
levels should be adjusted (Agra Europe, 1996). A two-tier price system is one of the 
options (with advocates particularly in France). Similar to the sugar regime, in a two-tier 
milk price system, A-milk is produced at a supported milk price and farmers are allowed to 
produce extra B-milk at the lower world market price. The advantage of the two-tier 
system is that it would enable dairy farms in the EU to export without export subsidies, a 
prerequisite given the 1994 GATT-agreement, while maintaining a high level of support 
for dairy farmers. However, there are high monitoring and administration costs involved 
(Agra Europe, 1996). Moreover, it is questionable if the WTO would accept the two-tier 
price system because it could be considered as unfair competition. Price support to A-milk 
increases the overall (A- and B-milk) average revenue of milk production (cross-
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subsidisation), and therefore, in a two-tier system the production of B-milk is indirectly 
subsidised. 
The European Commission's options for reform are reflected in the Agenda 2000 
agreement. The agreement (see Agra Europe, 1999a) contains a 15 per cent cut in dairy, 
i.e. butter and skimmed milk powder, intervention prices over the period 2005/06-2007/08 
in order to improve competitiveness of EU dairy farming. As a result, the possibilities to 
sell dairy products are broadened. Therefore, a 2.4 per cent increase in total EU milk 
quotas until 2007/08 is justified. Compensation for the price decrease is given on a flat rate 
basis per tonne of quota. The complex proposal to compensate by a 'virtual' dairy cow 
premium, based on an assumed average yield of 5,800 kg per cow (Agra Europe, 1998), 
has been discarded. It is questionable if the Agenda 2000 agreement meets the needs of the 
new trade round. The elimination of export subsidies is not ensured and compensatory 
payments are not completely production-neutral. Therefore, the Agenda 2000 agreement is 
not WTO-compatible. Moreover, the enlargement issues are not explicitly considered 
(Agra Europe, 1999b). 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the effects for dairy farmers of i) a two-tier 
milk price system, ii) the Agenda 2000 reform regarding dairy, and iii) quota abolition. 
Dutch dairy farming is considered to be one of the most efficient within the EU. Therefore, 
the effects on production of the two-tier price system and the Agenda 2000 agreement for 
the Dutch dairy sector will give an indication of the possible effects on EU production. The 
effects are analysed using a micro-econometric simulation model of Dutch dairy farms and 
they are calculated for individual farms and for the industry as a whole. The model used is 
from chapters 3 and 4. However, changes were made in order to simulate both the two-tier 
milk price system as the Agenda 2000 reform. Our theoretical model of the two-tier system 
is similar to the framework of Bureau et al. (1997) regarding the EU sugar sector, with A-
and B-quotas and the possibility to produce C-sugar. 
5.2 Model, data and estimation 
In order to analyse a two-tier milk price system, a model of output supply and input 
demand for dairy farmers is developed (see chapter 3). Farmers are assumed to be short-
run profit maximisers and price-takers in all input and output markets. In the short run, 
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volumes of fixed inputs and the state of technology are assumed to be fixed and there is no 
exit and entry of farms. It is assumed that each farmer has access to the same production 
technology; farm-specific features (e.g. the quality of land and management) are modelled 
using fixed effects. 
The outputs distinguished are milk (qo), which is subject to supply constraints, and 
a composite of other outputs (q\). Purchased feed (qi), dairy cattle (qi) and a composite of 
other inputs (q^) are used as variable inputs. Netput prices v 0 to V4 and quasi-fixed inputs 
labour (zi), land (zt), buildings ( 2 3 ) and machinery (z4) are assumed given. The model also 
includes a time trend (z5) representing technology and a dummy (ze) allowing for a change 
in technology due to the introduction of milk quotas in 1984. Furthermore, there are 
dummies (z 7 and zg) included to distinguish between three regions. 
A restricted profit function is defined as the cost of producing the constrained 
output qo (Moschini, 1988). The properties of the restricted profit function are equivalent 
to those of the regular profit function. However, it is possible that restricted profit is 
negative. The symmetric normalised quadratic (SNQ) is used as the empirical specification 
(Kohli, 1993; Oude Lansink and Thijssen, 1998) of restricted profit at the farm level. 
From the restricted profit function, the netput equations ( q i , z'=T,..,4) for each farm 
are derived using Hotelling's lemma. The intercepts of the netput equations represent farm-
specificity. The model is completed by the milk supply function, which is only valid in the 
pre-quota period (1973/74-1983/84). In the post-quota period (1984/85-1992/93), milk 
supply is exogenously given for the individual farm and the milk supply equation does not 
apply. In that case, the marginal costs of producing at the quota level are relevant. 
The netput equations and the milk supply function, with additional error terms, are 
estimated on a panel data set1 of 9365 observations on specialised dairy farms over the 
period 1973/74-1992/93. The data are described in chapter 3. The data for the average farm 
in 1992/93 are presented in Table 5.1. 
The milk supply equation is included during estimation in the pre-quota period. In 
the pre-quota period, the quantity of milk can be related to the error term and an 
instrumental variable estimator must be applied. Error terms may be correlated across 
equations. Therefore, 3SLS is an appropriate estimation technique (Judge et al., 1988 p. 
' The willingness of the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI-DLO) in The Hague to make the 
data available is gratefully acknowledged. 
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655). A detailed discussion on the estimation procedure and results can be found in chapter 
3. The Hessian of prices is positive semi-definite, a necessary condition for farmers to be 
short-run profit maximisers. 
Table 5.1: Data and base simulation for the average specialised dairy farm in 1992/93 (toted no. of 
farms: 27515). 
Price index 
(1980/81=1.00) 
Dimension Data Base simulation 
Quantity Shadow price 
(1992/93 gld) 
Milk output 1.17 Kilogram *1000 384.868 - 0.311 
Other output 1.05 Guilders* 1000 
(1980/81 prices) 
78.477 87.917 
Purchased feed 0.82 Guilders* 1000 
(1980/81 prices) 
71.090 61.901 
Dairy cattle 1.12 Guilders* 1000 
(1980/81 prices) 
4.020 3.493 
Other input 1.14 Guilders* 1000 
(1980/81 prices) 
74.909 70.086 
Profits - Guilders* 1000 205.151 228.697 -
Labour - Hours 3916 - 7.676 
Land - Hectares 31.117 - 1629 
Buildings Inventory value, 
guilders »1000 
(1980/81 prices) 
245.363 0.036 
Machinery Inventory value, 
guilders* 1000 
(1980/81 prices) 
197.110 0.086 
The base simulation represents the situation in which quotas are tradable in a competitive market. 
5.3 Theoretical framework of a two-tier price system 
The estimated model of the previous section is used to simulate the effects of the two-tier 
price system for individual Dutch dairy farms and the sector as a whole. In the theoretical 
model a distinction between a two-tier system with and without quota transfers is made. 
When trade in A-quotas is allowed, it is assumed that there are no quota trade restrictions. 
The theory behind the two-tier system is described in this section (see also Bureau et al., 
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1997). It shows that the estimated model, wherein no distinction is made between A- and 
B-milk, can be used to simulate a two-tier milk price system. 
5.3.1 No quota trade 
In a two-tier price system, a fixed amount of A-milk ( q M ) at the farm level (denoted by h) 
is produced at a given supported price (yA). Farmers are free to produce milk beyond their 
A-quota (qm), but they will receive the lower world market price (vB) for this B-milk. 
Thus, the milk price vo is now partitioned into vA and vB, such that vA > vB, and qah~qAh+qBh-
Therefore, given the world market price for milk, and given the level of A-quota, the 
farmer chooses his B-production where profits are maximised: 
Here, v is a vector of prices consisting of vA, vB and vb g/,(-) is restricted profit. The 
maximisation problem is restated as the Lagrangian: 
L(V, « Ah ^U,) = VA^Ah + VB^Bh + Kh 0/ > ? 0 A > Zkh ) ~ rAh i l Ah ~ S Ah ) + r«flm (5"2) 
where, rAh and rBu are farm-specific Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the constraints 
in (5.1). They represent the extra profit of the farm when the constraint is relaxed by one 
unit. Therefore, they are also referred to as the shadow price of the constraint (Chiang, 
1984 p.727). Thus, rAh and rBh represent the value of A-quota and B-milk respectively. 
Using the definition of marginal production costs, =s0h, the Kuhn-Tucker 
âloh 
conditions for an optimum are: 
V A - soi, = rAi, ; rAh(qAh - q A h ) = 0 (5.3a) 
v,< - % = -rM ; rBh1Bh = 0 (5-3b) 
The farm's shadow price of A-quota (rAh) equals the difference between the market price 
of A-milk and the farm's marginal cost of total production, and -rBh is equal to the 
difference between the price of B-milk and marginal cost. If both constraints in (5.1) are 
indeed binding (rAh, rBh>0), the optimal production of A-milk equals the quota level and 
there is no B-milk produced (q*Ah-qAh and I ? *B / ,=0 , optima are denoted by an asterisk). 
Thus, the optimal total production level equals the quota level. If only the quota constraint 
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is binding (rAh>0 and r B/=0), optimal A-milk production equals the quota level and the 
optimal total milk production is found by solving (5.3b) (q*Ah=qAh a n ^ 1*Bh= q*oh~qAfl ). If 
only the second constraint is binding (r^/,=0 and rs,y>0), there is no B-milk produced and 
total milk production is found by solving (5.3a) (#*B/,=0 and q\h-q*Ah)- Since it is 
assumed that VA > vB, it cannot be that both constraints are not binding. 
5.3.2 Free quota trade 
If the exchange of A-quota is allowed within a two-tier system, a farmer may choose to 
expand milk production beyond his initial A-quota (qM), either by producing B-milk at 
the low world price vB, or by buying extra A-quota at its market price (rA')2. However, a 
farmer may also want to sell part of his A-quota, expanding B-milk production instead. 
The following profit maximising problem holds: 
n^AAh^thA) = m a x { v ^ ^ +vnqBh+gh(yi,qM,zkh)-r1A(qM-qM)\ 
<i,».<itt,1 ' (5.4) 
s.t. q m > 0 
The corresponding Lagrangian is: 
L^^Ah^ki,^) =vA<lAh + V ^ S A +gh(yl,qM,zkh)-r'A{qAh -qAI,)+rmqBI, (5.5) 
Again, rBh is the farm-specific Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the constraint that B-
milk production cannot be negative. The conditions for an optimum are: 
^ - % = r j (5.6a) 
vn - % = -rBh ; rmqm = 0 (5.6b) 
Equation (5.6a) implies that the farm's marginal cost of total milk production equals the 
difference between the market prices of A-milk and A-quota. If the constraint is binding 
(rB/^0), there is no B-milk produced (C*B/,=0). The optimal milk production and market 
price of quota (q*oh=q*Af, and r/*) are found where the aggregate A-quota level {QA) is 
H 
given by ~£q0h = QA , and the marginal costs are equal across farms % = s0f (hJ=\,..,H). 
The market price of quota (r/*) is the price at which there is no excess demand or supply 
of quota. If the constraint is not binding (r f i / J=0), the market price of quota equals the 
2 r/ is the rental price of quota user rights which is not the same as the price of buying quota ownership 
rights. 
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difference between the price of A-milk and the world price (rA *=VA-VB)- Optimal milk 
production (q*oh) can be found by solving (5.6a) or (5.6b). The composition of q*oh (i-e. 
the share of A and B milk in it) is indeterminate, but it makes no difference for the profit 
level of the farm. 
5.4 Policy simulations and results 
The policy simulations are elaborated in this section. First, the effects of the two-tier 
system are determined. Then, the effects of the Agenda 2000 reform, wherein quota is 1.5 
per cent higher and milk prices are 15 per cent lower, are calculated. Finally, the effects of 
abolishing quotas are simulated. 
Note that long-term effects of dairy policy changes cannot be simulated, because of 
the short-run character of the model. Moreover, input and output prices are held constant, 
which could be unrealistic if there were large changes in total milk production. 
Furthermore, the model does not include consumer demand and budget costs, therefore, 
welfare analysis is not possible. Finally, manure legislation in the Netherlands could be 
restrictive if farmers want to increase their milk production. This is not incorporated in the 
policy simulations. 
The simulations describe the effects on farm profits, input demand and output 
supply, especially milk production, and the shadow prices of fixed inputs. Profits are 
calculated as the value of the netputs. If profits decrease as a result of the simulation, 
compensating payments, necessary to offset this profit loss, per hectare and per tonne of 
quota are calculated. Here we use the initial quota in 1992/93 as the base for compensating 
payments. This implies that the level of compensation does not influence production 
decisions. Prices of the other output and variable inputs and the amount of fixed inputs at 
the farm level are kept constant throughout all simulations. In the simulation model, the 
effects are determined for all individual farms in the sample for 1992/93, representing 
27515 farms in the sector. These farms represent a total initial quota of 10590 million 
kilograms, which is 95 per cent of the national quota in 1992. For ease of presentation, 
simulation results are presented for the average farm as percentage changes compared with 
the base simulation. The base simulation and the other simulations and their results are 
discussed now. 
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5.4.1 Base simulation 
The base simulation (see Table 5.1) represents the situation where quotas are transferable 
in a competitive market and every farm trades up to the point where the marginal costs of 
production are equal for all farms. The calculated market price of quota equals 0.39 
guilders/kg. So the base simulation does not represent the actual situation but represents 
the situation where all efficiency gains from quota trade are realised (see chapter 4). 
5.4.2 Two-tier price system 
In a two-tier price system, policy makers can use several instruments: i) allow for quota 
trade, ii) set the level of A-quota, and iii) set the level of A-prices. To keep the presentation 
clear we assume that the price of A-milk is fixed at 0.70 guilders per kilogram3 which is 
also the price of milk in the base simulation. Further, we assume farm level A-quotas to be 
the same as in the base simulation. One could argue that quotas should be reduced in a 
two-tier system, because maintaining the present level of quota would imply that the 1994 
GATT-agreement conditions would not be fulfilled. The simulations do not account for 
quota reductions in order to avoid that the effects of the two-tier system are confused with 
the effects of quota reduction. The main unknown variable is the price for B-milk (world 
market price 4). Therefore, simulations are presented for a range of prices for B-milk. 
The effects of a two-tier price system when quotas are tradable are shown in Table 
5.2 and in Figure 5.1. As in the base simulation the calculated marginal cost for all farms is 
0.31 guilders/kg. This is also the average marginal cost of producing A-milk, because of 
the linear supply equation. In the trajectory where the price of B-milk is less than the 
average marginal costs of producing A-milk, no B-milk is produced. Thus, the relevant 
quota price r / * is 0.39 guilders/kg (=0.70-0.31). 
3 Milk prices are standardised for 1992/93 and a fat content of 3.7 per cent. 
4 The average world market price of milk is assumed to be 0.35 guilders/kg (Ministry of Agriculture, 1996). 
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Table 5.2: Effects of a two-tier price system at different levels of the price of B-milk if quotas are 
transferable" (percentage changes compared to base simulation). 
Price of Netput quantities Profit Shadow prices 
B-milk 
(1992/93 Milk Other Purchased Dairy Other Labour Land Buildings Machinery 
gld/kg) output output feed cattle input 
v„<0.311 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.35 3.17 -0.68 6.00 5.10 0.18 0.10 5.16 8.95 51.91 37.61 
0.40 7.18 -1.79 13.95 11.96 0.70 0.52 11.67 20.26 117.47 85.12 
0.45 11.68 -3.36 23.37 20.23 1.69 1.38 19.00 32.98 191.24 138.56 
0.50 15.69 -5.05 32.17 28.07 2.92 2.49 25.52 44.28 256.80 186.07 
A-quotas are the same as in the base simulation and the price of A-milk is 0.70 guilders/kg. 
Figure 5.1 shows that milk supply does not change if vB S 0.31. There is no 
production of B-milk, but just as in the base simulation 1060 million kg of A-quota change 
hands at the market price of 0.39 guilders/kg. There are 12567 quota buyers and 14948 
quota sellers. If VB > 0.31, there is also B-milk produced and there is less quota trade. The 
most efficient farmers produce B-milk instead of buying quota. The relevant quota price 
r/* is 0.70-VB and therefore lower than in the base simulation. Profits are higher than in 
the base simulation. The supply of the other output is lower than in the base simulation, 
while the demand for variable inputs is higher. 
The results indicate that, at low levels of world market prices (lower than the 
industries' average marginal costs of producing A-milk i.e. 0.31 guilders/kg), a two-tier 
milk price system with free quota trade will not change milk production and farm profits. 
Higher world market prices induce the farmer to produce B-milk and profits will increase. 
Provided that the world market price of milk is high enough, the quota price under a two-
tier system would be lower than the present quota price, because the most efficient farmers 
will produce B-milk instead of buying A-quota. Note that quota transfer costs as in chapter 
4 are not accounted for here. 
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Two-tier system: Free quota trade 
0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 
Price of B-milk (1992/93 gld/kg) 
milk production profit 
Figure 5.1: Effects of a two-tier system if trade in A-quotas is allowed. 
5.4.3 Agenda 2000 
In the reform agreement of the European Commission intervention prices of butter and 
skimmed milk powder are cut by 15 per cent in three annual steps of 5 per cent between 
2005/06 and 2007/08 (Agra Europe, 1999a). Furthermore, a 1.5 per cent quota increase is 
to be implemented in three steps in parallel with the price reductions. Additionally, specific 
quota increases totalling 1.39 million tonnes in two years (2000/01-2001/02) are to be 
implemented for Italy, Greece, Spain, Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
For simplicity, the Agenda 2000 reform is simulated here by allowing the present 
Dutch farm quota level to increase instantly with 1.5 per cent and reducing the milk price 
instantly by 15 per cent for all farms. Thus, the future change is applied to the situation in 
1992/93. It is assumed that the reduction in intervention prices of butter and skimmed milk 
powder are fully reflected in the producers price. With more favourable world market 
conditions this may not be the case. The resulting milk price becomes 0.60 guilders/kg and 
the average amount of milk quota per farm is 390,640 kg. The quota increase is allocated 
evenly among all farms in the sample. Free trade of milk quotas is assumed. 
A 15 per cent milk price reduction, combined with a 1.5 per cent increase in quotas, 
result in less supply of the other outputs (-0.30 per cent) and increased demand for variable 
inputs (purchased feed 2.81 per cent, dairy cattle 2.38 per cent and other input 0.06 per 
cent). The shadow prices of fixed inputs also increase (labour 2.44 per cent, land 4.23 per 
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cent, buildings 24.56 per cent and machinery 17.79 per cent). However, profits decrease by 
17.06 per cent compared to the base simulation, because quota rents decrease. An average 
direct payment of 106 guilders per tonne of initial milk quota will offset farmers for this 
loss in profits. This compensation should be higher for the average intensive farm (119 
guilders per tonne) than for the average extensive farm (95 guilders per tonne) 5. If the 
compensation were given per hectare, the average payment should be 1291 guilders/ha. 
The proposed compensation of the EU for Dutch dairy farms amounts to 24.87 euro 
per tonne. The dairy cow premium is divided into a statutory EU element of 17.24 euro per 
tonne (from 2007 onwards) and a national element of 7.63 euro per tonne (from 2008 
onwards). The latter element allows Member States to decide how to allocate part of the 
CAP aid payments. Using an exchange rate of 1 euro = 2.20371 guilders, the proposed 
compensation is 55 guilders per tonne, which would cover 52 per cent of the calculated 
loss in profits. The calculated market price of milk quota is 0.27 guilders/kg, which is 
smaller than in the base simulation. 
The advantage of the Agenda 2000 measures over the two-tier system for the policy 
maker is that the increase in milk production is controlled i.e. fixed. However, farm profits 
are much lower inducing a policy of compensation, whereas profits are non-decreasing in 
the two-tier system. Quota trade prices are difficult to compare because support prices and 
the level of quota differs between the two-tier and the Agenda 2000 cases. However, in the 
way we have modelled both policies, the calculated market price of quota in the two-tier 
system equals the quota price in the Agenda 2000 simulation if the world market price of 
milk is 0.43 guilders/kg. 
5.4.4 Quota abolition 
Although the Commission agreed that milk quotas will stay until 2006, the abolishment of 
quotas is still an interesting case to analyse (especially for the Danish it seems to be a 
preferable alternative). Moreover, reviews of the dairy regime might be necessary before 
the agreed reforms have been finalised (Agra Europe, 1999b). If milk quotas are abolished, 
the price of milk determines milk production, as it did before quotas were implemented in 
1984. The price of milk is determined either by the policy makers or by the market. Since 
5 Intensity is calculated as the initial milk output per hectare. If a farms' intensity is higher (lower) than the 
average intensity, it is determined to be an intensive (extensive) farm. 
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the model does not include the consumption side of the milk market, it is assumed that the 
milk price is given exogenously. For a given milk price vn, the milk supply equation is used 
to simulate the corresponding milk supply qoh- The results of quota abolition are 
determined for a range of prices for milk. 
Table 5.3: Effects of quota abolition (percentage changes compared to base simulation). 
Price of 
milk 
Netput quantities Profit Shadow prices 
(1992/93 
gldTkg) 
Milk 
output 
Other 
output 
Purchased 
feed 
Dairy 
cattle 
Other 
input 
Labour Land Buildings Machinery 
0.20 -9.35 1.02 -16.23 -13.33 0.70 -84.15 -15.20 -26.38 -152.99 -110.85 
0.25 -5.34 0.77 -9.54 -7.93 0.18 -76.64 -8.69 -15.08 -87.43 -63.35 
0.30 -0.84 0.15 -1.54 -1.29 -0.01 -67.81 -1.36 -2.36 -13.66 -9.90 
0.35 3.17 -0.68 6.00 5.10 0.18 -59.62 5.16 8.95 51.91 37.61 
0.40 7.18 -1.79 13.95 11.96 0.70 -51.10 11.67 20.26 117.47 85.12 
0.45 11.68 -3.36 23.37 20.23 1.69 -41.14 19.00 32.98 191.24 138.56 
0.50 15.69 -5.05 32.17 28.07 2.92 -31.93 25.52 44.28 256.80 186.07 
The results of abolishing quotas are summarised in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2. Milk 
supply and the shadow prices of fixed inputs decrease compared to the base "simulation 
when the price of milk is less than 0.31 guilders/kg. Profits decrease over the simulated 
range of milk prices. The demand for purchased feed and dairy cattle decrease, while the 
supply of the other output increases up to the point where the milk price is 0.31 
guilders/kg. The demand for other input increases, except when the milk price is between 
0.29 and 0.31 guilders/kg. 
The results show that, for the simulated range of milk prices, farm profits decrease 
as a result of quota abolition. Total milk production equals the national production in the 
base simulation when the price of milk is 0.31 guilders/kg. In that case, profits are 65.8 per 
cent lower than in the base simulation. Therefore, the average direct compensation for this 
loss in profit should be 344 guilders/tonne (or 4477 guilders/ha). In Table 5.4 the necessary 
average compensations are shown for given milk prices. The compensation decreases with 
an increasing milk price. 
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Quota abolition 
40 T 
- 1 2 0 X 
Price of milk (1992/93 gld/kg) 
milk production ------profit 
Figure 5.2: Effects of quota abolition. 
If quotas are abolished and the (world market) price of milk becomes 0.60 
guilders/kg, the profit decrease (-13 per cent) is smaller than in the Agenda 2000 
simulation (where the price of milk is also 0.60 guilders/kg). Therefore, the necessary 
compensation for farmers is smaller if quotas are abolished. However, milk production is 
unconstrained if the quota system is abolished and therefore larger (23.7 per cent) than in 
the Agenda 2000 case. 
Comparing the results of quota abolishment and the two-tier system with quota 
trade (Tables 5.2 and 5.3) shows that the increases in milk production (and shadow prices) 
are equal if the milk price is high enough. In both simulations the world price determines 
milk production (at the margin). However, part of the production in the two-tier system 
(production of A-milk) is supported and therefore profits are higher in that case. 
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Table 5.4: Necessary average compensation for loss in profit when quotas are abolished (1992/93 
guilders per ha and per tonne). 
Price of milk (1992/93 gld/kg) Compensation per tonne Compensation per hectare 
0.20 456 5830 
0.25 411 5281 
0.30 357 4628 
0.35 306 4014 
0.40 252 3371 
0.45 189 2611 
0.50 130 1903 
5.5 Conclusions 
This research determines the short-run effects of a two-tier price system for the Dutch 
dairy sector. The effects of the Agenda 2000 reform, with a reduced milk price and 
increased quota levels, and the effects of abolishing the quota system, are also shown. 
The results indicate that in a two-tier milk price system with free quota trade, B-
milk will be produced if the world market price is higher than the industries' average 
marginal costs of producing A-milk (0.31 guilders/kg). In that case, profits, defined as the 
value of the netputs, will increase. If the world market price of milk were 0.31 guilders/kg, 
the present level of total milk production would not be exceeded. Provided that the world 
market price of milk is higher than 0.31 guilders/kg, the quota price under a two-tier 
system would be lower than the present quota price, because the most efficient farmers will 
produce B-milk instead of buying A-quota. 
The results of simulating Agenda 2000 for dairy farming indicate a 17 per cent loss 
in profits. The proposed direct payment per tonne of initial quota only compensates 52 per 
cent of this profit loss. Accounting for feed cost and slaughter premiums, Silvis and van 
Bruchem (1999), find a 64 per cent income coverage of the Agenda 2000 compensation in 
2007. The profit loss is mainly due to the decrease in milk prices. Because of the 1.5 per 
cent quota increase, the demand for variable inputs will increase, while the supply of other 
output decreases. The diminished milk price also results in a lower quota price compared 
with the base simulation. 
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If quotas were abolished, milk production increases if the price of milk is higher 
than the current average marginal costs. However, profits decrease, asking for 
compensating payments. At a world price of 0.60 guilders/kg, the necessary compensation 
in the case of quota abolishment is smaller than in the Agenda 2000 case, while milk 
production is higher. 
The model presented is a flexible tool to analyse the short-term effects of EU dairy 
policy changes in the Netherlands. The results show that the disadvantages of Agenda 
2000, i.e. increased budget costs and the insufficiency to meet future WTO demands, are 
complemented with strong negative income effects for Dutch dairy farmers. The income of 
the farmer is guaranteed in a two-tier price system and it serves farmers with some 
flexibility (partly giving in to the WTO demands), while the burden on the government 
budget is relatively lower. Quota abolition is for Dutch dairy farmers from an income point 
of view still less attractive (although highly dependent on the price at the world market) 
but more freedom in production could outweigh this disadvantage. The fact that the Dutch 
government did not opt for quota abolition probably has to do with the fear that a rise in 
milk production would increase environmental problems and would lead to a weakened 
financial position of farmers because their quota lose value. 
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Chapter 6 LAND DEMAND AND PHOSPHATE SURPLUS TAXES 
6.1 Introduction 
The effects of farm support programs and other policies affecting agriculture, like 
environmental and wildlife protection policies, are reflected in land values (Barnard et al., 
1997). The change in land value has an impact on the competitiveness of a sector. 
Furthermore, land prices are an important determinant of the income distribution between 
farmers that enter and exit the sector. Consequently, land prices and the demand for land 
have been areas of continuous interest in the agricultural economics literature. 
In particular, environmental and agricultural policies are often directly or indirectly 
linked to farmland. For example, set aside programs are directly related to land whereas 
policies aimed at reducing production intensity are often indirectly linked to land. The 
interdependence between agricultural, environmental and resource policies has recently 
gained attention (see e.g. Just and Bockstael, 1991). 
Empirical studies on land demand and land prices (see Weersink et al., 1996 for an 
overview) usually focus on the aggregate level, with the value of returns to farming being 
the driving force behind land prices (Just and Miranowski, 1993). A shortcoming of the net 
returns to farming approach is that it is an ad hoc method; net returns include the returns to 
labour and capital goods as well. This approach may be misleading, since a decrease in net 
returns to farming may go along with increasing land prices, due for example to 
technological change that increases economies of size (Doll, Widdows, and Velde, 1983). 
The use of aggregate data conceals differential behaviour among groups of farms in a 
sector, especially when agricultural and environmental policies have farm-specific impacts. 
Another group of empirical studies uses hedonic price functions to estimate the effects of 
government payments and other determinants (e.g. land productivity, site characteristics, 
urbanisation/population density, pollution, erosion control etc.) on land values (Barnard et 
al., 1997; Roka and Palmquist, 1997; Boisvert, Schmit and Regmi, 1997). A disadvantage 
of these studies is that subjective farmers' estimates are used as data for farmland values. 
This chapter presents a short-run, micro-economic simulation model that 
simultaneously determines the market price of land and the demand for land by individual 
Land demand and phosphate surplus taxes 
Dutch dairy farms. The model is then developed to show the impact of a phosphate surplus 
tax on land demand and land prices. 
This chapter makes four contributions to the literature. First, a theoretically 
consistent micro-economic model is used to determine land demand and land prices. That 
is, the shadow price of land determines land prices and land demand. Chavas (1993) 
provided a micro-economic framework, which was generalised by Hennessy (1997), for 
deterniining the market price of land and demand for land, but without providing empirical 
evidence. Schäfer (1985) used shadow prices to determine the impact of government 
policies but did not calculate equilibrium prices. 
Second, this chapter recognises land market imperfections. Following previous 
studies, attention focuses on demand rather than supply by assuming that the total quantity 
of land supplied is fixed (Burt, 1986). Imperfections on the demand side of the market are 
modelled by giving farms a probability of purchasing land. These imperfections are caused 
by frictions such as a discrepancy between the location of supply and demand. 
Third, this chapter adds to the literature by showing that modelling individual farm 
behaviour is relevant to the analysis of land demand, given the differential impact of farm 
policies that affect land values. Agricultural and environmental policies, like the phosphate 
policy addressed in this chapter, are increasingly farm-specific. The use of time-series 
conceals the impacts of policies on different (groups of) farms. 
Finally, this chapter explicitly analyses the effects of manure policies on land 
prices. Manure policies have been effective in the Netherlands since 1984, but most dairy 
farms were not restricted by this policy. From 1998 on, a new policy is effective, whereby 
a farm is taxed on its production of phosphate from manure in excess of 120 kg phosphate 
per hectare of grassland1. We show that this surplus tax increases the shadow price of land 
because farmers with a surplus can reduce the tax by buying or renting additional land. 
Previous studies analysed the consequences of a national nitrogen tax on production costs 
and prices in agriculture (Johnson, Atwood and Thompson, 1991) and the effects of a 
nitrogen surplus tax for arable farming (Oude Lansink and Peerlings, 1997). The micro-
economic effects of phosphate surplus taxes on land prices have not been studied before. 
' Nitrate is also part of the manure registration and surplus tax system. However, criteria are set such that this 
tax is not effective. 
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The chapter proceeds with a discussion of the micro-economic simulation model 
that is used to determine the demand for land and land prices. The effects of a phosphate 
surplus tax on land demand are also shown. Next, the results of different policy simulations 
are discussed. The chapter concludes with comments. 
6.2 A micro-economic model of land demand 
This section develops a micro-economic simulation model of land demand by Dutch dairy 
farmers. Land demand is derived from a static profit function, assuming that dairy farmers 
are maximising short-term profit given their levels of milk quota, land and other fixed 
inputs. In the long term, dairy farmers can adjust the quantity of land in order to maximise 
long-term profit. First, the basic micro-economic model is specified and estimated. Land 
demand is derived next, and finally it is shown how a tax on phosphate surplus is included 
in this framework. 
Micro-economic models of input demand and output supply have been applied 
frequently in the agricultural economics literature (see Shumway, 1995 for an overview). 
This also holds for the dairy sector in the Netherlands (Boots, Oude Lansink and Peerlings, 
1997; Helming, Oskam and Thijssen, 1993). Models of Dutch dairy farming have to take 
into account that individual dairy farms have operated under a quota constraint since 1984. 
Dairy farming is modelled by assuming that the farm produces two outputs; milk 
(z 0), which is subject to a supply constraint, and a composite of other outputs ( q \ ) . Three 
variable inputs are used; purchased feed {qi}, dairy cattle (qi), and a composite of other 
inputs ( < 7 4 ) . Furthermore, four quasi-fixed inputs are distinguished; land (I) , labour (zi), 
buildings (zi) and machinery (z3). The model also includes a time trend (z4) representing 
technology and a dummy (z5) allowing for a change in technology due to the introduction 
of milk quotas in 1984. Furthermore, two dummies (z 6 and zi) are included to distinguish 
three regions. Restricted profit (g) is defined as revenue of other output minus all variable 
costs. Profit, subject to the quota constraint, is given by the restricted profit maximisation 
problem: 
g(v,z ,Z) = max{vq} (6.1) 
Here v and q are vectors of netput prices and netput quantities, z is a vector of milk quota, 
fixed input quantities, trend and dummies, and L represents land. The restricted profit 
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function g(-) is convex, continuous and twice differentiable in prices, increasing in output 
prices and fixed inputs and decreasing in input prices and milk output. Netput equations 
are derived by taking the first order derivative of the restricted profit function with respect 
to netput prices (Hotelling's Lemma): q = $g(-)/ft. 
6.2.1 Empirical model 
The symmetric normalised quadratic (SNQ) is used as the empirical specification (Kohli, 
1993; Oude Lansink and Stefanou, 1997) of the restricted profit function. The SNQ is a 
flexible functional form that allows for negative profit and for curvature conditions 
(convexity in prices) to be imposed globally. Another advantage is that the estimation 
results do not depend on the choice of a numeraire netput (as is the case for the also 
frequently used normalised quadratic). The SNQ takes the following form: 
4 j 4 4 4 4 7 
g(v,.,z,,Z) = 2>,v,. + - w - , Z 5 > i / V ' V / +ZCM + Z S ^ V ' Z * + 
i=l ^ ;=1 7=1 W i=I 4=0 
1 7 j 4 4 
- wpL2 +w£pkzkL + -wYJ] A,,z* z„ + (6-2) 
4=0 ^ 4=0 «=0 
4 7 
4=0 »=5 
The last term in the restricted profit function indicates that the cross products of the 
dummies are not taken into account. Symmetry is maintained by requiring a^aj, and 
4 
Pkn=fink- Linear homogeneity in prices is imposed by the term w = Z^/v/v • ^ e r e $ & r e n o n " 
w 
negative constants determined as the average shares of netput / (/=1,..,4) in total costs plus 
4 
revenues. Additional restrictions Z aff^7 = ^ 0^ ' = l;-->4)have to be imposed, in order to 
7=1 
identify all parameters ay. Here, vj is an arbitrary point of observation. 
Netput equations (i=l,..,4) are derived using Hotelling's lemma: 
4 2 4 4 7 1 
I , = , , - = , 4=0 l 
7 J 4 4 4 7 
0/ Z i " * z * 1 + o e ' Z Z Pk»zk Z« + 9 1 Z Z A»Z* Z» 
4=0 4=0 n=0 4=0 n=5 
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The milk supply function for the period before the introduction of milk quotas is derived, 
by using the first order condition for profit maximisation: - dgi^jdz^ = v 0 . Solving for zo 
yields: 
6.2.2 Data and estimation 
Data on specialised dairy farms covering the period 1973/74-1992/93 come from a 
stratified sample of farms keeping accounts on behalf of the LEI-DLO farm accounting 
system. The data set used for estimation contains 9365 observations on 1961 farms. 
Data on variable outputs and inputs are measured as revenues and costs. Other 
output is an aggregate of revenues from marketable crops, beef and veal, and other 
animals. Other variable inputs consists of feed for animals other than dairy cattle, seeds, 
fertilisers, pesticides, contract work, veterinary services, fuel, energy and other cattle. 
Fixed inputs are labour (hours), land (hectares) buildings and machinery (total invested 
capital at 1980/81 prices). Other variables in the empirical model are a trend and regional 
dummies. The regions distinguished are sandy soils, northern clay and peat, and western 
pastures. 
Tornqvist price indices were calculated for the composite variables (other output, 
feed input and other variable input). Implicit quantity indices were obtained as the ratio of 
value and the price index. The price indices vary over the years, but not over the farms, 
implying that the differences in the composition of a netput, or quality differences, are 
reflected in the quantity. Data for the average farm in 1992/93 are given in Appendix 6.A. 
The system of equations that is estimated is (6.3) and (6.4), with additive error 
terms included prior to estimation. Every farm is assumed to have a farm-specific 
intercept, reflecting differences in farm characteristics (e.g. management quality and soil 
quality). A fixed-effects model explicitly accounts for this assumption. The necessary 
transformation for such a model can also be applied to an incomplete panel, like our data 
set. The profit function is not estimated along with the netput equations, since the 
intercepts of the netput equations appear as slope coefficients in the profit function. 
Including the profit function during estimation requires direct estimation of all farm-
(6-4) 
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specific intercepts. Note that all parameters of the profit function are identified in the 
netput equations. 
The milk supply equation is included during estimation in the period before the 
quota introduction, causing a difference in the number of observations across equations. In 
the pre-quota period, the quantity of milk can be related to the error term and an 
instrumental variable estimator must be applied. Endogenous variables are zo, <Hi (J=l>-->4), 
and all terms containing milk output (zoz 0 , zozt). All exogenous variables are used as 
instruments. Error terms may be correlated across equations. Therefore, the estimation 
technique used is non-linear 3SLS (Judge et al., 1988 p.655). The covariance matrix of 
residuals used in estimating the system is corrected for the difference in observations 
(Judge etal., 1988 p.462). 
The estimation results can be found in Appendix 6.B and show that 49 per cent of 
the parameters are significant at the critical 5 per cent level. 
6.2.3 Land demand at the farm level 
The basic micro-economic model above assumes that the quantity of land is exogenous, i.e. 
farmers take the quantity of land as given and maximise profit over all variable inputs and 
outputs. When the farmer has the possibility of buying or renting additional land, land 
becomes an endogenous variable with price r per hectare, and the following long term 
profit maximisation problem applies: 
J (v , r, z) = max{g(v, z, L) - rL) (6.5) 
with first order condition: 
m^R=r (6.6) 
dL 
This is the shadow price equation of land. Solving this expression for land, using the 
equation in (6.2) for g(-), gives the demand equation for land: 
1 = 1 (6.7) 
The first column in Table 6.1 gives the elasticities of the demand for land with 
respect to prices of netputs and land, and quantities of milk output and fixed inputs. The 
results show that the input of purchased feed is a substitute for land, implying that the 
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farmer decides to grow more feed on the farm if the price of purchased feed increases. 
Milk quota is a complement for land, indicating that an increase (purchase) of milk quotas 
has to go together with an increase in land. Land is less important in the production of 
other outputs. The small (and positive) effect of dairy cattle prices on land demand is 
striking. Buildings and machinery, as well as technology (trend), are substitutes for land. 
Due to annual technological development the demand for land decreases, ceteris paribus. 
Table 6.1: Average price and quantity elasticities of land, simulatedfor 1992/93 (weighted 
calculated mean). 
Elasticity of land demand Elasticity of land demand 
including surplus tax 
With respect to prices: 
Other output 0.51 0.36 
Purchased feed 0.51 0.37 
Dairy cattle 0.01 0.01 
Other input -0.42 -0.38 
Land -0.62 -0.49 
Surplus tax 0.13 
With respect to quantities: 
Milk quota 1.74 1.48 
Labour 0.03 0.03 
Buildings -0.33 -0.28 
Machinery -0.41 -0.35 
Technology -0.67 -0.57 
Threshold 0.13 
6.2.4 Land market 
The market for land consists of land demanders and suppliers. Inspection of our data shows 
that most of the farms in our sample do not sell land. Rather they purchase land 2, usually 
from small farms and farms that are discontinued. Neither are represented in the sample. 
Therefore, all farms are restricted to be potential buyers of land. Exogenous supply, 
denoted by E, is assumed to be perfectly price inelastic. The equilibrium price of land is 
2 Here purchasing is considered to include also renting land and using land for free (e.g. from relatives). 
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determined as the price that equalises supply and demand for land. Formally this land 
market is given by: 
A - I A=1 L " 
st. Y.x,{L\-L„)=E (6.8) 
L'„-Lh>0 
Here r and L/,* are the equilibrium price of land and the optimal quantity of land on farm h 
respectively. The number of farms in the sample is denoted by H (h=l,..JL). A weighting 
factor Xh for each farm h (given in the data set), denotes the number of farms in the sector 
which are represented by the farm in the sample. The weighting factors are used to 
aggregate the results to the sector level. Note that the equilibrium price of land is equal for 
all farms. Also note that the second restriction implies that all farms have to buy land or 
stay at their initial quantity Lh. 
The model so far assumes that all farms have equal access to the market, i.e. the 
location of the land has no impact on the decision to buy land. The model is extended by 
conjecturing that farmers have a probability of buying land, representing friction between 
the location of supply and demand for land (a market imperfection3). Formally this model 
is expressed as: 
H H . . 
X V * 0 > = X XK ™*«WA( V> ZA.4) - r • L\) 
A=l A=l ''» 
st. pj^x^-L^E (6.9) 
A=l 
L),-Lh>0 
The first restriction now explicitly includes the probability of buying land, denoted by P. 
Because of the weighting factor, the probability determines that for each farm h in the 
sample, P-xy, of the farms in the sector buy land (and (\-P)-Xh do not buy). The effect of the 
probability is that farms with high shadow prices of land cannot participate in the bidding 
process as much as they would like to. Therefore, farmers, whose shadow price of land was 
3 Other imperfections in land demand may stem from the unavailability of credit or the lack of successors. In 
this model, farms with very low shadow prices of land will never buy land, while, in practice, these farms 
may have the opportunity to attract credit and buy land. 
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too low to buy land in the model in (6.8), will now be enabled to buy land. The resulting 
equilibrium price of land will therefore be lower. 
6.2.5 Effects of a phosphate surplus tax 
In order to analyse the effects of phosphate surplus taxes on land demand, the model has to 
include a functional relationship between the phosphate surplus and output supply along 
with the demand for variable inputs and land. The approach that is adopted in this chapter 
requires the estimation of a phosphate production function. 
In the policy on manure surplus taxes in the Netherlands, phosphate production is 
calculated by using standards for phosphate production for each unit of livestock on the 
farm. Calculating the phosphate surplus therefore requires data on livestock numbers and 
knowledge of standards that apply. However, data on livestock numbers are not available 
in the data set that was used in this study. Therefore, data on total phosphate production m, 
and livestock values were used to estimate a phosphate production function. The phosphate 
production function is specified as: 
Here g 3 represents the volume of dairy cows (variable input in the basic micro-economic 
model) and q^, q^ and q*,c represent other bovine cattle, pigs and other livestock. The 
volumes of q^ q^ and qs,c are part of other variable input q$ in the basic micro-economic 
model. Estimation of the phosphate production is reported in Appendix 6.C. 
The phosphate surplus tax is included in the model using a methodology that was 
developed by Oude Lansink and Peerlings (1997) to determine the effects of nitrogen 
surplus taxes using a micro-economic simulation model of Dutch arable farming. 
Phosphate surplus S is defined as: 
S = m(q„q4a,q4h,q4c)-b-L (6.11) 
Here b is a threshold level of acceptable phosphate surpluses per hectare, which is a policy 
parameter, and L is land. 
The effects of a phosphate surplus tax are determined by incorporating the cost of 
the phosphate surplus tax into the restricted profit function as follows: 
m = K,q, + K4aq4a + Kuq4h + K4cq4c (6.10) 
/ ( v . ^ ) = Xv i ? r /^ (6.12) 
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The surplus tax t is related to the basic micro-economic model through the elements of m(-) 
and through the quantity of land L (see equation 6.11). It can be seen that q-i and L are 
directly linked to the basic micro-economic model. The other elements, qs,a, q^ and qt,c, 
have no direct relationship. However, by making the assumption that the demand for other 
inputs <74, is homogeneously separable in its components, such a link can be established 
(see Boyle and O'Neill, 1990). Denoting the shares of q^, q^ and q^c in q4, by c 4 a , and 
C4C, the new netput equations are derived as: 
t, =q,~t 
3n(-) dqi ân(-) dq4 ân(-) dq4 ân(-) dq4 
âj3 &>, dq4a âv, ôqu â/, âq4c dv. 
= q, -t-K, 
7=1 7=1 
1 ' ( C 4 o ' K4a + C1b ' K t b + C 4 c ' K4c ) ' 
4 4 J 4 4 
z ;=i 7=1 
(6.13) 
7=1 7=1 A ''=' 7=1 
Using the definition of restricted profit under a phosphate surplus tax (6.12) and the first 
order condition for profit maximisation, similar to (6.6), the equation for land demand is 
derived as: 
1 
f*y» - t(6}K3 + 64(c4a • K4A + cu • K4H + c4c • K4C))) 
i'=l 4=0 ( V 4=0 ' 
( c 4 „ • K * c + Cu • K 4 H + c4c • K4c) • [Ç4 + 94 £ pkzk J - -3 
(6.14) 
Note that all parameters K and the parameter p are negative, so that the denominator is 
strictly negative. Given this, it can be seen that the threshold level b and the tax rate t 
increase the demand for land. Furthermore, the impact of prices and fixed input quantities 
on land demand is moderated by the denominator (if w>l) and the additional term ?•{•} in 
(6.14). 
The last column in Table 6.1 shows that the elasticities of land, demand decline 
when the phosphate surplus tax is included in the model. The surplus tax can be interpreted 
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as the price of phosphate for dairy farming. The surplus tax and the threshold level for 
acceptable phosphate application have a small positive effect on land demand. 
6.3 Policy simulations 
With the model described in the previous section, three policy simulations are conducted. 
The results of the simulations are compared with a base simulation. The base simulation 
represents the situation for individual farms in the sample in 1992/93, and covers 27515 
farms in the dairy sector (using the weights xh). Simulated values of the variables in the 
base simulation are given in Appendix 6.A. The effects of the other simulations are 
determined for individual farms. However, they are reported only for the weighted average 
farm and for the weighted average farm with an initial phosphate surplus. 
6.3.1 Land demand 
The land market is simulated in which 20,000 hectares of farmland (£=20,000) are 
exogenously supplied4. This figure of twenty thousand hectares is based on the net increase 
of available land in our sample from 1991/92 to 1992/93, which was 21,324 hectares and 
includes both purchases and new land tenancies. Land demand is simulated using the 
system in equation (6.9). All farms are regarded as potential land demanders. The farm 
with the highest shadow price of land buys land. As a result, its shadow price of land 
decreases to the level of the farm with the next highest shadow price. The farm with the 
next highest shadow price of land also participates in the demand for land and the land 
price further decreases. In this way we move along the demand curve for land until the 
total exogenous supply of land is exhausted. Thus, the equilibrium market price of land is 
found when the last marginal unit of the exogenous supplied land is purchased. 
Farmers are provided with a fixed probability that the land is supplied in their 
neighbourhood, i.e. the probability that they actually purchase land. For simplicity, the 
probability is assumed to be the same for all farms in the sample. This simulation is 
repeated for different values for the probability (1, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2 and 0.1). The 
equilibrium market price on the land market is calculated at the point where the exogenous 
4 The model we use allows us to account for regional differences in the exogenous supply of land in the 
Netherlands. Thus, regional land markets can be simulated. In order to keep the presentations of the 
simulations clear, these regional simulations are not included here. 
115 
Land demand and phosphate surplus taxes 
supply of land equals the sum of demand. Farm demand equals farm h's desired demand 
times the weight factor times the probability (see also the first restriction in equation 6.9). 
This implies that the market price of land decreases if the probabilities decrease, because 
farms with lower shadow prices get the opportunity to purchase land. However, given the 
probabilities, not all farms in the sector will be able to buy 5. 
6.3.2 Simulation results for land demand 
Table 6.2 shows that, if twenty thousand hectares of land are supplied to our sample of 
dairy farmers, the equilibrium land price is 3541 guilders per hectare 6 (the probability of 
purchasing is 1). In this case, there are 1407 farms (5 per cent of all farms) purchasing on 
average 14.21 hectares. When the probability of purchasing land declines, the market price 
of land decreases. The number of purchasing farms is larger, although fluctuating, just as 
the average amount of land bought per transaction is smaller. For the non-purchasing farms 
nothing changes with respect to the base simulation. Comparing the resulting land market 
prices in Table 6.2 with the actually observed rent of circa 1700 guilders per hectare 
(Huntjens, 1996) suggests that the probability of actually purchasing land in the 
Netherlands is rather low. 
Table 6.2: Effects of supplying 20,000 hectares to dairy farming (prices in guilders/hectare). 
Probability of purchasing land 
1 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 
Market price of land 3541 2841 2632 2365 1991 1339 
Average shadow price of land for 
farmers that are willing to buy land 
before purchase 
4746 3777 3588 3296 2877 2335 
Average number of purchased hectares 
per farm 
14.21 11.03 11.27 10.98 10.44 11.74 
Number of purchasing farms" 1407 1813 1774 1822 1916 1704 
Number of farms in the sector that are willing to buy land multiplied with the probability. 
5 Resulting values of netputs and profits for the farms in the sector are determined in the same way as the 
demand for land, i.e. the results (value of netputs and profits) determined under the assumption that the farm 
in the sample actually buys the desired amount of land multiplied by P-xh, plus the results (value of netputs 
and profits) if the farm in the sample does not buy the land multiplied by (\-P)-xt,. 
6 This price is on an annual basis, therefore it is comparable with the rental price of land. 
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Table 6.3 shows that an increase in land leads, on average, to less feed purchases 
and dairy cattle input, and to an increase in other output, other input use and profit. 
Purchasing land reduces the phosphate surplus, since there is more land available on which 
to apply the maximum amount of 120 kg phosphate per hectare, and the input of dairy 
cows decreases. However, reducing the surplus is not a driving factor for purchasing land 
because there is no penalty for having a phosphate surplus in this simulation, it is merely a 
result of purchasing land. When the probability of purchasing land is lower the increase in 
other output and the decrease in purchased feed and dairy cattle become smaller. The 
increase in other input becomes larger, whereas the increase in profit remains more or less 
constant. 
Table 6.3: Simulation results for the average farm of supplying 20,000 hectares to dairy farming 
(percentage changes compared to base simulation). 
Probability of purchasing land 
1 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 
Other output 1.96 1.77 1.71 1.63 1.52 1.33 
Purchased feed -2.78 -2.54 -2.46 -2.36 -2.22 -1.99 
Dairy cattle -1.67 -1.40 -1.31 -1.20 -1.04 -0.78 
Other input 0.07 0.27 0.34 0.42 0.54 0.73 
Profit 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Land 2.34 2.34 2.34 2.34 2.34 2.34 
Phosphate surplus" -139.08 -129.06 -125.89 -121.82 -116.12 -106.50 
" Absolute change in kg. 
Table 6.4: Simulation results for the average farm with an initial phosphate surplus of supplying 
20,000 hectares to dairy farming (percentage changes compared to base simulation). 
Probability of purchasing land 
1 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 
Other output 2.78 2.55 2.47 2.35 2.15 1.83 
Purchased feed -3.71 -3.44 -3.35 -3.21 -2.96 -2.58 
Dairy cattle -2.42 -2.05 -1.93 -1.77 -1.51 -1.11 
Other input 0.11 0.41 0.51 0.62 0.77 1.00 
Profit 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.49 
Land 4.18 4.25 4.26 4.25 4.15 4.02 
Phosphate surplus" -234.69 -221.41 -216.78 -209.50 -195.61 -174.11 
" Absolute change in kg. 
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Table 6.4 shows the results for the average farm with an initial phosphate surplus. 
These farms buy more land than the average farm, and therefore, the effects on netputs and 
profit are larger. 
6.3.3 Phosphate surplus taxes 
The effects of taxing phosphate surpluses for dairy farms are now determined. The surplus 
tax is 2.5 guilders per kg for phosphate surpluses lower than 10 kg per hectare and 10 
guilders per kg for phosphate surpluses larger than 10 kg per hectare (Ministry of 
Agriculture, 1996). Simulating the effects of a phosphate surplus tax involves four, stages 
(see also Figure 6.1). 
In the first stage, the initial phosphate surplus on the farm is determined, using the 
phosphate production function (equation (6.C.1) in Appendix 6.C) and a threshold of 
£=120 kg phosphate per hectare. The end solution is obtained for farms that do not have a 
surplus in this stage (e.g. farm Bl in Figure 6.1). For these farms nothing changes if a tax 
is introduced. 
Tax 
(gld/kg) 
B6 B7 
10 
B5 
2.5 
B3 B4 
Bl 
0 10 Surplus (kg/ha) 
Figure 6.1: (Corner) solutions of simulating phosphate surplus taxes. 
118 
Chapter 6 
In the second stage, farms with an initial surplus of between 0 and 10 kg per 
hectare are faced with a tax of 2.5 guilders per kg. Farms with a surplus larger than 10 kg 
per hectare face a tax of 10 guilders per kg, however, the first 10 kg per hectare is charged 
with the lower tax of 2.5 guilders per kg. Farms with an initial surplus between 0 and 10 kg 
per hectare (or more than 10 kg per hectare), that still have a surplus between 0 and 10 kg 
per hectare (or more than 10 kg per hectare) after incorporating the taxes in this stage have 
reached the end solution (e.g. farms in Figure 6.1 going from B4 to B3 and from B7 to B6 
respectively). Corner solutions are obtained for farms which had an initial surplus between 
0 and 10 kg per hectare and have no surplus in this stage, or for farms which initially had a 
surplus of more than 10 kg per hectare and now have a surplus of less then 10 kg per 
hectare. 
In the third stage, for the farms with a corner solution, the surplus is fixed at zero. 
In the profit maximising process, a farm-specific shadow tax that yields a zero surplus is 
then calculated. The end solution is obtained for farms with a non-negative shadow tax 
smaller than 2.5 guilders per kg (e.g. a farm going from B3 or B6 to B2 in Figure 6.1). 
For farms with a shadow tax between 2.5 and 10 guilders per kg the surplus is set to 
be 10 kg per hectare in stage four and the new shadow tax is calculated, which should be 
between 2.5 and 10 guilders per kg (e.g. a farm going from B6 to B5 in Figure 6.1). If the 
new shadow tax is smaller than 2.5 guilders per kg, the end solution is obtained at a tax 
level of 2.5 guilders per kg and the corresponding surplus lies between 0 and 10 kg per 
hectare (e.g. a farm going from B6 to B4). The (shadow) tax and corresponding surplus in 
the different stages are used to determine the quantity of netputs and profit. 
6.3.4 Simulation results for surplus taxes 
When using the estimated phosphate production function (equation 6.12), with initial 
simulated values of 93 and q4a, q4h and q4c, the average initial phosphate production is 3824 
kg per farm. With a threshold of 120 kg phosphate per hectare, 14 per cent of the farms 
have an initial surplus between 0 and 10 kg per hectare, 37 per cent have a surplus higher 
than 10 kg per hectare, and 49 per cent of the farms have no surplus initially. The average 
surplus per farm is 90 kg (somewhat higher than the 70 kg reported by Silvis and van 
Bruchem, 1996 p. 162). The average surplus for farms that have a surplus is 918 kg per 
farm, the average for non-surplus farms is -766 kg. The average quantities of inputs, 
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outputs and profit are higher on surplus farms than on non-surplus farms. The average 
amount of land on surplus farms is lower. 
In the simulation, almost all the farms with an initial surplus reach a corner 
solution. The calculated shadow taxes (relevant for farms with an initial surplus) vary 
between 0.005 and 5.77 guilders per kg. The average shadow tax for farms with an initial 
surplus is 0.81 guilders per kg. The effects of introducing a tax on phosphate surpluses are 
shown in Table 6.5. The average surplus falls from 90 kg to -369 kg, the average surplus 
for the farm with an initial surplus falls from 918 kg to 15 kg. The reduction in phosphate 
surplus on farms with an initial surplus is not exactly 100 per cent because some farms 
reach a corner solution at a surplus of 10 kg per hectare instead of 0 kg and some farms 
reach a solution between 0 and 10 kg per hectare. 
Farms with an initial surplus avoid paying the phosphate tax by reducing the input 
of dairy cattle. Thus, the flexibility for the farmer is found in adjusting his variable netputs, 
especially decreasing his dairy herd. Note that the production of milk is fixed in this model 
because of the quota regime. As a result, farms produce exactly at their quota level and are 
not allowed to adjust their milk output (not even downwards) by trading quota. The 
shadow price of milk quota decreases (-1.52 per cent) showing that producing milk has 
become less attractive. The shadow price of land increases (3.97 per cent for the average 
farm) because the tax can be avoided if a farm would have more land. 
Table 6.5: Simulation results for phosphate surplus taxes (percentage changes compared to base 
simulation). 
Average farm Average farm with an initial phosphate surplus 
Other output -0.77 -1.27 
Purchased feed 0.28 0.43 
Dairy cattle -14.65 -24.82 
Other input -0.19 -0.33 
Profit -0.01 -0.02 
Phosphate surplus" -458.68 -903.29 
* Absolute change in kg. 
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6.3.5 Combined land demand and phosphate surplus taxes 
Simulating the effects of land demand in combination with a tax on phosphate surpluses 
involves calculating the market price of land, identifying the potential buyers in the sample 
and calculating the amount of land that potential buyers would be willing to buy. These 
results can be aggregated to the sector level and the changes in netputs, profit and 
phosphate surpluses can be determined. 
Land demand by farms (for both surplus and non-surplus farms) is simulated 
simultaneously with the introduction of the surplus tax. Thus, the system in (6.9), with the 
profit function given in (6.12) and netput equations (6.13), is simultaneously solved. The 
procedure followed for the surplus tax is identical to the one described in the previous 
simulation. After this procedure, potential buyers and their desired land demand are 
known. However, given the probabilities, only a fraction (P-Xh) of all potential buyers can 
actually buy land. Effects on netputs, profit and phosphate surpluses of the land purchasing 
farms are calculated as described in footnote 5. For potential buyers that are not able to buy 
land ((l-P)-xi,), the effects on netputs, profit and phosphate surpluses are only determined 
by the tax (so the outcomes for these farms are identical to calculated effects in the 
previous simulation). 
6.3.6 Simulation results of combined land demand and phosphate surplus taxes 
If our sample of dairy farms faces phosphate surplus taxes and at the same time twenty 
thousand hectares of land is exogenously supplied, the equilibrium market price of land is 
3642 guilders per hectare (probability of purchasing is 1, see Table 6.6). Thus, the market 
price is higher compared with the situation without a surplus tax (see Table 6.2). This 
effect is expected because introducing a tax increases the demand for land. There are 1392 
farms (5 per cent of all farms) purchasing on average 14.37 hectares. From the group of 
land-purchasing farms, 86 per cent had an initial phosphate surplus, whereas 9 per cent of 
the farms with an initial surplus purchase land at a probability of 1. 
In this simulation almost all surplus farms reach a corner solution. The shadow 
taxes vary between zero and 3.86 guilders/kg. The average shadow tax for farms with an 
initial surplus is 0.69 guilders/kg. In comparison to the situation with only a surplus tax 
both purchasing land and/or adjusting the input of livestock reduces the phosphate surplus. 
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Table 6.6: Simulation results for the average farm of phosphate surplus taxes and of supplying 
20,000 hectares to dairy farming (percentage changes compared to base simulation, market price 
in guilders/hectare). 
Probability of purchasing ; land 
1 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 
Market price of land 3642 2903 2690 2403 2019 1346 
Other output 1.32 1.11 1.04 0.96 0.84 0.63 
Purchased feed -2.55 -2.30 -2.22 -2.12 -1.98 -1.74 
Dairy cattle -14.04 -13.99 -14.01 -14.01 -14.08 -14.23 
Other input -0.10 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.36 0.56 
Profit 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31 
Land 2.34 2.34 2.34 2.34 2.34 2.34 
Phosphate surplus" -526.14 -523.19 -523.41 -523.07 -524.48 -527.73 
" Absolute change in kg. 
Table 6.7: Simulation results for the average farm with an initial phosphate surplus of phosphate 
surplus taxes and of supplying 20,000 hectares to dairy farming (percentage changes compared to 
base simulation). 
Probability of purchasing land 
1 0.5 0:4 0.3 0.2 0.1 
Other output 1.71 1.46 1.37 1.24 1.02 0.67 
Purchased feed -3.35 -3.07 -2.98 -2.84 -2.58 -2.18 
Dairy cattle -23.37 -23.38 -23.45 -23.48 -23.61 -23.90 
Other input -0.16 0.13 0.23 0.34 0.48 0.71 
Profit 0.41 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.46 
Land 4.18 4.25 4.26 4.25 4.15 4.02 
Phosphate surplus" -997.13 -997.61 - 999.74 - 999.76 - 999.82 -1003.65 
" Absolute change in kg. 
Comparing Tables 6.6 and 6.7 shows that, farms with an initial phosphate surplus buy 
relatively more land but also reduce their livestock more than farms without an initial 
surplus. The profit of the farms with an initial surplus also increases more. The reduction 
of the surplus is larger on farms with an initial surplus. Comparing Tables 6.5 and 6.6/6.7 
shows that the negative effects of the surplus tax are largely offset by the increase in land. 
However, the profit increase is of course smaller than in a situation without a surplus tax 
(Tables 6.3 and 6.4). 
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6.4 Conclusion and discussion 
This chapter develops an empirical micro-simulation model, in which land prices and the 
demand for land by individual Dutch dairy farms are determined. It also shows how this 
demand is affected by a phosphate surplus tax. Moreover, the separate effects (not related 
to land demand) of the phosphate surplus tax for Dutch dairy farming are analysed. The 
empirical micro-simulation model, based on shadow prices, is a theoretically sound 
alternative to the net return approach for determining land values and land demand. The 
complex system of phosphate surplus taxes is smoothly incorporated. 
The results show that the equilibrium price in the land market for dairy farms, with 
perfectly inelastic supply and frictionless demand, is higher than the equilibrium price in 
the situation with frictions. Comparing the simulated land prices with actual prices suggest 
that in reality the probability of purchasing land is low, that is, there are substantial 
imperfections on the demand side of the market. 
Since all farms reach corner solutions, the current phosphate surplus tax is an 
effective instrument to reduce manure surpluses in the Netherlands. In order to avoid 
paying the tax, farmers sharply reduce the input of livestock in the model. The opportunity 
to attract additional land has a minor impact on surplus reduction. However, for the 
average farm, purchasing land offsets the small negative effects of the surplus tax on profit. 
Introducing the phosphate surplus tax increases the demand for land and therefore the 
market price of land is higher than in a situation without a surplus tax. 
A few remarks should be made regarding our model. First, phosphate surpluses are 
mainly related to the input of livestock in the model. However, it is not likely that farmers 
will reduce the number of dairy cows by as much as 25 per cent, while maintaining the 
level of milk production. In practice, farmers may also transport phosphate (manure) off 
the farm or reduce the input of phosphate in feed. In the model, these possibilities are not 
accounted for. 
Second, the effects of milk quota trade on land demand are not taken into account. 
Given the changes in shadow prices for milk quota it is to be expected that, with a 
phosphate surplus tax and a changed amount of land, farmers also would like to adjust their 
milk production, by exchanging milk quotas. The large decrease in dairy cattle would then 
have to go together with selling milk quota (or buying quota would result in a more 
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moderate decrease in dairy cattle). However, given the high shadow prices of milk quota 
and the minor change in these shadow prices, this effect is probably small. 
Finally, for further research it would be interesting to include dynamic elements in 
the model. Adjustment costs related to land demand and infrequencies of land purchases 
could then be incorporated. For example, if a farmer gets a chance to buy land only once in 
a decade, perhaps he would buy more land than is economically efficient. 
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This final chapter is devoted to the general discussion of the methods used and the results 
obtained in this thesis. The purpose of the thesis was to assess individual farmers' 
responses to specific policy changes and therefore also to develop an econometric model of 
individual dairy farm behaviour. Interesting policy issues for dairy farming were identified 
and the econometric model was developed and adapted in subsequent chapters to simulate 
the policy effects for Dutch dairy farms. In the previous chapters, specific issues have 
already been discussed. In this chapter, more general discussion and conclusions regarding 
the methodology and the results of the estimations and policy simulations are given. 
Finally, general conclusions regarding the model are drawn. 
7.1 Methodology 
7.1.1 Farm level approach 
Decisions regarding production, e.g. about what to produce, in which quantities and how to 
produce it are taken on the individual farms. Reactions to policy changes also differ 
between farms, because conditions on which policy measures are based often depend on 
farm-level characteristics. This observation is taken as the starting point of modelling dairy 
farmers' behaviour at the individual level. Since differences in the efficiency of milk 
production drive the adjustments to policy changes on the farm, a micro-economic method 
is required. The farm level approach ensures that the empirical implementation is 
connected with neoclassical micro-economic theory and that information on production, 
price and policy are simultaneously considered. A natural approach would be to 
incorporate all heterogeneity in the behavioural modelling at the individual level, i.e. 
carrying out a separate simulation of each individual's behaviour. As Stoker (1993) 
indicated "Microsimulations models have the potential for the most realistic representation 
of aggregate data movements...". However, these micro-simulation models are practically 
impossible to implement, because of the large amount of detailed information that is 
necessary and because of the difficulty of aggregate validation. In this thesis this micro or 
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individual model is combined with an approach that accounts for aggregation over 
individuals (see e.g. Kleijnen and van Groenendaal, 1992 p.69). 
The privilege to use the rich panel data set of the farm accountancy network of the 
LEI-DLO enabled us to model dairy farming at the individual level. For the sake of a clear 
presentation, data and results were aggregated for different farm classes (e.g. regions) and 
for the dairy sector as a whole. Again, this was made possible by the data set that provides 
a weighting factor denoting the representation of each farm in the sector. However, the 
weighting factor is based on certain criteria that may differ from the particular variable that 
is aggregated. Hence, the weighting factor is not an exact base for aggregation, but it is the 
best available. The composition of the sample also plays a role here. The farm accountancy 
network does not include very small farms (Reinhard et a l , 1995). Moreover, we limited 
the sample by selecting only those farms that receive more than fifty per cent of their 
revenues from milk production and that are present in the sample for at least two 
subsequent years. Therefore, questions related to substitution e.g. switching from milk 
production to other types of production (agricultural or outside of agriculture) cannot easily 
be answered because relevant factors, such as the number of hours of family labour 
supplied outside the farm, are not included in the sample (Elhorst, 1996). 
Notwithstanding the fact that we used a micro-simulation model, farms were not 
analysed in isolation from each other. Prices and most of the estimated behavioural 
parameters were the same across farms and farms interacted on markets during the 
simulations. 
7.1.2 Econometric model 
In agricultural production analysis there are broadly two types of modelling approaches 
available: mathematical programming and econometric modelling (Rausser, 1982; Oskam 
et al., 1992). Mathematical programming uses information on the technical features of 
production on the farm in order to optimise the assumed objectives of the farm. Usually it 
is based on standard production relations and not on observed results in reality. Thus, one 
(or a few) typical farm(s) are modelled based on normative behaviour. Effects of changing 
circumstances, e.g. as a result of new policy, are easily determined by incorporating new 
production activities or restrictions to the mathematical programming model. At this point 
it is argued that econometric modelling is inadequate, because it uses perceived historical 
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data to determine farmers behaviour and therefore cannot include new policy measures 
(e.g. see Berentsen, 1999). However, the way in which the econometric model is used in 
this thesis, i.e. for simulations, shows that econometric models can be suitable for 
exploring the future. Hence, historical information on production behaviour and 
technology was combined with new policy parameters in order to assess the effects of 
policy measures. This required adapting the models with policy relevant parameters, see 
section 7.1.3. New technologies, such as the introduction of milking three times a day, are 
still ignored in such an approach. 
For the econometric modelling, the static dual approach was used. The dual model 
ensures that derivations and results are easily interpreted. Chapter 3 has already discussed 
why a simple functional form that is applicable for the purpose of the research (i.e. policy 
simulation) is preferred. Since the normalised quadratic (NQ) is not invariant with the 
choice of the numeraire and resulted in simulation effects wherein all variability is 
absorbed by the numeraire, the symmetric normalised quadratic (SNQ) was chosen. A 
more general discussion on functional forms is given by Oude Lansink and Thijssen 
(1998). 
Taking up all possible outputs and production factors in detail in the profit function 
would imply that many parameters have to be estimated and a lot of zero-observations 
would occur, because not all variables are relevant on every farm (although, with the 
functional forms used in this thesis, zero-observations are easily handled). Therefore, 
several products and production factors are aggregated into one variable. For example, the 
variable 'other output' in our model includes all farm products besides milk. Here, again an 
aggregation problem arises, because a weakly separable profit function is implicitly 
assumed (Elhorst, 1996; Rausser, 1982). Another problem relates to the way in which 
inputs and outputs are measured. For example, dairy cattle is measured in terms of annual 
revenues and costs, which makes it easy to compare and add-up, but is not easy to 
interpret. How many cows are involved if a farm has 4020 guilders worth of dairy cattle in 
terms of rental value in 1992/93? Dairy cattle on its own is already a difficult variable 
because it has both the character of an input and an output. It definitely is an input 
necessary to produce milk, but redundant cows and calves also generate revenue when they 
are sold. Moreover, there is the question of cattle being a variable or a fixed input (see 
below). 
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Individual farm behaviour could have been emphasised even more by incorporating 
socio-economic farm characteristics, such as farmers' age and education, composition of 
the farm household, etc. If the farm is not only viewed as a production unit but also as a 
consumption unit (because of the family farm structure), the supply of family labour could 
have been incorporated in the analysis. However, for the purpose of this study, it was not 
necessary to include these farm characteristics. 
The econometric model and estimation procedure used in this thesis includes some 
marked features. First, as already mentioned, the SNQ was used as a functional form. 
Second, the regime switch of introducing milk quotas is emphasised. The model includes a 
dummy that allows for technical change as a result of the introduction of the milk quota 
system. Apart from this dummy and an annual trend, no specific technical change is 
modelled. However, the model does allow for differences in technology levels between 
farms because of the farm-specific intercepts and the differences in the levels of the inputs. 
Third, dairy cattle is regarded as a variable input because cows are rather easily traded, 
while in most studies it is assumed to be a fixed input, i.e. livestock capital. The large and 
unrealistic adjustment in dairy cattle in chapter 6 shows that this also has its disadvantage, 
especially when milk quotas cannot be easily adjusted. Incorporating the dairy herd as an 
exogenous variable or constraining the reduction in cow numbers in chapter 6 could have 
been more appropriate. Moreover, since the rental value based on the inventory value of 
the herd is used in this thesis, technology shifts may not be measured appropriately. 
Fourth, the estimation procedure accounts for the difference in the number of observation 
across the equations in the estimated system, because the milk supply function is only 
estimated for the observations in the pre-quota period. In earlier econometric estimations 
that include quota introduction, for example by Helming, Oskam and Thijssen (1993) and 
Guyomard et al. (1996), it has not become clear if they corrected for the difference in the 
number of observations. 
7.1.3 Simulations 
Where the empirical model is based on historical data, i.e. describing behaviour that is the 
result of existing and past institutions and market conditions, simulations are used to 
analyse farm behaviour in possible institutional frameworks and market conditions in the 
future. The policy issues discussed in chapter 2 were translated into specific possible future 
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circumstances, for which the simulations were carried out in the subsequent chapters. The 
basic empirical model has been the same, that is, behavioural relationships were fixed, 
however each policy simulation asked for specific adaptations and extensions of the model. 
In chapter 5 the existing quota volumes were split into A-quota and B-milk volumes, while 
in chapter 6 a phosphate production function was added to the model. Note that the 
simulations are valid only within the experimental domain or historical range of the 
variables in the empirical model. 
Simulations are performed for the most recent data of dairy farms in the data set 
available, i.e. 1992/93. Due to, for example, weather influences, agricultural production 
and prices can be volatile and the use of data for one year could lead to untypical 
simulation results. However, the behavioural reactions are estimated on data for the period 
1973/74 to 1992/93. Therefore, simulation results will not depend too much on the data of 
just one year. Moreover, 1992/93 was a rather typical year for dairy farming (van Dijk, 
Douma and van Vliet, 1995). 
The equilibrium conditions imposed during simulation, for example, balancing the 
demand and supply of milk quotas, are commonly used in micro-economics. In this thesis 
it is shown how distortions in the market, e.g. due to government regulation or transaction 
costs, affect the optimum or equilibrium. However, we focused on specified distortions, 
e.g. the discrepancy between the location of land demand and supply in chapter 6. Thus, 
any possible unspecified distortion is ignored (e.g. instant adjustment is assumed). Note 
also that this is a partial equilibrium approach; other markets are assumed not to be 
affected. 
In the short-run model used here, static equilibrium conditions were applied. The 
volume of assets were fixed at the farm, implying that there was no explicit time path from 
the initial to the final situation given. Adjustments are assumed to take place instantly. As a 
consequence, the impact of investments could not be studied. Thus, only short-run quota 
trade, i.e. quota lease, was analysed and shadow prices of fixed inputs were given in terms 
of annual rental prices. In this respect, the financial situation of the farm is also important, 
but not regarded in this thesis. Adjustments at the farm that follow from the economic 
model could in reality have been prevented because of financial restrictions. Moreover, the 
group of agents was assumed fixed, i.e. the possibility of new farms entering and 
incumbent farms exiting the dairy sector is ignored. 
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7.2 Results and implications 
7.2.1 Model validation 
The micro-economic model was estimated using annual data from Dutch dairy farms over 
the period 1973/74 to 1992/93. The performance of the estimated model was measured by 
the parameter estimations, the elasticities and the shadow prices. Elasticities and shadow 
prices were calculated for each individual farm and weighted averages were presented. The 
theoretical assumptions of the static dual micro-economic model were fulfilled, especially 
the estimates were such that the profit function was convex in prices. 
Two types of elasticities were calculated for the data in 1992/93 in chapter 3 and 4. 
The conditional elasticity is conditional on the fixed volume of milk supply (=quota) on 
the farm and can be referred to as a short-term elasticity. The unconditional elasticity is an 
intermediate-term elasticity since milk supply is variable (quotas are tradable), but the 
fixed inputs are still taken as given. The unconditional own price elasticities were larger (in 
absolute terms) than the conditional elasticities, satisfying the Le Chatelier-Samuelson 
principle. Price and quantity elasticities of milk supply had the expected signs (decreasing 
in netput prices and increasing in fixed input quantities). In chapter 6 the unconditional 
(land is tradable) elasticities of land demand with respect to netput prices and fixed input 
quantities were calculated. Introducing a tax on phosphate surpluses at the farm increases 
the demand for farmland. 
It is difficult to compare the elasticities with results from other studies for several 
reasons. Most of the studies in the literature use aggregate data, which are likely to result in 
larger elasticities because of changes in the number, size and distribution of farms if prices 
change and because of the larger price elasticities of mixed farms (Thijssen, 1992). 
Moreover, if micro data are used, the definition of the inputs and outputs may differ, e.g. 
Thijssen (1992) distinguishes only one output for dairy farming. Helming, Oskam and 
Thijssen (1993) used the same type of data as in this thesis and also distinguished two 
outputs, including milk quota, for dairy farming. However, they reported average 
elasticities over the period 1970/71-1988/89 and used the NQ as a functional form. Their 
elasticities are even quite different from the elasticities calculated in this thesis (calculated 
only for 1992/93). 
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Shadow prices were calculated in order to determine the value of the fixed inputs 
and milk quotas for the dairy farms in 1992/93. The fixed inputs and milk quotas are at 
their long-run equilibrium level if the shadow price equals the actual rental price (Segerson 
and Squires, 1993). The average calculated shadow price of milk quota was 39 cents per 
kilogram, while in the same year the actual lease price (after correcting for fat content) was 
34 cents per kilogram in the Netherlands. The difference indicates an incentive to invest in 
quota. However, when regulatory distortions in quota trade are being included in the model 
(see chapter 4), the calculated shadow price of milk quota becomes 33 cents per kilogram. 
Compared with the actual lease price, this indicates a quota market that performs at its 
equilibrium. This result is conditional on the regulatory distortions, assuming that there are 
no other distortions and of course on the correctness of the model and data used. However, 
the observed quota lease price is the result of a dynamic process of trading, while in the 
model quota trade is a one-time event. Resulting shadow prices of quota in the Agenda 
2000 and two-tier system (chapter 5) cannot be validated to the actual lease price because 
conditions differ. 
The average shadow price calculated for agricultural land, 1629 guilders per 
hectare, closely resembled the actual free rental price of land, i.e. demand and supply of 
grassland for dairy farming are more or less balanced. However, the results in chapter 6 
indicate that dairy farmers are willing to purchase additional farmland if more land would 
be available in the Netherlands, i.e. there is a shortage of farmland. The shadow price of 
labour, 7.68 guilders per hour, was low compared to hourly earnings of hired farm labour. 
This is a well-known result in agriculture and indicates either, that agricultural labour is 
satisfied with lower wages because they are attached to the farm, or official off-farm wages 
are higher than real off-farm earnings for farm labour (Elhorst, 1996). 
7.2.2 Policy simulations 
The simulation results of alternative policies in chapters 4, 5 and 6 were compared to a 
base simulation. The base simulation represented the initial situation for the dairy farms 
when no additional policies were implemented. When the effect of quota trade was 
important in the policy analysis (e.g. in chapters 4 and 5), the simulation results were also 
compared to a base simulation in which milk quotas were efficiently reallocated in a free 
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quota market. Thus, the base simulation is used as the benchmark in our comparative static 
model. 
In chapter 4 we saw that, despite the earlier possibilities for farmers to trade milk 
quotas (in the period 1984-1992, included in the estimations), the allocation of quotas in 
1992/93 could still be improved upon if quota trade were unconstrained. The equilibrium 
quota price is 0.39 guilders per kg. The effects of a two per cent margin between the 
buying and selling price of quota, representing transfer costs, are small. However, 
thresholds in quota trade (minimum supply of ten thousand kg and maximum demand of 
75 thousand kg per transaction) result in substantial smaller profit increases. The 
equilibrium quota price with thresholds is 0.33 guilders per kg. Thus, efficiency gains can 
be obtained if restrictions on milk quota trade are removed. However, the trade restrictions 
protect small farms because they gain more from quota trade than large farms. The welfare 
losses should outweigh the perceived advantages of the quota trade restrictions. 
As the shadow prices already indicated, farms at western pastures are net quota 
suppliers in the unconstrained trade simulation. Thus, quotas are reallocated to sandy soils 
and the northern parts. This is also the case when a price margin is included. However, the 
situation changes when thresholds on transactions are imposed. Farms on northern clay 
also become net quota suppliers and the whole quota flow is in the direction of the sandy 
soils. 
The price of quota in a two-tier system depends on the level of the world market 
price of quota; the higher the world price, the lower the quota price. Because of the milk 
price decrease and quota increase, the equilibrium price of milk quota under the Agenda 
2000 reform becomes 0.27 guilders per kg (see chapter 5). In the discussion on quota lease, 
this implies that, in order to obtain lower quota prices, introducing a centralised quota 
exchange is not required, because quota prices will probably already decrease because of 
the Agenda 2000 reform. However, the timing aspects should be kept in mind here; 
Agenda 2000 will show its full effects only in 2008, whereas we simulated it for 1992/93. 
The results in chapter 5 show that, in a two-tier milk price system with free quota 
trade, B-milk will be produced if the world market price is higher than the industries' 
average marginal costs of producing A-milk (0.31 guilders per kg). In that case, profits will 
increase. If the world market price of milk were 0.31 guilders per kg, the present level of 
total milk production would not be exceeded. Provided that the world market price of milk 
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is higher than 0.31 guilders per kg, the quota price under a two-tier system would be lower 
than the present quota price, because the most efficient farmers will produce B-milk 
instead of buying A-quota. Moreover, less quota would be traded than currently. 
The Agenda 2000 reform for dairy farming, a 15 per cent milk price reduction 
combined with a 1.5 per cent increase in quotas, results in a 17 per cent fall in profits 
(defined as the value of netputs). However, with more favourable world market conditions, 
milk price reduction and profit reduction would probably be less severe. The proposed 
direct payment per tonne of initial quota (55 guilders) only compensates for 52 per cent of 
this profit loss. Silvis and van Bruchem (1999) found a cover for 64 per cent of income 
loss. The profit reduction is mainly due to the decrease in milk prices. Because of the 1.5 
per cent quota increase, the demand for variable inputs will increase, while the supply of 
other output decreases. If quotas were abolished, milk production increases if the price of 
milk is higher than the current average marginal costs. However, profits decrease, asking 
for compensating payments. At a world price of 0.60 guilders per kg, the necessary 
compensation in the case of quota abolishment is smaller than in the Agenda 2000 case, 
while milk production is higher. 
The disadvantages of Agenda 2000, i.e. increased budget costs and the 
insufficiency to meet future WTO demands, are complemented with strong negative 
income effects for Dutch dairy farmers. The income of the farmer is guaranteed in a two-
tier price system and it serves farmers with some flexibility (partly giving in to the WTO 
demands). The burden on the government budget in a two-tier system is probably lower 
because price support, export subsidies and compensation payments are lower. Quota 
abolition is, from an income point of view, still less attractive for Dutch dairy farmers 
(although highly dependent on the price at the world market) but more freedom in 
production could outweigh this disadvantage. The fact that the Dutch government did not 
opt for quota abolition probably has to do with the fear that a rise in milk production would 
increase environmental problems and would lead to a weakened financial position of 
farmers because their quota lose value. 
The results in chapter 6 show that the equilibrium price in the land market for dairy 
farms, with perfectly inelastic supply and frictionless demand, is higher than the 
equilibrium price in the situation with frictions (i.e discrepancy between the location of 
land demanded and supplied). Comparing the simulated land prices with actual prices 
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suggest that in reality the probability of purchasing land is low, that is, there are substantial 
imperfections on the demand side of the market. 
The current phosphate surplus tax is an effective instrument to reduce manure 
surpluses in the Netherlands. In order to avoid paying the tax, farmers reduce the input of 
livestock. However, it is not likely that farmers will reduce the number of dairy cows by as 
much as 25 per cent, while mamtaining the level of milk production. Using the rental value 
based on the inventory value of the dairy herd may have contributed to this result. In 
practice, farmers may also transport phosphate (manure) off the farm or reduce the input of 
phosphate in feed. In the model, these possibilities are not accounted for. The opportunity 
to attract additional land has a minor impact on surplus reduction. However, for the 
average farm, purchasing land offsets the small negative effects of the surplus tax on profit. 
Introducing the phosphate surplus tax increases the demand for land and therefore the 
market price of land is higher than in a situation without a surplus tax. The phosphate 
surplus is reduced by both purchasing land and adjusting the input of livestock. Farms with 
an initial phosphate surplus buy relatively more land but also reduce their livestock more 
than farms without an initial surplus. By purchasing land, profit of the farms with an initial 
surplus increases more than profit of the average farm. 
7.3 General conclusions on model use 
In constructing and using a model, the model purpose is crucial. The purpose could be 
descriptive or explanatory analysis, forecasting or policy impact analysis. The latter is of 
direct interest in policy formulation and usually the most demanding because it also 
requires the construction of descriptive and causal models. In essence, the research strategy 
for model development and use (i.e. specification, estimation, validation and effective use 
of economic models) is determined by the trade-off between simplicity and accuracy of the 
model (Rausser, 1982). In this thesis, the modelling is typically intended to support policy 
analysis for Dutch dairy farming. Major issues of the model specification (e.g. the 
appropriate level of aggregation, the selection of endogenous and explanatory variables, 
the choice between a stochastic and a deterministic model or between a static and a 
dynamic model), estimation and validation have already been discussed. However, the 
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question remains if the model is appropriate for answering dairy policy questions 
accurately. 
The micro-economic model developed in this thesis is a single-purpose model in 
the sense that it is intended to support dairy policy analysis. However, where it is used to 
analyse different types of policies relevant to dairy farming it is a multi-purpose model. 
Once the basic model is available, it should be adapted in order to address specific policy 
questions. Thus, quick answers are not to be expected by this procedure, but it provides 
relevant and interesting policy insights. The micro-econometric and micro-simulation 
approach ensures that systematic individual differences in economic behaviour are 
accounted for. 
Model outcomes should be used as an indication of the direction and size of the 
effects of policy changes, relative to the value of the exogenous variables. Results 
generated by simulating variables beyond their historic range should carefully be 
interpreted. The choice of the functional form for the empirical model is especially 
important if the model is to be used for simulating policy issues. Simulating alternative 
policies requires appropriate model adjustments and additions. Of course, this type of 
modelling and simulating is only possible if the proper data is available. Developing and 
adjusting the model take some time, therefore this type of modelling is less adequate in 
giving rapid response to requests for policy impact scenarios. 
To conclude, the empirical micro-economic model developed in this thesis proved 
to be a flexible tool for analysing alternative policies. The approach of combining 
historical information on production technology and production behaviour of individual 
farmers with information on future or new policy measures is suitable for analysing policy 
effects at the farm level. 
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A P P E N D I X 
3.A: Normalised Quadratic 
For each farm h and year t, the normalised quadratic restricted profit function (Moschini, 
1988) is written as: 
3 8 1 3 3 
Sh, (v», qoh,, zu,) = «o* + X a'h% + ^ O A , + E A Z «» + r E Z ^ - v 9 ^ ' + 
; = l 4 = 1 ^ / = l 7=1 
3 3 8 j 
/=1 4=1 
5 5 
~^jMkZkhl1ahl + 'T ^ ! PknZkb,Znh, + /^l ^ "1 PknZkhtZnhl 
4 = 1 Z 4 = 1 B=l 4 = 1 » = 6 
The last term in the restricted profit function indicates that the cross-products of the 
dummies are not taken into account. Farm h specific parameters are denoted by aoh and 
an,. Symmetry is maintained by requiring a,y=^-, and fih,=p\k- The normalised prices v, 
(z'=l,2,3) ensure that the profit function is linear homogeneous in prices. The price of other 
input is used as the numeraire. Furthermore, the profit function is convex in prices if the 
Hessian matrix of prices is positive semi-definite. 
Using Hotelling's lemma, the supply function for other output and demand 
equations for feed and dairy cattle (z'=l,2,3) are derived: 
3 8 
7 = 1 4 = 1 
Note that the netput equations contain a farm-specific intercept. The demand for other 
3 
input follows from the definition of normalised profit, ghl = ^ Jvuqm + qihl, and is: 
7 = 1 
8 j 3 3 j 
8 1 5 3 5 8 
^,MkZkhl9ohl + ^ZIj^fc Z W Z * +^X^*»Z*2«*' 
4 = 1 ^ 4 = 1 77 = 1 4 = 1 7 7 = 6 
The model is completed by the milk supply function, which is only valid in the pre-quota 
period. Note that the milk supply function does not include a farm-specific intercept. 
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Iaht (3.A.4) 
After the introduction of the quota system, milk supply is exogenously given for the 
individual farm and the milk supply equation does not apply. The marginal cost of milk 
supply, that is, the price that would have given rise to producing at the quota level, is given 
by: 
S + E + + E Mkza, 
4=1 
(3.A.5) 
The farm shadow price of milk quota, r^, equals vorsoht- The shadow prices of the quasi-
fixed inputs (A=l,..,5) are calculated as: 
sm =ßk + Y,7<k%, + E A A (3.A.6) 
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3.B: Data for the average specialised dairy farm (yearly weighted averages). 
Milk production 
400 T 
1970 1 9 7 5 1980 1985 1990 1 9 9 5 
Year 
Purchased feed 
90 T 
1970 1 9 7 5 1980 1 9 8 5 1990 1 9 9 5 
Year 
Dairy cattle 
1970 1 9 7 5 1980 1985 1990 1 9 9 5 
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Labour 
4500 T 
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Year 
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u 
a 
1970 1 9 7 5 1980 1 9 8 5 1990 1 9 9 5 
Year 
Buildings and machinery 
00 
t-
•a a 
e e e 
300 T 
1970 1 9 7 5 
-Bui ld ings 
1980 1985 
Year 
• Machinery 
1990 1 9 9 5 
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Other output and other input 
Other output Other input 
3.C: Results of the estimation including fixed effects in the milk supply equation 
(SNQfem) and of the weighted estimation (SNQweight). 
Parameter SNQfem SNQweight Parameter SNQfem SNQweight 
Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio 
16.970 5.38 14.256 5.52 Y4* 11.847 0.79 1.813 0.15 
a12 1.789 0.93 1.882 1.25 p -0.011 -16.92 -0.010 -11.60 
« 1 3 -1.451 -3.85 -1.309 -2.72 Mi 1.0E-4 9.69 6.0E-5 7.05 
« 2 2 2.391 1.20 2.962 1.92 Mi 0.027 12.76 0.026 11.31 
an -0.425 -3.18 -0.258 -1.56 M-h 0.002 12.91 0.003 11.04 
ax 1.586 5.14 1.479 3.67 MA 0.006 14.65 0.005 10.56 
Ci 0.107 9.78 -0.287 -17.71 Ms 0.041 9.21 1.9E-5 0.01 
6 -0.306 -36.55 -0.697 -45.89 Mi -0.530 -16.98 0.165 1.82 
& -0.011 -22.40 -0.033 -29.08 Mi 
Ms 
0.064 0.53 0.012 0.67 
- - -0.167 -10.15 0.034 0.26 -0.093 -4.43 
Yu 7.4E-6 0.00 0.004 2.39 fin 3.5E-7 0.38 4.9E-7 0.43 
Yn 1.209 5.99 1.522 6.49 fin 3.5E-6 0.04 -7.5E-5 -0.67 
Yn 0.124 7.93 0.051 2.93 fin -2.0E-5 -2.85 -1.6E-5 -1.89 
Yu 0.093 2.97 0.272 6.72 filA -9.3E-5 -6.47 -1.0E-4 -5.45 
7\i 0.003 0.00 -0.585 -0.85 fia -3.5E-5 -0.11 0.001 1.64 
Yl6 4.463 0.57 -5.442 -0.71 fiu 0.002 1.00 -0.003 -1.29 
Yn -0.776 -0.06 -2.019 -0.20 fin 0.003 0.84 4.0E-4 0.12 
Yi» -5.288 -0.34 -19.215 -1.43 fill 0.003 0.76 -0.001 -0.28 
Yi\ -0.003 -1.62 0.002 0.88 fin -0.152 -9.45 -0.106 -6.12 
Y22 1.561 7.62 1.840 7.71 fia -0.005 -4.61 -0.005 -3.65 
Yn 0.068 4.20 0.003 0.17 filA -0.003 -1.81 -0.007 -3.06 
Y24 0.068 2.11 0.273 6.55 fil5 -0.127 -3.22 -0.091 -1.98 
Y25 0.236 0.32 -0.798 -1.13 fill 2.336 7.98 0.751 1.68 
Y26 3.637 0.45 -5.372 -0.67 fill -0.278 -0.53 0.082 0.14 
Y21 -1.550 -0.13 -3.036 -0.31 fill -1.195 -1.76 0.166 0.22 
Yzs 9.249 0.60 -5.462 -0.42 fix -3.8E-4 -4.42 -0.001 -5.66 
Yii -1.6E-4 -1.61 1.0E-4 .0.87 filA -0.001 -6.69 -0.002 -8.10 
Yn 0.022 1.64 0.041 2.62 fits -0.013 -3.74 0.011 2.87 
7 3 3 0.006 6.06 0.001 1.13 fix 0.094 3.84 -0.127 -3.39 
Yu 0.003 1.34 0.016 5.69 fill -0.025 -0.86 -0.035 -1.03 
73} 0.029 0.61 -0.044 -0.94 Pi* 0.023 0.73 0.014 0.43 
7>e 0.279 0.53 -0.309 -0.59 fiAA -0.004 -10.23 -0.003 -5.71 
m 0.307 0.44 0.111 0.16 PAS -0.008 -1.17 0.002 0.21 
ft* 0.710 0.74 -0.291 -0.33 0.129 2.87 -0.188 -2.95 
YAI -0.004 -2.70 0.001 0.43 PAI 0.004 0.06 -0.015 -0.19 
YA2 -1.108 -5.69 -0.571 -2.53 PAS -0.026 -0.32 0.172 1.87 
YA3 0.078 5.13 0.005 0.27 fix 0.410 1.98 0.200 0.98 
YAA -0.011 -0.35 0.159 4.05 fix. -3.035 -1.56 1.184 0.60 
YAS -1.389 -2.00 -1.726 -2.57 P51 -0.054 -0.05 0.490 0.46 
YA6 7.674 1.01 -3.139 -0.42 Pss 0.794 0.66 -0.629 -0.53 
YAI 1.625 0.14 0.795 0.08 e -0.390 -2.68 - -
Observations 9 365 
Farms 1 961 
Period 1973/74-1992/93 
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4.A: Data and base simulation (between brackets) for average specialised dairy farms in 1992/93. 
Dimension e Price 
index 8 
Sandy soils Northern clay Western pastures Total sector 
(No. of farms) (14 517) (6 888) (6 110) (27 515) 
Milk output Kilogram *1000 - - 1.17 366.412 441.047 365.380 384.868 
Other outputs Guilders* 1000 0.323 1.04 1.05 84.121 72.112 72.243 78.477 
(1980/81 prices) (87.603) (75.379) (75.114) (81.769) 
Purchased Guilders* 1000 0.337 0.94 0.82 73.321 70.348 66.626 71.090 
feed (1980/81 prices) (69.174) (70.010) (64.364) (68.315) 
Dairy cattle Guilders* 1000 0.022 1.04 1.12 3.852 4.562 3.809 4.020 
(1980/81 prices) (3.743) (4.463) (3.685) (3.910) 
Other inputs Guilders* 1000 0.317 0.98 1.14 81.134 69.382 66.349 74.909 
(1980/81 prices) (82.051) (71.241) (67.539) (76.122) 
Profits Nominal guilders *1000 189.364 
(195.508) 
244.293 
(245.999) 
198.531 
(202.190) 
205.151 
(209.632) 
Labour Hours - - - 3869 4054 3871 3916 
Land Hectares - - 28.738 37.790 29.244 31.117 
Buildings Inventory value, guilders *1000 
(1980/81 prices) 
- - 235.160 277.324 233.572 245.363 
Machinery Inventory value, guilders *1000 
(1980/81 prices) 
- - 195.540 211.498 184.619 197.110 
a 1980/81=1.00, w=1.003 in 1992/93. 
6.A: Data and base simulation for the average specialised dairy farm in 1992/93. 
0 a Price 
index b 
Dimension Data Base simulation 
Quantity Shadow price 
Milk output 1.17 Kilogram »1000 384.868 0.311 
Other outputs 0.323 1.05 Guilders* 1000 
(1980/81 prices) 
78.477 81.769 
Purchased feed 0.337 0.82 Guilders* 1000 
(1980/81 prices) 
71.090 68.315 
Dairy cattle 0.022 1.12 Guilders* 1000 
(1980/81 prices) 
4.020 3.910 
Other inputs 0.317 1.14 Guilders »1000 
(1980/81 prices) 
74.909 76.122 
Profit Nominal guilders 
*1000 
205.151 209.632 
Labour Hours 3916 7.676 
Land Hectares 31.117 1629 
Buildings Inventory value, 
guilders »1000 
(1980/81 prices) 
245.363 0.036 
Machinery Inventory value, 
guilders* 1000 
(1980/81 prices) 
197.110 0.086 
Phosphate production Kilogram 4057 3824 
Other bovine cattle0 Guilders* 1000 
(1980/81 prices) 
2.394 2.452 
Pigs 0 Guilders* 1000 
(1980/81 prices) 
0.315 0.322 
Other livestock 0 Guilders* 1000 
(1980/81 prices) 
0.186 0.193 
4 
* Note that w = ^ Qpit i n 1992/93 equals 1.003. h 1980/81=1.00. 0 Two farms (0.5 per cent) have no other 
M 
bovine cattle, 331 farms (81 per cent) have no pigs and 277 farms (68 per cent) have no other livestock. 
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6.B: Estimation results. 
Parameter Estimate t-ratio Parameter Estimate t-ratio 
a „ 18.J63 5.69 747 1.180 0.08 
«12 2.382 1.24 P -0.085 -5.27 
« 1 3 -1.662 -3.08 Mo 0.020 10.72 
«22 2.619 1.32 Mi 2.3E-5 0.22 
« 2 3 -0.453 -2.39 M2 -0.004 -2.99 
a33 1.752 3.96 Ms -0.006 -2.69 
£ 1.405 5.58 MA -0.089 -1.85 
1.775 6.89 Ms 1.277 2.59 
0.035 2.10 M6 0.098 0.16 
-0.860 -3.53 Mi 0.045 0.06 
r i o -0.247 -16.58 Poo -0.009 -11.17 
/ l l 0.004 2.20 Poi 5.4E-5 6.70 
7l2 0.059 3.07 Pol 0.003 10.61 
7a 0.292 6.75 fix 0.004 10.17 
7u -0.976 -1.10 P0A 0.007 2.22 
7M -7.595 -0.77 Pos 0.102 1.08 
7l6 -0.972 -0.07 Pm 0.038 2.00 
7ll -15.583 -0.97 Poi -0.108 -4.63 
720 -0.678 -48.65 Pll 5.2E-7 0.45 
721 0.002 0.97 Pll -8.4E-6 -0.98 
722 -0.001 -0.04 Pn -1.2E-4 -6.07 
723 0.276 6.18 PlA 0.001 2.07 
724 -0.785 -0.86 Pis -0.005 -1.62 
725 -9.075 -0.88 filt -0.001 -0.21 
726 -1.730 -0.14 Pll -0.001 -0.20 
727 -1.632 -0.10 Pll -0.001 -5.75 
730 -0.035 -35.47 Pi, -0.002 -7.16 
731 1.3E-4 0.96 PlA 0.007 1.57 
732 0.002 1.71 Pis -0.102 -2.42 
733 0.017 5.70 fix -0.073 -1.97 
734 -0.046 -0.77 Pll -0.021 -0.52 
735 -0.510 -0.76 Pn -0.002 -5.14 
736 0.294 0.35 PiA -0.004 -0.44 
737 -0.004 -0.00 Pis -0.171 -2.69 
740 -0.179 -11.98 Pl6 0.072 0.84 
741 4.6E-4 0.24 Pll 0.265 2.56 
742 0.014 0.78 PAA 0.246 0.93 
743 0.191 4.53 PAS 1.385 0.55 
744 -2.332 -2.69 PA6 -0.254 -0.19 
745 -4.926 -0.51 PA7 -1.221 -0.79 
746 1.662 0.14 
Observations 
Farms 
Period 
9365 
1961 
1973/74-1992/93 
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6.C: Estimation of the phosphate production function 
A weighted OLS estimation procedure is used to estimate the phosphate production 
function. The data provides a weighting factor for each farm in each year, denoting the 
number of farms in the sector that are represented by the farm in the sample. The 
phosphate production function is estimated for the 409 observations (=farms) in the sample 
in 1992/93, representing 27515 farms in the sector. Data regarding phosphate production 
for the average farm in 1992/93 are reported in the bottom part of the table in Appendix 
6.A. 
m= -797.84 .^ -21234-? 4 f l - 3 0 6 . 5 0 - ^ - 4 3 7 . 8 9 - ^ 
(-25.30) (-423) (-4.80) (-3.98) k ' ' ' 
Here the t-ratios are given in brackets and R 2 is 0.69. Note that the variables on the right 
hand side have the expected sign because the netputs q$ and q4a to q4c are inputs and 
therefore have negative values. The estimation results imply that the numbers of dairy 
cows, other bovine cattle, pigs and other livestock are positively related to phosphate 
production. 
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SUMMARY 
The dairy sector is to a large extent influenced and restricted by environmental and 
agricultural policies. These policies are often very detailed in nature and oriented at the 
farm level. That is, policy measures and regulations, such as taxes and support payments 
often depend on local farm circumstances and farm management. Dairy farmers constantly 
face minor and major policy changes, causing farm-specific uncertainties and adjustments 
in production. This thesis aims to quantify the effects of specific policies on production 
decisions and profit of individual Dutch dairy farms. Thus, the individual behaviour of 
dairy farmers in response to policy changes is the main focus here. 
Chapter 2 describes some of the relevant policies faced by dairy farms and serves 
as background for the research and delineates the research questions of the thesis. A 
distinction is made between policies directed by the EU, such as the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) with respect to dairy and the milk quota system, and typical Dutch policies, 
especially quota trade and manure policy. In these fields policy changes are expected or 
recently introduced. 
The supply constraint, enforced by the milk quota regime, combined with the price 
support and border protection measures, play a central role in dairy policy. However, the 
EU seeks to readjust dairy policy. The alternative EU policies analysed in this thesis are a 
two-tier milk price system, quota abolition, and the Agenda 2000 reform, which includes 
quota increases, price cuts and compensating premiums. Within the milk quota system, 
quota mobility and the organisation of quota trade have been debated constantly. In the 
Netherlands, milk quotas are traded in a fairly liberal quota market. The efficiency of milk 
quota trade and the effects of distortions in quota trade are analysed. Another policy issue 
of interest for Dutch dairy farms consists of the nutrient surplus taxes recently introduced. 
The effects of phosphate surplus taxes, especially in relation to the demand for farmland, 
are investigated. 
An empirical economic model of the production behaviour of dairy farming is 
developed and applied to determine the effects of policy changes. It is assumed that 
farmers react differently to policy changes, especially because policies become 
increasingly farm-specific. Therefore, a micro-economic approach is used. The micro-
economic model for analysing production behaviour and profit of dairy farms that are 
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subject to milk quotas is developed in chapter 3. The decisions behind model choices are 
explained and some alternative specifications and estimations are reported. Moreover, the 
data that is used throughout the thesis, as well as estimation results are discussed. 
The basic theoretical assumption is that dairy farmers maximise profits in the short 
run, while facing technical and market restrictions. When farm-level effects of policy 
changes are determined, they are aggregated in order to resolve the effects for the dairy 
sector. The availability of a rich panel data source, provided by LEI-DLO, allowed us to 
identify dairy farmers' behaviour at the micro level and check the theoretical assumptions. 
In this thesis the static dual approach is adopted, using a flexible functional form 
specification for the profit function. Micro level demand and supply equations were 
derived and a fixed-effects model was used, which assumes equal functional forms across 
farmers, however with different intercepts. The analysis relied on a strong empirical 
orientation, hence technical details of policy changes were explicitly incorporated. The 
model is estimated with data on 1961 dairy farms over the period 1973/74 to 1992/93. 
The empirical model consists of a system of simultaneous equations, which 
accounts for the introduction of milk quotas (a regime switch) through a difference in the 
number of observations across equations. Since estimating such a model, using an 
unbalanced panel data set, is complicated, the structure of the model is kept as simple as 
possible (keeping in mind also the applicability for policy simulations). Therefore, the 
normalised quadratic (NQ) would have been preferred to the symmetric normalised 
quadratic (SNQ) as a functional form. However, the NQ is not invariant with the numeraire 
and resulted in one-sided simulation effects, that is, all variability is absorbed by the 
variable used as the numeraire. The SNQ is used to avoid this problem. 
Two alternative estimation procedures, using the SNQ, are compared with the 
central model that is used further in this thesis. The data used are selected from a stratified 
sample of farms, which gives an opportunity to obtain weighted estimators. Estimation 
results of the weighted estimation are similar to the results of the unweighted estimation. 
However, further research is necessary to test for the difference between weighted and 
unweighted estimation. The estimation of the central model does not account for the 
weights. Weighting factors are only used to present averages and totals. 
The available panel data set makes it possible to apply fixed effects or random 
effects estimators. In this study the fixed effects model is used, because the model is 
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mainly used to make inferences about the behaviour of individual farms in the sample. A 
more complicated system, i.e. including additional fixed effects in the milk supply 
equation, was also estimated. However, they could only be derived for the pre-quota 
period, whereas the model is used for simulating behaviour in the post-quota period (the 
most recent year, 1992/93, is taken as the base year). 
In chapter 4 the issues of milk quota trade efficiency and resulting quota prices are 
addressed. Although the Dutch quota market is known as fairly liberal, there still exist 
some distortions in quota trade, resulting in efficiency losses for dairy farming. Distortions 
are caused by limits on the amount of quota that can be traded according to the regulations. 
Costs related to transaction services by a middleman or a notary are less visible. Both types 
of trade distortions are simulated and compared with unconstrained quota trade. 
Unconstrained tradability of milk quotas increases total profit by 9 per cent and reallocates 
quotas from farmers on western pastures to farmers on sandy soils and the northern clay 
and peat area. The equilibrium quota price is 0.39 guilders per kg. The effects of a two per 
cent margin between the buying and selling price of quota, representing transfer costs, are 
small. However, thresholds in quota trade (minimum supply of ten thousand kg and 
maximum demand of 75 thousand kg per transaction) result in substantial smaller profit 
increases and farmers in the northern clay and peat area switch from being net buyers to 
net suppliers of milk quota. The equilibrium quota price with thresholds is 0.33 guilders 
per kg. Thus, efficiency gains can be obtained if restrictions on milk quota trade are 
removed. However, the trade restrictions protect small farms because they gain more from 
quota trade than large farms. 
The effects of alternative EU dairy policy changes are assessed in chapter 5. The 
theoretical model is extended to allow for a two-tier milk price system, in which A-milk is 
produced at a supported milk price and farmers are allowed to produce additional B-milk at 
the lower world market price. Further complication is introduced by simulating a two-tier 
system in which milk quota trade occurs. Moreover, quota abolition and the agreed price 
cuts for dairy products and quota increases of Agenda 2000 are simulated. In a two-tier 
milk price system with free quota trade, B-milk will be produced if the world market price 
is higher than the industries' average marginal costs of producing A-milk (0.31 guilders 
per kg). In that case, profits will increase. If the world market price of milk were 0.31 
guilders per kg, the present level of total milk production would not be exceeded. Provided 
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that the world market price of milk is higher than 0.31 guilders per kg, the quota price 
under a two-tier system would be lower than the present quota price, because the most 
efficient farmers will produce B-milk instead of buying A-quota. Moreover, less quota will 
be traded than currently. 
The Agenda 2000 reform for dairy farming, a 15 per cent milk price reduction 
combined with a 1.5 per cent increase in quotas, results in a 17 per cent fall in profits. The 
proposed direct payment per tonne of initial quota (55 guilders) only compensates for 52 
per cent of this profit loss. The profit reduction is mainly due to the decrease in milk 
prices. Because of the 1.5 per cent quota increase, the demand for variable inputs will 
increase, while the supply of other output decreases. If quotas were abolished, milk 
production would increase if the price of milk were higher than the current average 
marginal cost. However, profits decrease, asking for compensating payments. At a world 
price of 0.60 guilders per kg, the necessary compensation in the case of quota abolition is 
smaller than in the Agenda 2000 case, while milk production is higher. 
The disadvantages of Agenda 2000, i.e. increased budget costs and the failure to 
meet future WTO demands, are complemented with strong negative income effects for 
Dutch dairy farmers. The income of the farmer is guaranteed in a two-tier price system and 
it offers farmers some flexibility (partly giving in to the WTO demands). The burden on 
the government budget in a two-tier system is probably lower because price support, export 
subsidies and compensation payments are lower. Quota abolition is, from an income point 
of view, still less attractive for Dutch dairy farmers (although highly dependent on the 
price at the world market) but more freedom in production could outweigh this 
disadvantage. The fact that the Dutch government did not opt for quota abolition probably 
has to do with the fear that a rise in milk production would increase environmental 
problems and would lead to a weakened financial position of farmers because their quota 
loses value. 
In chapter 6, the core issues are land demand and the introduction of phosphate 
surplus taxes. The model is adapted in order to simulate an imperfect market for farmland. 
Additionally, phosphate surplus taxes per farm are calculated and incorporated in the 
model in such a way that the surplus tax to be paid depends on the amount of farmland and 
the input of livestock. The equilibrium price in the land market for dairy farms, with 
perfectly inelastic supply of twenty thousand hectares and frictionless demand, is higher 
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than the equilibrium price in the situation with frictions. Frictions in the land market are 
caused by discrepancy between the location of the land supplied and demanded. The 
phosphate surplus tax is an effective instrument to reduce manure surpluses in dairy 
farming. In order to avoid paying the tax, farmers reduce the input of livestock. However, 
it is not likely that farmers will reduce the number of dairy cows by as much as 25 per cent, 
while mamtaining the level of milk production. In practice, farmers may also transport 
phosphate (manure) off the farm or reduce the input of phosphate in feed. In the model, 
these possibilities are not accounted for. The opportunity to attract additional land has a 
minor impact on surplus reduction. However, for the average farm, purchasing land offsets 
the small negative effects of the surplus tax on profit. Introducing the phosphate surplus 
tax increases the demand for farmland and therefore the equilibrium price of land is higher 
than in a situation without a surplus tax. 
Finally, in chapter 7 the various policy simulations and their effects for dairy 
farming are discussed. The model is evaluated on its theoretical and practical applications. 
The empirical micro-economic model presented in this thesis is a flexible tool to show 
short-term behaviour of individual Dutch dairy farms in response to policy changes. The 
approach of combining historical information on production technology and production 
behaviour with information on future or new policy measures is suitable for analysing 
policy effects at the farm level. 
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SAMENV ATTING 
De zuivelsector wordt in hoge mate beihvloed en beteugeld door het landbouw- en 
milieubeleid. Dit beleid is vaak tot in detail uitgewerkt en gericht op het bedrijfsniveau. 
Dat wil zeggen dat beleidsmaatregelen, zoals belastingen en inkomenssteun, vaak 
gebaseerd zijn op lokale bedrijfsomstandigheden en afhankelijk zijn van het 
bedrijfsmanagement. Melkveehouders hebben doorlopend te maken met kleine en grote 
beleidsveranderingen, welke bedrijfsspecifieke onzekerheden en aanpassingen in de 
bedrijfsvoering met zieh meebrengen. Dit proefschrift heeft tot doel de effecten van 
speeifieke beleidsmaatregelen op produktiebeslissingen en winsten van individuele 
Nederlandse melkveehouders te kwantificeren. De individuele reactie van melkveehouders 
op beleidsveranderingen Staat hier dus centraal. 
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een beschrijving van enkele relevante vormen van beleid 
waarmee melkveehouders te maken hebben. Het hoofdstuk geeft achtergrondinformatie en 
bakent de onderzoeksvragen voor dit proefschrift af. Onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen 
het beleid dat door de Europese Unie (EU) wordt opgelegd, zoals het gemeenschappelijk 
landbouwbeleid met betrekking tot zuivelprodukten en het melkquotum systeem, en 
typisch Nederlands beleid, zoals de quotumhandel en het mestbeleid. Op deze terreinen 
worden beleidsveranderingen verwacht of zijn zij recentelijk doorgevoerd. 
Produktiebeperkingen binnen het melkquotum systeem, in combinatie met 
prijssteun en beschermende maatregelen aan de grens, speien een centrale rol in het 
zuivelbeleid. De EU wil het zuivelbeleid echter wijzigen. Aiternatieven voor het EU 
zuivelbeleid die in dit proefschrift worden uitgewerkt zijn een tweeprijzen systeem, 
afschaffing van de quota en de Agenda 2000 hervormingen waarin verruiming van het 
quotum wordt gecombineerd met prijsdalingen en compensatiebetalingen. Binnen het 
melkquotum systeem zijn de quotummobiliteit en de organisatie van de quotum handel 
constante onderwerpen van discussie. In Nederland bestaat een redelijk vrije handel in 
melk quota. De efficiency van quotumhandel en de effecten van belemmeringen in de 
quotummarkt worden in dit proefschrift geanalyseerd. Daarnaast is de recentelijk 
ingevoerde heffmg op het fosfaat en nitraat overschot van belang voor de melkveehouderij. 
De effecten van een fosfaat overschotheffing, in combinatie met de vraag naar 
landbouwgrond, worden tevens onderzocht in dit proefschrift. 
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Om de effecten van beleidsveranderingen te bepalen, wordt een empirisch model 
van het produktiegedrag van melkveehouders ontwikkeld en toegepast. Er wordt 
verondersteld dat melkveehouders verschillend reageren op beleidsveranderingen, met 
name omdat beleidsmaatregelen gebaseerd zijn op bedrijfsspecifieke omstandigheden. Een 
micro-economische aanpak wordt daarom gebruikt. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt het micro-
economisch model voor de analyse van het produktiegedrag van melkveehouders, die te 
maken hebben met een melkquotum, ontwikkeld. Overwegingen en keuzen ten aanzien 
van het model worden verklaard en enkele alternatieve modelspecificaties en schattingen 
worden besproken. Verder worden de gebruikte data en schattingsresultaten besproken. 
De centrale theoretische veronderstelling is dat melkveehouders hun korte termijn 
winsten maximaliseren, gegeven een aantal technische en markt restricties. Berekende 
beleidseffecten op bedrijfsniveau worden geaggregeerd naar sectorniveau. De gebruikte 
panel dataset van het LEI-DLO biedt de mogelijkheid om het gedrag van melkveehouders 
op micro niveau te analyseren en vervolgens te aggregeren, en om de theoretische 
veronderstellingen te checken. In dit proefschrift wordt de duale benadering gehanteerd 
waarbij voor de winstfunctie een flexibele functievorm wordt gebruikt. Vraag- en 
aanbodvergelijkingen worden van de winstfunctie afgeleid. Een zogenaamd 'fixed effects' 
model wordt toegepast: voor alle bedrijven wordt dezelfde functievorm verondersteld, de 
constante varieert echter over de bedrijven. De analyse is sterk empirisch georienteerd, dat 
houdt in dat technische details van beleidsveranderingen expliciet worden meegenomen in 
het model. Het model is geschat met behulp van gegevens van 1961 verschillende 
melkveehouderij bedrijven over de periode 1973/74 tot en met 1992/93. 
Het empirisch model bestaat uit een systeem van simultane vergelijkingen, waarin, 
door middel van een verschil in het aantal observaties over de vergelijkingen, rekening 
wordt gehouden met de introductie van melkquota in 1984. De structuur van het model is 
zo eenvoudig mogelijk gehouden, omdat schatting van het model met behulp van de 
'incomplete' panel dataset al gecompliceerd is. De genormaliseerde kwadratische (NQ) 
functievorm zou daarom te verkiezen zijn boven de symmetrisch genormaliseerde 
kwadratische (SNQ) vorm. De simulatie effecten met de NQ zijn echter sterk afhankelijk 
van de gekozen numeraire. Alle veranderingen ten gevolge van de simulatie worden 
volledig geabsorbeerd door de numeraire. Daarom wordt in dit proefschrift de SNQ 
gebruikt. 
158 
In hoofdstuk 3 worden twee alternatieve schattingsprocedures vergeleken met het 
basismodel dat verder in dit proefschrift wordt gebruikt. De gebruikte data is geselecteerd 
uit een gestratificeerde steekproef van bedrijven, welke het mogelijk maakt een gewogen 
schatting uit te voeren. De schattingsresultaten van de gewogen schatting verschillen echter 
niet veel van die van de ongewogen schatting. Verder onderzoek is nodig om de 
verschillen tussen gewogen en ongewogen schatting te testen. Schatting van het 
basismodel in dit proefschrift houdt geen rekening met weging. Wegingsfactoren worden 
alleen gebruikt om gemiddelden en totalen te berekenen en te rapporteren. 
De beschikbare panel dataset maakt het ook mogelijk om 'fixed effects' en 'random 
effects' schatters te hanteren. In dit proefschrift wordt het 'fixed effects' model gebruikt 
omdat het model vooral wordt gebruikt om conclusies ten aanzien het gedrag van 
individuele melkveehouders in de steekproef te trekken. Een gecompliceerder systeem 
waarin extra 'fixed effects' aan de aanbodfunctie van melk worden toegevoegd is ook 
geschat. Deze effecten konden echter alleen worden bepaald voor de période tot 1984 
(voor de invoering van melkquota), terwijl het model verder gebruikt wordt om gedrag te 
simuleren in de na-quotum période (het meest récente jaar, 1992/93, is het basisjaar). 
De efficiency van de handel in melkquotum en de resulterende quotumprijzen zijn 
de onderwerpen in hoofdstuk 4. Hoewel er in Nederland een vrij liberale quotumhandel is, 
bestaan er nog steeds enige belemmeringen in de markt die tot efficiencyverliezen voor 
melkveehouders kunnen leiden. Deze belemmeringen zijn enerzijds het gevolg van 
regelgeving, die bepaalt dat de hoeveelheid quotum die mag worden verhandeld is 
begrensd. Anderzijds zijn er kosten gerelateerd aan quotumhandel, zoals kosten van een 
tussenpersoon of notaris. Beide vormen van handelsbelemmeringen worden gesimuleerd 
en vergeleken met een volledige vrije quotumhandel. 
Volledig vrije handel in melkquotum resulteert voor het gemiddelde bedrijf in het 
model tot een winststijging van 9 procent ten opzichte van de basissituatie. De 
handelsstroom van quotum loopt van bedrijven in de Westelijke weidegebieden naar 
bedrijven in de zandgebieden en Noordelijke klei- en veenweidegebieden. De berekende 
quotumprijs is 39 cent per kg. Effecten van kosten van quotumhandel, in de vorm van een 
marge van twee procent tussen de prijs waartegen quotum ge- en verkocht wordt, zijn 
klein. Fysieke grenzen in de quotumhandel (aanbod van minimaal tienduizend kg en vraag 
van maximaal vijfenzeventigduizend kg per transactie) resulteren in kleinere 
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winststijgingen en bedrijven in de Noordelijke klei- en veenweidegebieden worden 
gemiddeld netto verkopers van melkquotum. De berekende quotumprijs is 33 cent per kg. 
Er kunnen dus efficiencyvoordelen behaald worden door restricties in de quoturnhandel te 
vermijden. De handelsrestricties beschermen kleine melkveehouderij bedrijven echter ten 
opzichte van grote bedrijven, omdat kleine bedrijven meer profiteren van quoturnhandel. 
In hoofdstuk 5 worden alternatieven voor het huidige EU zuivelbeleid geevalueerd. 
Het theoretisch model is uitgebreid zodat een tweeprijzen systeem kan worden 
geanalyseerd. In een tweeprijzen systeem wordt A-melk geproduceerd tegen een 
gegarandeerde prijs, daarnaast kan B-melk geproduceerd worden tegen de lagere prijs op 
de wereldmarkt. Bovendien wordt rekening gehouden met handel in melkquota binnen een 
tweeprijzen systeem. Daarna volgt een simulatie van het afschaffen van quota en van de 
overeengekomen prijsdalingen en quotaverruiming in Agenda 2000. 
In een tweeprijzen systeem met vrije quoturnhandel zal B-melk worden 
geproduceerd als de prijs op de wereldmarkt hoger is dan de gemiddelde marginale kosten 
om A-melk te produceren (31 cent per kg). In dat geval zullen winsten stijgen. Het huidige 
niveau van melkproduktie zal gehandhaafd blijven als de wereldmarktprijs 31 cent per kg 
is. Bij hogere prijzen op de wereldmarkt zal de quotumprijs in een tweeprijzen systeem 
lager zijn dan de huidige quotumprijs, omdat de meest efßciehte bedrijven B-melk zullen 
gaan produceren in plaats van A-quotum te kopen. Bovendien zal er minder quoturnhandel 
plaatsvinden. 
Een melkprijsdaling van 15 procent gecombineerd met een quotumverruiming van 
1,5 procent, als gevolg van de Agenda 2000 hervormingen, leiden tot een gemiddelde 
winstdaling van 17 procent. De voorgestelde inkomenstoeslag van 55 gülden per duizend 
kg melkquotum dekt maar 52 procent van deze winstdaling. De teruggang in de winst is 
vooral het gevolg van de gedaalde melkprijzen. Vanwege de quotumverruiming stijgt de 
vraag naar variabele inputs terwijl het aanbod van overige Outputs daalt. Als de melkquota 
zouden worden afgeschaft en de prijs van melk is hoger dan de huidige gemiddelde 
marginale kosten, dan stijgt de produktie van melk. Winsten zullen echter dalen zodat er 
een vraag naar inkomenscompensatie ontstaat. Bij een wereldmarktprijs van 60 cent per kg 
melk is de noodzakelijke compensatie in het geval van afschaffing van quota kleiner dan in 
de Agenda 2000 simulatie, terwijl de melkproduktie hoger is. 
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Nadelen van Agenda 2000 zijn stijgende budgetkosten, het niet kunnen voldoen aan 
de afspraken binnen de wereld handelsorganisatie (WHO) en negatieve inkomensgevolgen 
voor de Nederlandse melkveebedrijven. In een tweeprijzen systeem is het inkomen van de 
boer gegarandeerd, bovendien biedt het de boeren enige flexibiliteit (waarbij deels wordt 
voldaan aan de WHO afspraken). Het beslag dat een tweeprijzen systeem legt op het 
overheidsbudget is waarschijnlijk lager omdat prijssteun, export subsidies en 
inkomenscompensaties lager zijn. Afschaffing van het quotum systeem is minder 
aantrekkelijk voor Nederlandse melkveehouders vanwege de verwachte inkomensdaling, 
hoewel deze sterk afhankelijk is van de prijzen op de wereldmarkt. Het geeft boeren echter 
wel meer produktievrijheid. Vanwege grotere milieuproblemen en een verzwakking van de 
fmanciële positie van melkveehouders kiest de Nederlandse overheid waarschijnlijk niet 
voor afschaffing van het melkquotum systeem. 
Hoofdstuk 6 rieht zieh op de vraag naar landbouwgrond en de invoering van een 
heffing op fosfaat overschot. Het model is aangepast zodat een imperfecte markt in grond 
kan worden gesimuleerd. Bovendien worden fosfaatoverschothefßngen per bedrijf 
berekend en aan het model toegevoegd, zodanig dat de te betalen heffing afhankelijk is van 
de hoeveelheid grond en de veestapel op het bedrijf. De berekende evenwichtsprijs voor 
grond, bij een volledig inelastisch (exogeen) aanbod van twintigduizend hectare en 
ongerestricteerde vraag naar grond door melkveehouders, is hoger dan de evenwichtsprijs 
in het geval van gerestricteerde vraag. Restricties in de grondmarkt worden onder andere 
veroorzaakt door een verschil in locatie van de gevraagde en aangeboden grond. 
De fosfaatoverschotheffing is een effectief instrument om mestoverschotten in de 
melkveehouderij te reduceren. In het model voeren melkveehouders hun koeien versneld 
af, zodat ze geen fosfaatheffing hoeven te betalen. In werkelijkheid is het echter 
onwaarschijnlijk dat de veestapel met 25 procent wordt ingekrompen terwijl de 
melkproduktie op peil blijft. Boeren zullen hun mest (fosfaat) van hun bedrijf afvoeren en 
het fosfaatgehalte in het veevoer reduceren. Met deze mogelijkheden is geen rekening 
gehouden in het model. 
De mogelijkheid om naast het afvoeren van koeien extra grond te kopen om het 
fosfaatoverschot te reduceren heeft maar weinig effect. Door de aankoop van grond kan het 
gemiddelde bedrijf echter wel het kleine negatieve effect dat de fosfaatheffing heeft op de 
winst compenseren. De vraag naar grond stijgt door invoering van de overschotheffing. De 
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evenwichtsprijs voor grond is daarom hoger dan in de situatie waarin geen 
overschotheffing wordt toegepast. 
In hoofdstuk 7 worden de verschallende beleidssimulaties en nun effecten voor de 
melkveehouderij nogmaals besproken. Het gebruikte model wordt geevalueerd op zijn 
theoretische en praktische toepassingen. Het empirische micro-model dat in dit proefschrift 
wordt gepresenteerd is een flexibel instrument om körte termijn gedrag van individuele 
Nederlandse melkveehouders in reactie op beleidsveranderingen te tonen. Het 
gecombineerde gebruik van historische gegevens met betrekking tot produktietechnologie 
en -gedrag en van gegevens over toekomstig of nieuw beleid is geschürt om 
beleidseffecten op bedrijfs- en sectorniveau te analyseren. 
162 
CURRICULUM VII AK 
Maria Geertruida (Maroeska) Boots werd op 21 augustus 1969 geboren te Ursem, 
gemeente Wester-Koggenland. In juni 1987 behaalde zij haar VWO diploma aan het Han 
Fortmanncollege te Heerhugowaard. In 1987 begon zij met de Studie Agrarische Economie 
aan de Landbouwuniversiteit Wageningen, waarvan zij in augustus 1993 het diploma in 
ontvangst mocht nemen. 
In januari 1994 begon Maroeska als Assistent in Opleiding (AIO) met haar 
promotieonderzoek bij de toenmalige vakgroep Algemene Agrarische Economie, 
Landbouwuniversiteit Wageningen. Gedurende haar AJO-schap tot januari 1998, heeft zij 
het diploma van het landelijk Netwerk Algemene en Kwantitatieve Economie (NAKE) 
behaald. 
Sinds augustus 1998 werkt Maroeska als wetenschappelijk medewerker bij de unit 
Beleidsstudies van het Energieonderzoek Centrum Nederland (ECN) te Petten. Haar werk 
is vooral gericht op de liberalisering van de elektriciteits- en aardgasmarkten in Europa. 
163 

